Zitat:According to a 2020 report by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the greatest threats to national security are no longer nuclear war or conventional warfare. Instead, cyber warfare, terrorism, foreign influence activities, international cartels, illegal immigration, and natural disasters are the main threats.

By 2050, the growth of distributed systems, quantum computing, 3D printing, cryptocurrencies, biotechnology, and climate change is expected to cause an even more drastic shift. For one, some have argued that the power of nation-states is expected to decline considerably and to give way to autonomous regions, megacities, and private interests.

Simultaneously, technologies like CRISPR gene editing, desktop bioprinters, genetic databases, and AI software will create new opportunities for bioterrorism. With the right training, equipment, and supplies, a larger number of threat actors will be capable of engineering viral bodies or toxins in a lab. As a result, the opportunities for conflict, and the range of protagonists will multiply considerably.

Because of these emerging changes, it is difficult to predict what the battlefields of the future will look like. However, examining emerging technologies and changing dynamics does allow for some tentative conclusions and generalizations to be made.

Among them, the future of warfare is likely to come down to a handful of major factors: new technologies, new threats, the obsolescence of heavy armor, and the replacement of humans by drones, robots, and potentially cyborgs.

Zitat:Fight and Win in Contested Multi-Domain Operations

Nick Chadwick

The instant reach-back capabilities to the Joint Intel Cloud provided millions of specialized AI models. Everyone worried about the “armchair quarterbacks” back in the U.S., but the overwatch, especially machine vision augmented reality improvements, added levels of focus and awareness in real time. Back on March 17, 2030, Donovia flexed its military muscles and invaded Osto, rushing into its neighbor and taking control of the vast robotic manufacturing automation district surrounding Soto, the megacity capital of Osto. The Pentagon think tanks predicted this a decade ago but couldn’t get the timeline down to create a sense of urgency for Congress to act. It was another example of the slow-rolling strategy that gets by our ability to cut it off early.

The mission became rescuing our ally Otso from the influence and control of Donovia, which was seeking to control global supply lines of lithium and cobalt refinement and manufacturing. The strategic importance of Otso was obvious to the United States’ ability to power its economy. The risk of not engaging Donovia’s aggression was an economic setback estimated at half a decade; this was unacceptable now that we were in a mobile capable quantum computing age and our transportation industry relies on lithium and cobalt for high-capacity batteries.

We were six months into the deployment when Army Futures sent out some microchip-LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) helmets weeks after field tests. These gave each warfighter a 360-degree machine vision advantage, not only giving everyone “eyes in the back of our heads,” but also indicators when weapons or bombs were identified within view. We all thought it would take years to get them fielded; thank God someone had the guts to write the check and get us the gear. About 10% didn’t work correctly due to rushed production, but the ones that did work gave us a huge edge in the fight.

The built-in brain wave sensors baselined each wearer within 10 minutes and synced with our wearables and implants. The old-timer millennials called this “autotuning,” and we couldn’t help laughing at their old-school humor. Before these helmets, we had sensory overload and couldn’t focus amid the chaos. More than a few times, Donovia used focused-energy weapons to disorient us, but after the new helmets arrived, we didn’t even notice the difference. Those that chose to ride cowboy, without their helmets, had to take a knee and rest for a few days. Active noise canceling was something we had 30 years ago, but these headsets could read our brain waves and, in a microsecond, offset the frequencies coming from energy pulses.

Donovia was well prepared and anticipated our ramp-up, especially when our expeditionary units didn’t enforce OPSEC, or Operations Security, on social media. The warfighters got the brief and cut ties with Facebook and LinkedIn, but the spouses and kids made it obvious with their post about going-away parties and missing someone soon. Donovia knew well the standard U.S. “shock and awe” bombing campaign on its supply lines and outposts. They set up outposts manned with older-model robotics moving supplies around and setting up autonomous resupply routes to draw our attention.

The Donovia Special Ops forces came months before the invasion, removed their uniforms and assimilated into the Otso megacity of Soto. They understood that the United States would have problems identifying them as enemy combatants. If Donovia Special Forces were cut down by the U.S., they appeared to be innocent civilians, which Donovia used as further propaganda against the U.S. Donovia fighters could be identified only by their augmented-reality visors, which looked like thick black frames, and control rings they use to see each overlay of the environment, including each other. They commandeered the subways and conducted major operations only in underground spaces. The Donovia Special Forces never left a footprint and used mobile adhoc outposts in civilian spaces to remain covert, even setup holographic distractions to draw attention away from their true actions.

They knew if they could keep the city occupied and functioning, they could obscure their connections to it. They controlled the bridges, and food and ammo were brought in by underground tunnels and northern supply lines. They were regularly reinforced with combat robots that enabled them to remotely control vulnerable locations. Robots don’t need an air supply, and are impervious to chemical and bioweapons, which means our asymmetric tactics didn’t affect their operations. Soto was a smart megacity with over 18 million residents, and Donovia hooked into every network and controlled the city. If Donovia could control Soto, it knew that Otso was theirs.

Skirmishes and major battles happened south and east of the city, with heavy losses on both sides. Air battles ensued, but not with jets and massive bombing campaigns. The air was dominated by thick clouds of drones. Any jet that tried attacking them would end up severely damaged. The old-timers said it reminded them of an old movie called “Birds” and made us watch it. If Donovia couldn’t control the birds to attack us, it could mass manufacture drones, which wasn’t much different. Dogfights rarely occurred, because Donovia didn’t want to commit heavy platforms for its proxy wars.

Bombers could drop precision bombs on open targets, but couldn’t risk hitting most of Soto, fearing thousands of civilians could be killed by extreme collateral damage. Neither side wanted a repeat of the first 12 months: 20,000 lost lives between the Donovia and the United States. Otso didn’t have much of a standing Army resistance, since Donovia controlled the generals and officers through corrosion and payoffs. Patriotism in Otso had dwindled after years of political dissidence and strife.

Many in the Otso media claim nationalism was dangerous and would strike at one political side based on facts and data they obtained from “reliable sources.” Both Donovia and the United States were testing their military’s discipline and new tech, unsure of the results. Otso has more than 70% of its population in mega cities, nearly 50% in Soto alone. Therefore, control of Otso rested in the control of its megacity capital of Soto.

The United States could do little to destroy targets in the subways using aerial bombing without killing tens of thousands of civilians. The dense urban fabric of Soto meant any bombing would result in heavy civilian casualties. When assault and explosive drones were deployed by the U.S., there was a backlash of negative political sentiment from allies and major violent protests broke out worldwide. Videos of drones that were shot down or disabled by Donovia showed the U.S. drones exploding, killing innocent Soto civilians. Some drones hit the mark, but the public backlash diminished Otso war support for kinetic ground operations. Most Otso citizens were appeased by Donovia’s military rulers since they did little to disrupt their lives.

The U.S. was being painted as war-hungry, and every disruption to Otso citizens’ ultra-connected lives only served to radicalize the youth who joined drone, hacker, and extremist groups. Those 13 to 29 years old didn’t have much connection to the physical world or relationships that might shame them if they joined extremist groups. Most of them were addicted to virtual reality, massive multiplier online worlds, robots, and AI companions. The ruling class was older than 60 and didn’t understand the motivations of these young men, motivated only by keeping the status quo. The Otso women tended to stay out of these groups, but some did join and were the eager to prove their mettle, making the most violent contributions against U.S. involvement. Donovia has removed Otso’s government leaders but had well-placed civil replacements from Otso loyal who were to Donovia.

Donovia appointed former provincial governors who had taken bribes over the years. Donovia had politically damaging information on the former governors and threatened them not only with mass shame and ostracization, but execution of their entire extended families. The Otso people recognized these leaders and there was little dissidence about the power shift, especially when Donovia used coordinated psychological messaging across media platforms. Donovia has been sewing mistrust for Otso and Soto officials for years and portraying political factions and social groups against each other as adversaries. This was not like Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan, where weak military leaders rotated often. This was planned for decades, starting around 2008 when worldwide data hacks, botnets, and social media marketers collected every detail on every person. The Donovia propaganda division seemed to know more about each person than they knew about themselves.

Donovia didn’t need to hold massive tracks of land or hills when it owned the majority of the population’s attention through rerouting internet sites and searches, and used social media campaigns to bolster support of Donovia’s agenda. They propagandized the U.S. as the aggressor and oppressor of Otso. Donovia would message that its forces were there to save Otso from civil war and assist with building a stronger, more unified region. Donovia persistently used AI on Otso social media and search engines to determine the population sentiment. They measured their efforts based on Otso’s social discussions and of the general population using data science models and machine learning bots. Donovia would stay ahead of dissidence by effectively measuring the mood and collective emotion of the citizens of Soto and Otso.

It used facial recognition and wireless carriers to track movement of Soto’s citizens to identify irregular behavior. Donovia monitored every cell tower and data-mined to discover and tear out opposition groups. The Nazis did this back in the 1930s and 1940s, but Donovia could almost read the population’s minds using predictive policing. The U.S. measure of victory and progress had to be modified to Influence Operations. The U.S. had used very tightly controlled micro drone swarms to send messages in the sky at night to still-loyal Soto residents, enabling the U.S. to clear the streets for days while armored divisions rolled in and dug a foothold in the lesser-occupied warehouse district. This gave the U.S. the ability to control part of the supply lines and choose its place of battle.

From there, the U.S. forces could access Soto’s smart-city system, and cyber operators launched tools to disable cameras and sensors throughout the city. Taking this advantage away from Donovia gave the U.S. an opportunity to infiltrate the subway systems with autonomous hounds and explosive drones. This began the long journey of clearing over 100 miles of heavily protected subway and supply tunnels. Most of the underground outposts discovered were completely autonomous, except for one communications expert who kept the meshed fog nodes up and ensured the robotics were maintained. The communications experts were of no value anyway, as they were basic recruits trained in data science and systems design. They were never brought into the military decision or strategy meetings.

Half the city fled when fighting began, creating massive tent cities and a humanitarian crisis for millions of civilians. Donovia biological and electronic warfare units attacked fleeing refugees and humanitarian workers in these camps using modified superbugs and directed energy, causing confusion and hysteria. Donovia was suspected of these refugee attacks, but never admitted to them. The attacks resulted in millions of civilian refugee deaths, and significant focus and effort on the attacks diverted attention from the main conflict in Soto. Donovia used this as additional reason for Soto residents to remain in the city, repeatedly telling them, “Your best interest and desires are here in the city; only death awaits you in fleeing to the aggressors.”

The U.S. used tech developed by FEMA and lessons learned in Africa combating Ebola. FEMA had pod dwellings created by pre-fabricated components built to stack, connect, and seal. These were rapidly scaled and erected into massive interconnected hallways, commons, and isolation chambers. Body heat thermal sensors were installed to read signatures of the population, and those with high temperatures and persistent coughs were immediately quarantined.

By late 2032, the major kinetic ground operations ended with Donovia’s Army and Drone forces. A steady stream of refugees left Soto to flee war, mostly the poor and already disadvantaged. The refugees are usually happy to see the U.S., where they expect to get full refugee status. Donovia has reinforced this message to generate an overwhelming refugee crisis and make the ruling and middle class more content. Once the Soto refugees discovered they will not get a fully paid trip to the “land of opportunity,” further turmoil and riots started in the camps.

When the rest of Otso was secured from the ground, Donovia relentlessly attacked U.S. Navy navigational and GPS grids. The fact is, Donovia has used the entire invasion as a massive diversion while launching coordinated cyber and space assaults. Its main goal was to set back the U.S. economy, knowing that all-out war was a “no win” for both sides, but it knew how to draw the U.S. in and generate unrest within our political parties. Unlike other major conflicts, this war has no end and started long before Donovia invaded Otso.

Leaders knew this was going to be a stalemate, since cobalt and lithium supply chains would be destroyed for the U.S., limiting new tech replacement timelines and setting back our research, innovation, and adoption cycles. Donovia wanted to be the No. 1 world power, and control or at least disruption of these resources would give Donovia an edge. The U.S. has had the superior military for a century, but Donovia was showing it had other methods.

The War Department ran out of rechargeable power cells for the millions of small drones, sensors, autonomous vehicles, eMobility conveyances, and Internet-of-Things devices shortly after the first anniversary of the war on March 17, 2031. Back in the United States, the electronic vehicle and eMobility industry were shuttered while the War Department nationalized remaining cobalt and lithium supplies and mines. The War Department had to work with the Ad Counsel on communicating this with the U.S. public. Rationing of lithium batteries severely damaged support for the Otso war efforts back home. The U.S. public has been addicted to high-capacity batteries for smart devices and electronics for a decade.

Most can hardly remember a time before this war when they had to wait for new technology devices and mobility upgrades. The American people are now impatient when it comes to technology and getting new tech. The U.S. people only knew the war from the internet and social media news they consumed, and Donovia was tainting the message and spreading misinformation. Donovia produced videos and other multimedia that appear real, what the government referred to as “deep fakes.” Donovia would post them as if they were from the major media, internet, and social media outlets. The news and social media sites unified and sponsored a bill to create a blockchain-based chain-of-trust that would verify that the video or story came from them officially. They used the blockchain-based Ethereum smart contracts and digital signatures that generated new application and browser requirements.

Congress passed the bill unanimously, the first time since the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack that Congress voted in unison on anything involving warfare. Many are now pushing to make official U.S. elections at all levels using blockchain based voting system with a single source of truth. Magnesium rechargeable substitutes were soon used back home, but it didn’t help much as the U.S. public’s patience for the kinetic war to be over was gone. New equipment was eventually modified to accept common consumable lithium batteries they had in stockpile until the supplies and manufacturing were restored and other alternative additives were developed.

On the battlefield, the U.S. used 3-D and 4-D printing machines in its field-deployable mixed-use Fabrication Laboratories, or “Fab Labs,” to print new external battery cases and soldered connection to the circuit boards. 4-D printing, watching those carbon nano-tubules, or as we called them, “bucky balls,” was amazing. When heated, they would bend into new shapes after printing and, after they cooled, attempt to return to their printed form. This was extremely helpful in creating mechanical and miniature fasteners that would be printed a bit smaller than needed. High heat would then be used to grow them around the join.

We could apply the fastener to join separately printed components, and then 4-D-printed fasteners would shrink to create natural tension. The resulting tight seals made our printed devices, machines, and replacement components resistant to vibration. We had the Fab Labs reinforced with lead and lined with copper to shield our electronic signatures and protect our gear from energy-pulse weapons. It’s literally the only “safe place,” and we aptly named it “The Bunker.” It had drone-defeat turrets and active-passive Radio Frequency jamming. These became targets when we used active jamming, so we had to be smart with our digital footprint since Donovia used millions of roving microdrones that were deployed by larger drone platforms to sweep large areas for radio spectrum daily.

They used machine vision and geospatial machine learning methods to detect our movements and activities. One major benefit was that our Bunker was actually deployed into a crater that our bombers created. Once the Air Force dropped the controlled-depth bombs to create the crater, it also dropped the Bunkers into them. The Bunkers then deployed small drone tractors about the size of riding mowers to fill in and reinforce the sides. They were deep enough that 3 feet of dirt and foliage matching the terrain were moved on top of them to obfuscate and camouflage them completely. Donovia didn’t even know the Bunkers were there when its troops walked and drove right over them.

The Air Force was able to deploy the Bunkers ahead of the supply lines and enabled early entry ahead of ground supply lines. By the time we occupied the Bunker a few hours later, it had already auto-deployed the stealth beacon, deployed pebble-like perimeter sensors, and charged the internal batteries. The genius of the power system was that instead of worrying about a fuel plan for petroleum-based generators, the Bunker used a folding solar array that looked like a huge sunflower, which followed the movement of the sun and folded away completely.

This made our logistics planning much simpler, rapid, and scalable. These sunflower panels were mobile and could be moved around easily with either a few people and a dolly, or using the small tractor in the Bunker.
A few times, the Bunker was discovered by Donovia’s drones, but thankfully, it was a shell inside a shell, which helped to move it to a new Bunker shell within a couple of hours using mega-drone airlifts. We left the outer shell in place as a honeypot to Donovia that attracted attention away from our new position by sending out random active jamming sequences, and the small tractors would make it appear that we were still there. The shell within a shell also created a sealed airgap that helped insulate it from radiologic, chemical, biological, and energy weapons.

The command post tents of past wars were deployed at first, but proved too slow to deploy and provided no physical protection for a sitting unit. The only units still using them were the hospitals, due to the massive influx of refugees, but this made the hospitals unwilling combatants and easy targets of opportunity. Most of us chose to use the remote doctors. Most of us never met our doctors, and they could have been anywhere in the world. Those doctors used remote telemedicine diagnosis and autonomous delivery drones for medicine drops. When there was non-life-threatening surgery, they used robotic arms and tools for sanitization, surgery, and stitches. The doctors could verify there were no foreign objects using Nano mites we poured onto our own wounds. Any foreign object or particle not made of cell-based proteins would cause them to luminate on the mini-fMRI scanners and appeared green to the naked eye. This made projectile and shrapnel injuries from blasts or microdrones easier to repair in the field.

After repairing organs and skin, we were given stem-cell-based CRISPR-Cas9 protein injections around the site and poured some of the solution over the wound. This reduced the time for full recovery from non-bone and non-joint injuries to less than two weeks. Doctors also sent in blood that was drawn from new recruits who “donated” it a few weeks after Basic Training. If they were 17 to 25 years old, they got an extra 4-day weekend every 90 days to donate a pint. Athletes knew about “blood doping” for decades. The medical community discovered in the early 2020s that something different in the blood of the youth made healing much faster, especially when it came from physically fit, well-rested recruits. The Japanese knew about this well before the U.S. did, but we all just thought they were nuts back then.

The Bunker was one of a couple of hundred of these Fab Labs also used as “cloudlets” where new AI and ML algorithms are sent in from the AI Centers of Excellence spread across the Intel and Defense agencies from the Department’s Joint Intel Cloud. They call these new AI algorithms “explainable” since data provenance is so important now. Donovia had been polluting our data sensors and intelligence sources, has known about our tech for years and has the same, but it has been focusing on non-kinetic Information operations, cyber, and space.

This war with Donovia has affected everyone worldwide. There were no near, deep, and reserve elements like in previous air-land battle campaigns. Everywhere can be a battlefield with space and cyber domains, which has made our Reserve and Guard elements extremely important, especially with cyber, medical, logistics, PSYOP, and space. The United States population has experienced many disruptions to daily life. Massive botnets in the millions that came from imported, insecure embedded hardware and software manufactured in Donovia and Otso have been causing unpredictable power and internet blackouts inside houses, autos, and personal area networks. Citizens have delays and difficulty accessing payment and bank information, getting directions without paper maps, or monitoring health care devices. Few networks are unaffected, except those that employed Zero-trust security models and embedded Trusted Platform Modules.

Previous worries over the past 20 years were of a cyber “Armageddon,” but none occurred on an existential level. Most simply live their lives in a daily battlefield, ignorant to the cyber, influence, and space wars; accepting the disruptions like Great Britain’s citizens accepted the bombings that Nazis poured over their lives during WWII. Our leaders know there is no end to this war and tell us to remain resilient. Our only saving grace from constant disruption is Quantum computers reaching a factor of 20 quants, making autonomous cyber patching at the code level a reality. We have seen a slowdown in frequency of attacks since the 2035 referendum allowing AI to integrate into our trusted networks and personal devices. This enabled minimizing blast radius down to the individual as a result; only those who opted out of AI became disconnected from society. The mobile quantum devices are now at 4 quants and give us enough power to use our universal translators and control our mini-drone swarms that protect us from the larger drones by piercing their blades and providing smoke-like concealment for movements.

Looking forward from 2035 into the next 15 years, our future seems more certain, as we have the capability for fully autonomous robotics and general AI. These technologies reduce the need for a large standing Army; instead, they favor highly skilled small teams working along with autonomous systems. Our new threat is the lack of engaged citizens across the globe with their governments and those who are not working. The number of disenfranchised citizens is growing, because the number of jobs is decreasing, and they require increased expertise and long apprenticeships to enter the field.

The high automation leaves humans competing with intelligent machines, even with skills taught through virtual and augmented reality. Massive demonstrations and civil unrest against the rich companies and governments aiming to control them is expected to escalate. These citizens feel left behind in the global society and the benefits realized by automation and AI. Most believe the U.S. Congress must call for a robotics & automation tax, but will likely struggle to agree on the rate and economic disruptions it may cause. Most world leaders agree augmentation over AI is best, but without economic incentives or penalties, the broad market seems to always choose the path to highest profit. This new cognitive and influence battlefield will emerge worldwide. Those citizens who feel purposeless will generate the most agitation and aggression. Many will relentlessly experiment with unsanctioned biomodifications, leading to highly unstable genetic variations that persist through generations.

The biggest threat to the world order is the idle hands of large, disengaged populations who witnessed automation take away their opportunities and jobs. The youth try to find any avenue toward upward mobility, but without the right connections, they struggle to find their path. The future wars of 2050 and beyond are likely to be between the part of humanity who believe they are missing out and the wealthy class who believe they no longer require as much human labor for production. Many are eager to change this outcome and are working with local, regional, state, and national governments to develop new works programs that keep every citizen engaged in society. The balance is between not only the have and have-not, but also the engaged and disengaged.

Zitat:Conclusion

THE CORPS ECHELON is likely to be the keystone in future operations between the operational and tactical level of war. This is because tactically relevant effects can now be applied throughout the operational depth of a force, and because MDO require a level of command that would cognitively overload or dangerously bloat divisional headquarters. Moreover, as informational and political factors have an increased shaping effect on tactical activity, these elements must be managed as part of the tactical level, while necessitating senior officers to provide an appropriate interface with civilian counterparts. Higher echelon headquarters are required to ensure an appropriate span of responsibility and not just the span of control of subordinate formations.However, the nature of corps-level warfighting has evolved from the Cold War. The corps is no longer just a command function but a critical warfighting echelon engaged in its own fight. If that fight is under resourced, subordinate echelons will find themselves either running low on supplies or facing adversaries that have not been subjected to shaping, and therefore be at a disadvantage.

This shaping activity is not just critical in warfighting but central to deterrence and to the period of prolonged competition preceding and following combat operations. It is also increasingly necessary in low-intensity expeditionary operations, especially as long-range precision fires and strategic anti-aircraft systems proliferate among sub-peer adversaries.93During the unipolar post-Cold War era, NATO corps headquarters have multiplied, but the corps echelon has been inadequately resourced and insufficiently exercised. Today, states maintain corps headquarters while having insufficient enablers to support divisional operations, which leaves corps to draw on the often inappropriate and incompatible remnants of national capability. The corps level of command has been left to political jockeying and turn-taking at the expense of military effectiveness. With the return of great power competition and a renewed threat from Russia, the lack of a resourced corps echelon in NATO threatens to undermine the Alliance’s central mission of deterrence.

The Future of the NATO CorpsTo conduct its shaping, C2, force protection, sustainment and fighting responsibilities, a credible corps echelon needs more than just a headquarters. Its organic assets should include:

• A signals brigade.
• A fires command, capable of controlling multiple brigades with organic target acquisition radar systems.
• Electronic warfare-, information operations-, psychological operations- and cyber-capable companies.
• An aviation brigade.
• A reconnaissance brigade.
• A military intelligence brigade, including:ÊAn ISR battalion equipped with multi-role long-range unmanned aerial systems and manned and/or unmanned ground surveillance assets.
• A logistics command able to control and support multiple logistics brigades, including:ÊA medical brigade.
• A chemical defence brigade.
• A combat engineer brigade.
• An air defence brigade.
• An infantry brigade with organic mobility for force protection or a military police brigade.
• A civil affairs brigade and political liaison team.
• An air support operations group, with sufficient air support squadrons to support subordinate divisions.
• A space support element.

This is a considerable force package, comparable in scale and complexity to a frontline division. Yet, without it, NATO’s frontline divisions are liable to lack survivability or endurance, becoming less than the sum of their parts. It is therefore essential that the Alliance – in regenerating its conventional deterrence posture – encourages and rewards states for offering capabilities to this echelon. NATO must also prioritise exercises that link this to divisional headquarters. The need for this echelon of capabilities does not alter the requirement for NATO members to ensure there are a credible mass of warfighting divisions. But the Alliance as a whole must judge the value of contributions by the effectiveness of the combined force, rather than on the balance of inputs. Finally, it must be clearly acknowledged that after a brief dalliance with prioritising highly enabled brigades in the Russian Ground Forces, the Russian Federation has concluded that they lack endurance and combat power,94 and has returned to divisional structures for warfighting. Moreover, Russian divisions are supported by a robust higher echelon structure.

Russian Ground Forces conduct regular snap drills that link tactical dispersed drills with the centralised C2 structure, practise operational manoeuvres and are currently well placed to conduct operations at scale.96 Russia is taking their warfighting capability seriously. To maintain conventional deterrence, NATO must do the same. Revitalising the corps echelon would be a powerful signal of intent.

(01.05.2021, 22:41)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Was bin ich anderes als genau so ein Amateur.

(01.05.2021, 22:41)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Die US Streitkräfte weisen Divisionen weiter Aufgaben zu, hier hat aber auch die Brigade als wichtigste Einheit die ursprünglichen Aufgaben einer Division übernommen und die Division dient meiner Ansicht nach mehr der Entlastung der Korps bei der Führung und Versorgung.

(01.05.2021, 22:41)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Die Lösung liegt meiner Meinung nach darin, wieder kompakte kleinere (nationale) Divisionen zu schaffen und davon mehr. Kleinere EU Staaten entstenden als Teil von multinationalen Korps ebenfalls komplette Divisionen, statt uns Brigaden abzugeben.
...
Statt also einer Struktur ... bei der jede Division vollumfänglich 4 Brigaden hat (und eine 5 ausländische noch dazu aufnehmen soll), wovon bei 3 Divsionen nicht weniger als 8 Brigaden als nationale mechanisierte Brigaden geplant sind, wäre es sinnvoller aus diesen Brigaden insgesamt 4 nationale mechanisierte Divisionen zu je 2 Brigaden zu formen. ... Wenn man dann noch aus den Brigaden entsprechend Untereinheiten hinaus zieht und als Divisionstruppen einreiht, werden die Brigaden zudem noch kompakter und können ihre eigentliche Aufgabe besser erfüllen.

(01.05.2021, 22:41)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Und die Gebirgs-Brigade könnte man mit den Luftlandeinheiten entsprechend der DSK unterstellen.

(01.05.2021, 22:41)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Zu den Divisionen als Großkampfverbänden kann man dann selbstständige kleinere Einheiten andenken, welche außerhalb der Divisionstruktur stehen (als Korps-Truppen) und je nach Bedarf unabhängig von den Divisionen agieren oder diesen bei Bedarf unterstellt werden.

Zitat:Ich habe immer ein bisschen den Eindruck, das BCT-Konzept würde von vielen kleineren Streitkräften versucht zu übernehmen, die eigentlich viel zu klein sind, um die Vorteile dieses Systems nutzen zu können

Zitat:Wie müsste ich mir das zahlenmäßig vorstellen? Unsere Brigaden liegen derzeit bei etwa 5000 Mann. Wie weit würdest du das reduzieren zugunsten der Divisionstruppen und wie groß wären diese dann? Insgesamt klingt das für mich nach Divisionen im untersten Größenbereich, also 10-12 Tsd. Soldaten.

Zitat:Was würdest du z.B. davon halten, die Jägerbataillone als Divisionstruppen zu gliedern und somit nur ein Bataillon (oder Regiment) für zwei mech. Brigaden einzusetzen um diese beweglicher zu halten und die Jäger flexibler und konzentrierter einsetzen zu können?

Zitat:

Zitat:Zu den Divisionen als Großkampfverbänden kann man dann selbstständige kleinere Einheiten andenken, welche außerhalb der Divisionstruktur stehen (als Korps-Truppen)

Was bliebe denn da noch übrig, das nicht auch in den Divisionen vorhanden wäre

Zitat:Und wie sieht es bei Pio, Art, Aufkl etc. aus: Bataillone in den Brigaden oder Regimenter der Divisionen? Ich tue mich etwas schwer damit, bei einer Zwei-Teilung eine sinnvolle Struktur zu finden.

Zitat:Im ersten Fall könnte ich es mir sinnvoll vorstellen, den Divisionen organisatorisch größere Kapazitäten zuzuweisen, die Sie im Einsatzfall dem Korps zur Verfügung stellen.

Zitat:Ich könnte mir z.B. sehr gut vorstellen, aus Fallschirm- und Gebirgsjägern eine leichte Infanteriedivision zu formen,

Zitat:Is it Time for the U.S. Navy to Build the Drone Carrier Warship?

Naval Group’s 4,000-ton trimaran “Ocean Avenger” Drone Carrier Warship has two straight runways to launch UCAVs with VTOL rotorcraft stationed at the stern. “Ocean Avenger” also has a main gun turret and VLS cells for missiles in addition to four 30mm autocannon turrets at the corners of the trimaran. Right: BAE’s 8,000-ton UXV Drone Carrier Warship uses two split-V runways to launch UCAV aircraft. Spots on the stern and forward deck are reserved for unmanned VTOL rotorcraft while the floodable well deck can launch unmanned surface and subsurface systems. UXV carries offensive and defensive VLS missiles and a 155mm gun with the possible addition of larger Hypersonic missile tubes. UXV is stated to be 500-feet long, or the length of the upcoming U.S. Navy’s FFG-62 FREMM-modified frigate .

As the Pentagon and Congress grapple on determining what to build to meet the “500-ship U.S. Navy goal,” a couple of years-old ideas and artist renderings may lead to a more flexible future for the U.S. Navy’s global operations.

(02.05.2021, 13:44)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Tatsächlich ist 10-12 Tsd. die absolute Obergrenze welche eine Divsion meiner Überzeugung nach nicht überschreiten sollte. Welche Größe exakt die Divisionen haben sollten will ich nicht festlegen, sie können auch unterschiedlich groß sein, aber sie sollten sich meiner Meinung nach im Bereich um die 10.000 Mann bewegen. Entsprechend wären die je Division dann zwei Brigaden deutlich schwächer als die aktuell ca. 5000 Mann pro Brigade Sie würde wohl im Bereich um die 3000 Mann liegen.

(02.05.2021, 13:44)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Die Frage ist was Jäger überhaupt sein sollen? Mittlere Kräfte? De facto Panzergrenadiere? Tatsächlich leichte Infanterie? Das aktuelle Mutterschiff-Konzept und die Idee eines abgesessenen Kampfes mit jeweils schneller Verlegung mittels überschwerer Rad-Transportpanzer ist im Endeffekt Unsinn und macht innerhalb einer mechanisierten Division ebenso keinen Sinn wie innerhalb einer mechanisierten Brigade. Und auch als echte leichte Infanterie machen Jäger innerhalb der Panzer-/Panzergrenadier-Division wie -Brigade keinen Sinne. Sinnvoller hat man hier dann mehr Panzergrenadiere.

Deshalb würde ich beispielsweise die Jäger komplett aus den Divisionen heraus ziehen und sie außerhalb dieser als selbstständige Einheiten des Korps sammeln

(02.05.2021, 13:44)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Andere Beispiele für Einheiten die man aus den Divisionen heraus ziehen sollte wären Panzerspäher (für die allerdings Last Dingo und meine Wenigkeit schon seit x Jahren ein völlig anderes Konzept vorsehen würden), oder beispielsweise Heli-Verbände - stattdessen sollen diese nach aktuellem Plan auch Divisionstruppen sein (Division 2027) und natürlich gehören aus den Brigaden die Unterstützungs-Einheiten, Pioniere, San usw so weit wie möglich raus auf die Divisionsebene. ... Innerhalb der Brigaden reicht eine Aufklärungs-Kompanie- der Gros der Aufklärungsmittel ist Divisionstruppe. Es reicht auch ebenso eine Pionier-Kompanie, und ebenso ist der Rest der Pioniere Divisionstruppe.

(02.05.2021, 13:44)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Die aktuelle (und zeitnah geplante) Struktur von Brigaden mit je 1 Aufklärungs- 1 UStg- 1 Pio- und in naher Zukunft 1 Artillerie-Bataillon ist genau der Irrweg der seit der Gründung der Bundeswehr konsequent weiter betrieben wurde und denn man meiner Meinung nach mal irgendwann in der nächsten Zeit überwinden sollte.

(02.05.2021, 13:44)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Die ganzen dadurch frei werdenden Stellen (es würden insgesamt eine ganze Menge Kompanien wegfallen) kann man entsprechend in mehr Kampftruppe und insbesondere in Artillerie und Heeresluftabwehr stecken.

(02.05.2021, 13:44)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Artillerie macht innerhalb von mechanisierten Brigaden deshalb keinen Sinn, weil der logistische Aufwand zu groß ist, die Artillerie auch von außerhalb der Brigade abgerufen werden kann (da heute die Reichweiten wie die Präzision immens viel größer sind) und die Brigade dadurch zu groß und zu unbeweglich wird. ... Artillerie gehört daher auf die Divisionsebene und darüber.

(02.05.2021, 13:44)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Macht gerade eben deshalb keinen Sinn weil die Divisionen als Großkampfverbände ja geade eben so kompakt wie möglich sein sollen, mit einem so großen Anteil von Kampftruppen wie möglich. Wozu dem Korps etwas zuweisen wenn dieses auch ohnehin so beim Korps aufgehängt sein kann?

(02.05.2021, 16:19)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Drohnen-Träger

Ich hau es mal hier rein da es diese System noch nicht mal im Ansatz gibt und sich die Frage stellt, ob sie überhaupt konzeptionell sinnvoll sind?

(02.05.2021, 16:19)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Ich will den Gedanken eines solchen Drohnenträgers noch weiter führen: meiner Meinung nach werden Überwasser-Einheiten es im Krieg der Zukunft immer schwerer haben sich zu behaupten. Drohnenschwärme haben nun ganz andere Voraussetzungen als bemannte Systeme, weshalb es meine Idee dazu wäre, solche Drohnen-Träger als U-Boote auszulegen. Größere U-Boote welche dann eine Vielzahl von Unterwasser-Drohnen wie auch fliegenden Drohnen einsetzen. Was haltet ihr von der Idee eines U-Drohnenträgers?

(02.05.2021, 16:19)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Ich will den Gedanken eines solchen Drohnenträgers noch weiter führen: meiner Meinung nach werden Überwasser-Einheiten es im Krieg der Zukunft immer schwerer haben sich zu behaupten. Drohnenschwärme haben nun ganz andere Voraussetzungen als bemannte Systeme, weshalb es meine Idee dazu wäre, solche Drohnen-Träger als U-Boote auszulegen. Größere U-Boote welche dann eine Vielzahl von Unterwasser-Drohnen wie auch fliegenden Drohnen einsetzen. Was haltet ihr von der Idee eines U-Drohnenträgers?

Zitat: Das Leistungsspektrum der klassischen Brigade mit der taktischen Beweglichkeit und Führbarkeit einer Regimentskampfgruppe. Klingt für mich stimmig, sofern man es schafft, den Wasserkopf der Brigaden klein zu halten.

Zitat: nur dass sie aufgrund des technischen Fortschritts bereits in dieser Größenordnung, das Gefecht der verbunden Waffen führen können. Das wäre für mich so etwas wie die Verschmelzung dieser beiden Ebenen.

Zitat:Aktuell ist das für mich berittenen Infanterie. Die hat durchaus ihre Berechtigung,

Zitat:Echte mittlere Kräfte müssten mMn ähnlich dem Ursprungsgedanken der SBCTs aufgestellt sein. Also einheitlich ausgestattet, autark handlungsfähig und schnell (luft-)verlegbar. Damit unsere Jäger das leisten können müssten sie konsequent mit Boxern ausgestattet werden (Drummond lässt grüßen) und zwar in vielen zusätzlichen Versionen. Der Waffenträger auf Basis CRV, auch als schwerer Aufklärer wäre ein Anfang. Dann mindestens noch Mörser und gewisse Pionierfähigkeiten.
Nur muss man sich im Rahmen der Schrumpf-NATO fragen, ob mittlere Kräfte nicht bewusst kleineren Nationen vorbehalten sein sollten, die sich mehr nicht leisten können. Den Briten z.B., Big Grin die sich ja derzeit in genau diese Richtung entwickeln.

Zitat:Eure Entwürfe zu Spähkräften habe ich nicht mehr parat (auch wenn ich das bestimmt verfolgt haben werde), aber ich würde sie zumindest eher als separat agierende Späh-/Jagd-/Kavallerietruppe sehen, während die mechanisierten Verbände nur im Rahmen ihres eigenen Auftrags selbst aufklären

Zitat:Als organisches Steilfeuer braucht es Panzermörser, keine Haubitzen-Bataillone.

Zitat:Seh' ich auch so, vor allem auch im Hinblick auf JointFire u.ä.

Zitat: Nicht dass wir hinterher x eigenständige Kompanien über Deutschland verteilen

(02.05.2021, 21:32)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Wie ich es schon eingangs schrieb sind zudem all diese Begriffe (Brigade, Regimentskampfgruppe etc) heute alle schwammig und austauschbar. ... Worin soll überhaupt der Unterschied zwischen einer Regimentskampfgruppe und einer Brigade sein? In Wahrheit gibt es eigentlich keinen.
Im einen Fall haben wir ein Regiment an welche weitere Einheiten angehängt werden. Der Regimentsstab führt dann diese Einheiten, es entsteht de facto also eine Brigade. Im anderen Fall sind diese Einheiten bereits organisch dem Brigadestab unterstellt.

(02.05.2021, 21:32)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Da ich explizit auf deutlich kompaktere Brigaden hinaus will können diese zwar im Verbund der Division (oder im Verbund mit Korpstruppen) das Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen führen - sie können es aber nicht selbstständig führen (bspw. wegen fehlender Artillerie) und das Wort: selbstständig ist hier das entscheidende. Wenn man gar nicht erst versucht Brigaden so auszulegen, dass sie die kleinsten Großkampfverbände sind, welche das Gefecht verbundener Waffen selbstständig führen, dann kann man diese wesentlich kleiner und wesentlich besser organisiert aufstellen und sind diese dann viel schneller und beweglicher und können klassische Brigaden allein dadurch ausmanövrieren und durch eine höhere Geschwindigkeit in allen Abläufen und Handlungen aus dem Feld schlagen obwohl sie kleiner sind.

(02.05.2021, 21:32)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Zudem bleibt da noch die Frage der strategischen Verlegbarkeit. Große Divisionen sind nicht ansatzweise so gut strategisch verlegbar wie kleine kompakte Divisionen.

(02.05.2021, 21:32)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Meiner Ansicht nach hat sie keine Berechtigung weil man hier mit einem immensen Aufwand im Endeffekt eine vom Kosten-Nutzen Verhältnis her nicht tragbare Truppe unterhält. Die Kampfkraft im Vergleich zum Aufwand ist zu gering, das ganze Konzept unbrauchbar für den Krieg und ein Ausfluss einer Überspezialisierung auf Friedenseinsätze. Making yesterday perfect in Afghanistan wird in Osteuropa gegen russische mechanisierte Verbände nichts bringen.

(02.05.2021, 21:32)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Stichwort Mittlere Kräfte:

Ich bin kein Freund der Stryker Brigades Combat Teams (welche eigentlich ursprünglich von Shinseki nur als Testeinheiten und Interimsverbände zum Übergang in das FCS gedcht waren) - und auch nicht des aktuellen britischen Strike Brigade Konzeptes. Spezifisch Deutschland sollte bewusst auf solche mittleren Kräfte verzichten - den diese kosten auch nicht unerheblich Geld und die höhere strategische Verlegbarkeit (welche gerade in Richtung Osteuropa in Sachen Eigenverlegbarkeit als Hauptargument geführt wird) ist in Wahrheit unnütz, weil sich diese Verbände gegen ernsthafte mechanisierte Verbände nicht behaupten können und in entsprechendem Terrain gegen echte leichte Verbände ebenso eingehen.

Gerade Deutschland sollte und müsste meiner Meinung nach Schwerpunkte setzen und Mittel die man für mittlere Verbände aufwenden müsste konsequent in vollmechanisierte Einheiten stecken, nicht zuletzt auch weil Europa ohnehin zunehmend in Richtung mittlere Verbände abgleitet.

(02.05.2021, 21:32)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Stichwort Panzerkavallerie:

Im Prinzip kann man hier eine Art Aufteilung in Schlachtfeldaufklärung/Plänkler (Skirmisher) und weitstreifende Fernaufklärung/Streifschar (Raider) vornehmen. Eine solche Panzerspähtruppe könnte als Fernaufklärer/Streifschar aufgrund der schon oben beschriebenen Situation von weiten Räumen geringer feindlicher Truppendichte verheerende Wirkung erzielen ohne sich feindichen Großkampfverbänden stellen zu müssen. Sie wäre auch sonst von großem Wert und die Radpanzer würden in ihr gute Verwendung finden.

(02.05.2021, 21:32)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Joint ist hier ohnehin ein Ansatz den man weitergehend verfolgen sollte. Statt einer streitkräftegemeinsamen Feuerunterstützung sollte man hier weiterdenken an ein Streitkräftegemeinsames Feuer an sich. Damit meine ich, dass man jede Waffe - auch die Systeme welche im direkten Schuss wirken - für möglichst viele verschiedene Aufgaben verwenden kann - dass sie miteinander vernetzt sind und gemeinsam abgerufen werden können.

Zitat:Daher kam mein Ausgangsgedanke, die Divisionen nur als Heimatorganisation zu verwenden, eben weil sie derzeit viel zu groß und träge für eine Verlegung sind.

Zitat:So gesehen könnte man in deiner Struktur auch die Brigaden Regiment nennen und die Divisionen Brigade. Was den Definitionen von Verband und Großverband eher entsprechen würde. So oder so passen die gängigen Größenordnungen nicht. Aber im Endeffekt ist es ja egal, wie man's nennt. Wenn man dran denkt, wie viele Bataillone weltweit aus Traditionsgründen Regiment heißen.

Zitat:Genau da hatte ich dich falsch interpretiert, weil ich eben dachte, du hättest dich für kleine Brigaden statt Regimentern entschieden, gerade weil diese Großverbände sind und eben GefVbuWa beherrschen. Diesen Ansatz fand ich besonders interessant.

(05.05.2021, 09:36)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Ein weiteres Konzept des USMC ist das All Domain Reconnaissance Detachment

https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6504735/11th-meu-all-domain-reconnaissance-detachment-conduct-raids

Aufklärungseinheiten dieser Art sollten eigentlich Kampfaufträge vermeiden, da diese oft dem Aufklärungsauftrag entgegen laufen. Das ist aber ganz allgemein eine Entwicklung der letzten Jahre, Aufklärungs-Einheiten immer mehr für Kampfeinsätze vorzusehen, beispielsweise wurden und werden entsprechende Bataillone der US Streitkräfte fortwährend als Kampftruppen missbraucht. Das führt mich zu der Frage, ob man nicht ausdrücklich parallel zwei verschiedene Formen von Aufklärern benötigt: wobei die einen explizit einen Kampfauftrag haben und Aufklärung durch Kampf versuchen und die anderen sich auf die bloße Aufklärung konzentrieren statt beides in einem Verband zusammen zu mischen. Dadurch könnte man die entsprechenden Einheiten viel besser auf diese Aufgaben hin spezialisierten und ausrüsten.