Zitat:A senior Israeli government official, meanwhile, described it as "preposterous" that the Cairo panel sessions implied any kind of diplomatic contact between Iran and Israel.

"For years Iran and Israel have participated at the same time in multilateral forums like this," he said, giving the examples of UN agencies, and the IAEA.

[...]

The sessions dealt with efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone, non-proliferation in the region and developing peaceful nuclear energy.

In one of the discussions, Haaretz quotes Mr Soltanieh directly asking Ms Zafary-Odiz: "Do you or do you not have nuclear weapons?"

Ms Zafary-Odiz reportedly smiled, but did not respond.

The newspaper says the two representatives did not meet separately outside the session or shake hands.

Zitat:Diplomatie in Nahost
Iran dementiert Atom-Gespräch mit Israel

Es klang wie das Ende einer jahrzehntelangen diplomatischen Eiszeit: Israel vermeldete das erste Gespräch über Atompolitik mit Iran seit Jahrzehnten. Nun dementiert Teheran heftig und wirft dem Kontrahenten "psychologische Kriegsführung" vor.

Zitat:Russland schließt große Kriege nicht aus

ST. PETERSBURG, 22. Oktober (RIA Novosti). Nach seiner Ankündigung, Russland schließe künftig einen nuklearen Präventivschlag nicht aus, weist der Chef des russischen Sicherheitsrats, Nikolai Patruschew, erneut auf die Gefahr großer Militärkonflikte hin.

„Wir hoffen, dem Präsidenten bis Jahresende die neue Militärdoktrin vorlegen zu können“, sagte Patruschew am Donnerstag in St. Petersburg. Das werde bereits die dritte Fassung der russischen Militärdoktrin sein. Die erste sei 1993 angenommen worden, die zweite gelte seit 2000.

„Die Situation hierzulande und weltweit verändert sich dynamisch. 1993 hatten wird gesagt, Militärkonflikte seien ausgeschlossen. Das Leben zeigt aber, dass dies nicht stimmt. Es gibt regionale und lokale Konflikte, auch Konflikte von großem Ausmaß sind nicht ausgeschlossen. Wir müssen darauf gefasst sein“, hieß es......

revan schrieb:Erich wo steckst du den ? Warum schimpfst du denn nicht auf den bösen Atomwaffenstaat der grad seine Nuklear Doktrin zur Erstschlags Doktrin umgekrempelt hat. Ich habe es, der guten Atomwaffen Staat ist ja Russland die dürfen alles.

Zitat:U.S. Called on to Redeploy Nuclear Weapons in South Korea

Amid fears of North Korea's nuclear-weapon efforts, an assortment of South Korean academics and former military officials recently urged the United States to consider once again fielding tactical nuclear weapons in their nation, United Press International reported (see GSN, Oct. 21).

The group also appealed to Washington to postpone past 2012 the scheduled transfer to Seoul of wartime operational command of South Korean forces.

Last June, U.S. President Barack Obama declared in writing that the United States would ensure its nuclear umbrella was "wide enough to protect" South Korea.

However, that commitment is "fragile," South Korean analyst Cheon Seong-whun said during a recent forum in Seoul. He characterized the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan as a "negative security assurance" that has produced "a question of credibility."

Additionally, with Pyongyang's effort to create a long-range nuclear missile capable of striking the continental United States, Washington runs the chance of opening the United States to attack if it includes South Korea in its nuclear umbrella, Cheon said.

"There is doubt that the United States could protect Seoul at the risk of nuclear attacks on New York or Los Angeles," Cheon said. "The United States should consider redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea to effectively deter North Korea's nuclear threats."

Tactical nuclear weapons are generally understood to be those with limited ranges, such as land-based missiles that can fly up to 300 miles or sea- and air-based weapons with a range of approximately 360 miles.

Under a 1992 agreement between Pyongyang and Seoul, the United States removed its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.

"The United States could link the plan of nuclear weapons deployment to the North's nuclear arsenal program," Cheon said. "The United States can tell the North to dismantle its nuclear weapons by 2012 or Washington would deploy a nuclear arsenal again in the South."......

revan schrieb:Was hast du den das ist doch Sachlich der Link ist Fakt genau wie die plötzlich fehlende Kritik des Erichs als Busch diese Strategie verfolge wurde er nicht müde X-mall darüber zu toben.

Ingenieur schrieb:Der Link war sachlich, du nicht. Kommentar zu jedem Thema kannst du maximal von nem Regierungssprecher erwarten, nicht von uns Hobbystrategen. Wir schreiben hier nicht, um uns persönlich anzugreifen, sondern um zu diskutieren.

Erich schrieb:war jetzt einige Tage lang nicht im Netz sondern auf ner Tagung

Zitat:Wie ich lernte, die Bombe zu lieben

Barack Obama bekam den Friedensnobelpreis dafür, nicht George W. Bush zu sein. Der offizielle Grund ist hingegen sein erklärtes Streben nach einer Welt ohne Atomwaffen. Doch das ist nicht nur ein wirklichkeitsfremdes und naives, sondern vor allem ein falsches Ziel. Unterstützung erfährt er von Friedensbewegten aller Couleur sowie von amerikanischen und deutschen Elder Statesmen, darunter Helmut Schmidt. Aber niemand, der tatsächlich politische Verantwortung trägt, wünscht sich ernsthaft zurück in eine Zeit ohne atomare Abschreckung. Denn nur die Atombombe verhinderte, dass der Kalte Krieg heiß wurde.....

Zitat:ein schöner Artikel - der erklärt, warum immer mehr Staaten in den Besitz von Atomwaffen gelangen wollen (und deutlich macht, dass damit der Frieden immer sicherer wird) Wink

Zitat:ein schöner Artikel - der erklärt, warum immer mehr Staaten in den Besitz von Atomwaffen gelangen wollen (und deutlich macht, dass damit der Frieden immer sicherer wird)

Zitat:The End of Obama’s Vision of a Nuke-Free World

As any student of foreign and national security policy well knows, the devil is in the details. Back in April 2009, in a speech delivered in Prague, the Czech Republic, President Barack Obama articulated his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Since that time, however, the Obama administration has offered very little of substance to push this vision forward. When one looks past the grand statements of the president for policy implementation that supports the rhetoric, one is left empty-handed. No movement on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). No extension of a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia (START). No freeze on the development of a new generation of American nuclear weapons. Without progress in these areas, any prospects of a new approach to global nuclear nonproliferation emerging from the May 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference are virtually zero.

Perhaps the most telling indicator of failed nonproliferation policy on the part of the Obama administration is the fact that there has been no progress on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, and in particular the ongoing controversy surrounding a proposed uranium exchange. The deal would have Iran swap a significant portion of its existing stock of 3.5 percent enriched uranium (the level needed to fuel Iran’s planned nuclear power reactors, as opposed to uranium enriched to 90 percent, which is needed for nuclear weapons) in exchange for nuclear fuel rods containing uranium enriched to 19.5 percent (the level needed to operate a U.S.-built research reactor in Tehran that produced nuclear isotopes for medical purposes). Iran is running out of fuel for this reactor, and needs a new source of fuel or else it will be forced to shut it down. As a signatory member of the NPT, Iran should have the right to acquire this fuel on the open market, subject of course to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, but the United States and Europe have held any such sale hostage to Iran’s agreeing to suspend its indigenous uranium enrichment program, which is the source of the 3.5 percent enriched uranium currently in Iran.

The crux of the U.S. and European concerns rests not with Iran’s possession of 3.5 percent enriched uranium, but rather that the enrichment technique employed by Iran to produce this low-enriched uranium could be used, with some significant modifications, to manufacture high-enriched uranium (90 percent) usable in a nuclear weapon. This reality, and the fears of a nuclear-armed Iran it produces, trumps the fact that the IAEA today is in a position to certify that it can account for the totality of Iran’s inventory of nuclear material, and that any diversion of nuclear material would be detected by the IAEA almost immediately. Furthermore, beyond its capacity to enrich uranium, there is no real evidence that Iran has engaged in a nuclear weapons program.....