Zitat:Ich meine doch, dass der Krieg in der Ukraine zeigt, dass unsere militärische Lage so schlimm nicht ist. Wir müssen doch feststellen, dass wir die Fähigkeiten der russischen Streitkräfte in der Breite überschätzt haben.

Zitat:Dann kam der jetzige Ukrainekrieg, und die Russen wurden als (Teil) Papiertiger identifiziert. Was aber überhaupt nichts an unseren Defiziten ändert.

Zitat:Ehrlich gesagt ist mir – eine ordentliche Vorbereitung vorausgesetzt – schleierhaft, wie bei der robusten Durchsetzung einer Flugverbotszone groß etwas anders herauskommen sollte als eine schnelle Zerschlagung der eingesetzten russischen Luftverbände.

Zitat:Das sinnvollste was man da machen könnte wäre aber die Stärkung der baltischen Streitkräfte selbst. Jede Milliarde die da investiert wird generiert ein vielfaches der Kampfkraft als wenn wir sie für die Bundeswehr ausgeben würden. Es wäre absolut zu überlegen, ob wir nicht mit einem Teil des Sondervermögens schlicht (deutsche) Waffen für die baltischen Verbündeten kaufen.

Zitat:Angenommen dies passiert und Rußland hat die Ukraine de facto besiegt, zum Beispiel durch die Eroberung Kiews, Annektierung der Ostukraine und Einsetzung eines Marionettenregimes in der Westukraine. Wie groß wird dann noch die Kampfmoral für einen langfristigen Guerillakrieg sein? Wäre es nicht wahrscheinlicher dass die Männer dann ihren Frauen und Kindern in die EU folgen und den bewaffneten Kampf aufgeben?

Zitat:Aber man muss halt als Gemeinschaft festlegen, was man gewillt ist, zu akzeptieren.

Zitat:den Ansatz, die Ukrainer möglichst schnell zur Einstellung der offenen Kriegshandlungen und zum Rückzug in den Guerillakampf zu treiben, halte ich weder für erstrebenswert, noch für realisierbar. Der Widerstand lebt doch im Moment gerade davon, dass man an die Chance glaubt, regulär siegen zu können, so gering diese auch in der Realität sein mag. Aber dieser Glaube und auch das Gefühl einer gewissen -wenn auch begrenzten- internationalen Rückendeckung sind es, die den Ukrainern den Willen zum Kampf gibt. Jede Bemühung, die diesem Glauben abträglich ist, schwächt auch den zu erwartenden Guerillakampf,

Zitat:Polen hat eine "Friedensmission" der NATO zur Unterstützung der Ukraine im Krieg gegen Russland gefordert. "Diese Mission kann keine unbewaffnete Mission sein", zitierte die Nachrichtenagentur PAP den polnischen Vize-Regierungschef Jaroslaw Kaczynski, der mit den Regierungschefs von Polen, Slowenien und Tschechien nach Kiew gereist war.

Nach den Vorstellungen Polens sollte eine NATO-Mission mit "Zustimmung des ukrainischen Präsidenten" auf "ukrainischem Territorium agieren" und "humanitäre und friedliche Hilfe" leisten. Dabei solle sie allerdings "von Streitkräften geschützt" werden und "in der Lage sein, sich selbst zu verteidigen", betonte der Vorsitzende der regierenden konservativen Partei in Polen.

Zitat:Vor allem anderen sollte der Krieg in der Ukraine aufzeigen, dass man NIEMALS einen Feind unterschätzen darf.

Zitat:@QF Da bin ich allerdings wieder voll bei dir und dass ist exakt das was ich hier im Forum auch schon vor 2014 so geschrieben habe, dass man das Baltikum zu einer neuen Militärgrenze aufrüsten muss. Indem wir unser Geld für die Aufrüstung der Balten geben.

Zitat:Und was die letzten Verhandlungen Ukraine- Russie) angeht, ich bin ja ein ewiger Optimist...
Jetzt noch ein "genialer "Vorschlag" der EU, an dem schon (vielleicht) seit einiger Zeit gefeilt wird,
und der auch für die Moldawien und Georgien funktionieren kann

Zitat:Biden approves more anti-aircraft systems, drones for Ukraine, warns of 'long and difficult battle'

New US for package for Ukraine includes 800 Stinger anti-aircraft systems, 2,000 Javelin and more [...]

President Biden on Wednesday approved an additional $800 million in military aid for Ukraine, saying the United States is "answering" Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's call for more help, while warning of a "long and difficult battle" ahead against Russia. [...]

The new package includes 800 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; 2,000 Javelins, 1,000 light anti-armor weapons and 6,000 AT-4 anti-armor systems; 100 unmanned drones; 100 grenade launchers, 5,000 rifles, 1,000 pistols, 400 machine guns, and 400 shotguns; more than 20 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenade launcher and mortar rounds; 25,000 sets of body armor; and 25,000 helmets.

(16.03.2022, 11:04)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Warum muss man das? Allein schon den Begriff Gemeinschaft finde ich übrigens hier einfach nur falsch: es gibt keine Gemeinschaft.

Zitat:Natürlich muss man klar vorher festlegen was passiert wenn NATO Territorium angegriffen wird, aber die Ukraine und NATO Staaten sind etwas völlig verschiedenes.

Zitat:Die Russen verhandeln, aber sie greifen an: Für sie ist das nicht unvereinbar! Die russische Offensive scheint hier und da wieder in Gang zu kommen.

Zitat:Donezk verlangt Luftverteidigung

Russland meldet schwere Gefechte in Ostukraine

Die Ukraine scheint kleinere Gegenoffensiven im Osten des Landes zu starten. Die selbst ernannte Volksrepublik Luhansk meldet schwere Kämpfe, Donezk bittet den Kreml um Luftunterstützung. Nach US-Angaben könnten bereits 28.000 russische Soldaten verletzt oder getötet worden sein.

Im Osten der Ukraine hat es nach russischen Angaben wieder schwere Gefechte um die Großstadt Sjewjerodonezk gegeben. Die Einheiten der selbst ernannten Volksrepublik Luhansk (LNR) hätten vergangene Nacht Erfolge "gegen ukrainische Nationalisten" erzielt, teilt das russische Verteidigungsministerium in Moskau mit. [...] Der Ukraine zufolge ist die russische Armee drei Wochen nach Kriegsbeginn derart dezimiert, dass man kleinere Gegenoffensiven starten könne. So rief der Separatistenführer der selbst ernannten Volksrepublik Donezk, Denis Puschilin, den Kreml im russischen Staatsfernsehen dazu auf, die Luftverteidigung in den Separatistengebieten zu verstärken. [...]

Moskau gibt an, seit dem 24. Februar 1379 ukrainische Panzer und gepanzerte Fahrzeuge zerstört zu haben. Zudem seien 181 Flugzeuge und Hubschrauber sowie 172 Drohnen getroffen worden. Allein am Mittwoch seien zwei ukrainische Kampfhubschrauber abgeschossen worden.

Zitat:Wenn du 10 % davon abzweigst um Marschflugkörper zu kaufen um Kalingrad platt zu machen, trage ich das Konzept mit.

Zitat:Die Frage ob eine Flugverbotszone a) militärisch und politisch sinnvoll ist und b) eine (nukleare) Eskalation einigermaßen sicher ausgeschlossen werden kann, ist unabhängig von einer möglichen Durchsetzung zu bewerten.

Zitat:Gemeinschaft im Sinne von Zusammenschluss einer oder mehrerer Gesellschaften. Das kann die NATO, die EU, der Westen oder auch "die freie Welt" sein. Und diese Gemeinschaften gibt es.

Zitat:für sehr viele Menschen in der/den westlichen Gesellschaft(en) ist ein Nuklearwaffeneinsatz ein Angriff auf die Menschheit an sich und nicht hinzunehmen

Zitat:Es gab schonmal einen nuklearen Zwischenfall in der Ukraine, dessen Auswirkungen sich auch auf Gebiete erstreckt haben, die heute NATO-Territorium sind. Also kann man mMn einen entsprechenden Bündnisfall definieren.

Zitat:Und aufgrund der bereits angesprochenen Folgewirkungen einer fehlenden Erwiderung, kann man das auch für erforderlich halten.

Zitat:Tag 20 und 21:

Gesamtkarte:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1504329499470712836/photo/1

1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 20 & 21: The third week of the war ends with failed Russian efforts to regain the strategic initiative in Kyiv, exposed to raids and ambushes in the Sumy Oblast, slow progress in the Donbas, and brutal siege warfare in Mariupol.

2/ Humanitarian Impact. There are now an estimated 3 million refugees in various European countries. Humanitarian corridors continue to be interdicted, blocked, or attacked by Russian forces. Civilians increasingly become targets of Russian attacks.

3/ Weather assessment. Visibility and wind speed are favorable for VKS execute aerospace operations. Temperatures generally will remain between 10/-6 C, hampering tactical movement, morale of Russian forces, and vehicle maintenance.

Kampfpanzer im Schlamm stecken geblieben:

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1502224853746790402

Karte Raum Kiew:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1504330172962643970/photo/1

4/ Kyiv AO assessment. The continued inability of Russian forces to execute offensive operations larger than small-scale tactical assaults reveals the principal obstacle to regaining offensive momentum, unimaginative & ineffective leadership at echelons above brigade.

5/ Warfare is a vital and creative process; the great difficulty of tactics is to cause the disparate fractions of a mobile corps to unite in the execution of a decisive maneuver through simultaneous combined action in accordance with the campaign plan, resulting in victory.

Karte Nordosten:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1504330630573789188/photo/1

6/ Northeast AO assessment. A system of rapid and continuous marches multiples the effect of an army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of the enemy. Ukrainian Territorial Defense units in the Chernihiv & Sumy Oblasts have done just that.

7/ By moving rapidly between contested areas and striking supply convoys & patrols, the Ukrainians have immobilized parts of three Russian CAAs. Great mobility and frequent offensive movements covered by strategic reserves is the best means of defense.

Und das heißt maximale Querfeldeinbeweglichkeit !

Karte Osten:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1504330903203594242/photo/1

8/ Kharkiv and Donbas AO assessments. Strategy fixes the direction of movement. In the Kharkiv & Donbas area, this direction is aimed at securing the borders of Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, a stated political objective of the Kremlin.

9/ The Donets River is the topographic key to the Kharkiv-Donbas AO. Seizing this line will dislodge Ukrainian forces from the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, threaten to cut off forces in Kharkiv, and open the way for strategic maneuver on Dnipro.

Zunehmende Kriegsführung mit Minen und ersten IEDs - Beispiel: Kamfpanzer wird von Richtmine zerlegt:

https://twitter.com/ArmedForcesUkr/status/1503745296932773897

Karte Süden:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1504331275305426947/photo/1

10/ The Southern AO assessment. Russian operations against Mykolaiyv and Odesa have been curiously under resourced for the importance they seem to have for the Kremlin's overall war aims.

11/ Russian forces in the Kherson-Odea AO appear to be more of a detachment meant to observe and hold in position a large portion of Ukrainian forces available for the western defense of Zaporizhya.

12/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS forces still struggle with SEAD / DEAD of Ukrainian air defenses. Russian losses continue to mount among rotary and fixed wing airframes. The Russians are starting to use UAVs more effectively in support of artillery.

Das Artillerie - Drohnen Gespann erweist sich erneut als die wirkungsvollste Kombination von allen, besser als bewaffnete Drohnen für sich allein !

13/ Information War. Ukraine continues to dominate the information sphere, communicating very effective strategic messaging to punch well above their political weight and illicit essential international aid across to sustain their war effort.

14/ By contrast Russia’s messaging seems to be consumed with ensuring public perceptions of the war in Ukraine remain at least neutral, if not supportive. Coercing domestic support is critical if the MoD hopes to bring in enough reservists & conscripts to replace losses.

15/ Russian Overall Assessment. Until Russian commanders can grasp and implement unified action, they will remain incapable of regaining any semblance of offensive momentum regardless of improvements to logistics, morale, or manpower replacement.

16/ Likewise, Kremlin leadership will have to eventual face the long-term political impact the war is having on the sustainability of the Russian state as the international community further isolates the ability of the Russian government to function.

Zitat:A background briefing with a senior U.S. defense official about the Russian war on Ukraine has just concluded. It’s Day 22 of the invasion.

Zitat:Russian Attack Helicopters Are Now Wildly Lobbing Rockets Over Ukraine

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44803/russian-attack-helicopters-are-now-wildly-lobbing-rockets-over-ukraine

[quote]So far, the tactics and application of the Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, have left many observers baffled. Compounding this is recent footage that appears to show attack helicopters from the service launching unguided rockets in an apparent effort to provide ‘airborne multiple rocket launchers‘

While most VKS attack helicopters involved in the conflict have been noted carrying unguided rockets, as well as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), what makes this footage extraordinary is the way the rockets are fired. Starting at low level, each helicopter pulls up into a fairly steep climb, launching rockets as they gain height. At the same time, they eject infrared decoy flares, typical practice to counter the man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that are prevalent in Ukrainian hands. The helicopters then break to the left, dive down to lower altitude, and fly away.

The thinking behind this rocket-launching tactic is unclear, but has already been the subject of pretty intense online debate. Firstly, it is almost certain these are unguided rockets. What we are likely seeing, then, is unguided rockets being fired in an upward trajectory, which would extend their range by a considerable margin, but at the same time would reduce their accuracy substantially. .......Launching them on a parabolic trajectory will ensure they fly further, but they will also disperse much more widely.

One explanation is that these VKS attack helicopters are simply using their unguided rockets in a fairly indiscriminate way, much like how some multiple rocket launcher systems can be used, to rain down explosives on a wide area.

The decision to launch rockets further from whatever the objective was also likely points to a particularly well-defended target being under attack.

This ballistic rocket-launching tactic could very well be an attempt to mitigate the threat posed by Ukrainian air defenses. If that’s the case, the presence of Ukrainian MANPADS or other low-level missiles, in this instance, seems to have had the effect of reducing the accuracy of VKS airstrikes, by forcing the attacking helicopters to greatly reduce their exposure to these missiles.

There is one other possibility that could also explain this tactic. Among the wide range of warheads available for the S-8 rocket is the S-8P, a jamming rocket that provides protection for the launch aircraft, or other nearby helicopters, by dispensing metalized fiberglass chaff. Potentially, the helicopters may be attempting to disrupt air defense radar or other radio-frequency emitters in the area, for their own safety, or that of other friendly aircraft.

Furthermore, another video shows this kind of ballistic rocket-firing being practiced in a training scenario, suggesting it’s a recognized tactic. There are also reports that Russian helicopters have operated this way during the Syrian campaign.

Indeed, there is also this example from a Cold War-era East German training manual explaining a similar tactic, albeit this time making use of the Mi-24 Hind helicopter. Interestingly, this manual also notes that a disadvantage of the tactic is that the rocket warheads are less likely to detonate on impact, due to a slower impact speed.

Zitat:3/25 Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions. As I noted two days ago, the Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate.

4/25 With the strain on the Russian forces (and their slovenly plans) showing, the Russian high command has gone back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. We are now seeing Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine.

5/25 Plan C can be described as: hold current gains, long range firepower on cities, foreign fighters as cannon fodder, destroy as much infrastructure & manufacturing as possible, expand the war to the west to deter foreign volunteers & aid providers.

6/25 The new Russian campaign also seems to have a punitive, almost medieval, aspect to it. The Russians appear to be punishing the Ukrainian people for daring to stand against the Russian bear, while hoping they capitulate. ‘Hope’ is a bad course of action in war.

Karte Kiew:

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1504219084908490754/photo/1

7/25 A key part on Russia’s ‘Plan C’ appears to be the Russian encirclement and capture of Kyiv. On 6 March, I explored how Russia might capture Kyiv. In the 11 days since, the Russians have slowly, inexorably closed on the Ukrainian capital but at very high cost.

8/25 Why does Kyiv matter? The capture of Kyiv is the main effort for the Russian military campaign in Ukraine. Russian possession of Kyiv is essential for Putin’s desired political end state for the war – Ukrainian subservience.

9/25 Kyiv’s importance to the Ukrainians has only grown as the war has progressed. It remains the centre of Ukraine’s democratic government. It is from here that President Zelensky leads his nation – and shapes world opinion about the war.

10/25 Holding Kyiv also provides a major psychological boost for Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians. So, to the Russian President, the capture of Kyiv is essential to ‘his’ defeat of Ukraine.

11/25 What might be the key features of any battle for control of Kyiv? First, the Russians are severely short in personnel. They can’t take the whole city. They will focus only on key nodes & parts of the city where Ukrainian politicians, government officials & military HQ are.

12/25 Second, urban operations are significantly more expensive in human life than combat operations in other environments. We will see a spike in casualties – both civilian and military. It will be a large spike.

13/25 Third, perhaps because of the high threat posed by urban operations, we may see more autonomous systems on the ground, and in the air, to reduce risk to human combatants. It is one thing I expected to see more of in this war.

Ebenso!

14/25 Fourth, we can’t visualise this as a single massive battle. It won’t be. It will be thousands of micro-battles between different combatants in streets, buildings, rubble, tunnels, towers, in the air & info domain. This will be very difficult for either side to control.

15/25 Fifth, this lack of control, combined with limited visibility and the brutalisation of soldiers that occurs in this kind of combat, means that the potential for war crimes is significantly increased in any fight for Kyiv.

16/25 Sixth, both sides will need to fight in combined arms teams that are well lead and logistically supported. This means tanks, accompanied by infantry, logistics, UAVs, repair and recovery assets, and many, many combat engineers.

17/25 And if they are smart (which there has not been a lot of evidence for on the Russian side in this war), lots and lots of armoured bulldozers. We know for sure the Russians have them.

18/25 Finally, airpower and air defence, are important. Currently, the Ukrainians are holding their own in the air fight. As for the Russians, I don’t think the head of the Russian Army will be sending a Christmas card to the Russian Air Force this year.

9/25 However, this remains a hypothetical for now. There have been many predictions of ‘imminent’ Russian assaults against the capital. But as @danlamothe
notes in his latest Pentagon update, the Russians remain bogged down on Kyiv’s eastern & north-western approaches.

20/25 What are Russia’s chances of a successful seizure of Kyiv? My assessment is ‘low’. Urban operations are much more complex to plan and execute than other conventional operations. And the Russians have not shown high competence in their normal ops.

21/25 The rough rule for urban attacks (not COIN) is about 3-5 attackers for each defender. Given the number of Ukrainian defenders & complexity of the defences, the Russians will need tens of thousands of soldiers to attempt an attack into Kyiv. Tens of thousands.

22/25 And in the information battle, an assault on Kyiv will only see things get worse for the Russians. The world will focus on Kyiv as the decisive fight of the war. And most of the world will be seeking – and supporting - a Ukrainian victory.

23/25 So any Russian attack on Kyiv will be very costly for soldiers (especially infantry, armour and commanders) and civilians. It will also be enormously destructive with a huge post-war financial impact.

24/25 As @LawDavf
makes clear in his latest (and quite superb) analysis of the war and its financial impact on Russia, the economic costs of the Battle for Kyiv will be extraordinarily high.

25/25 If the Russians were to attack into Kyiv (not just missile attacks) it would be drawn-out battle that will last weeks, possibly months. Given the military disaster this campaign has already been for Russia, things could get much worse for them in Kyiv. End.