Zitat:Willkommen im Forum

Zitat:Because if you failed to deal with Ukraine, why do you threaten NATO? Why do you threaten the US? You could not deal with Zelensky, so what are you?

Zitat: Whatever treaty Russia may sign with current Ukraine regime will mean the defeat of Russia.

Zitat:This treaty may be the beginning of the end of the Russian State

Zitat:Gesamtkarte:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1508274710223720450/photo/1

1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 30-32: The past 72 hours has seen Ukrainian forces continue to conduct localized counterattacks in the Kyiv area, Sumy Oblast, and around Kharkiv & Izium. Russian forces continue to press in the Donbass & Mariupol.

2/ Today’s update will focus areas that have seen significant activity in the last 72 hrs, namely Kyiv, Sumy, the Donbas, Mariupol. Note, my last update erroneously placed the attack of Russian warships in the Mariupol area, this was a map error. The attack occurred in Beriansk.

3/ Humanitarian Impact. Refugees in various European countries reach 5 million, with 6.5 million IDPs throughout Ukraine. Civilian suffering in many Ukrainian cities continue to reach new depths of inhumanity and cruelty. Although international aid increases, suffering persists.

4/ Weather assessment. Forecasted rain and wintery mix for 5 of the next 10 days will adversely affect aerospace and ground operations, potentially slowing down offensive momentum. Temperatures generally will remain between 15/-2 C.

Die Russen werden in den nächsten Tagen so absaufen im Schlamm dass alles zu spät sein wird!

Karte Raum Kiew:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1508275239775526924/photo/1

5/ Kyiv Front. Ukrainian forces continue to press counterattacks west of Kyiv in Irpin, Bucha, Vorzel, Borodyanka, Andrivka, and Makariv. East of Kyiv Ukrainian forces have recaptured Luk’yanivka, forcing most of the Russian forces in the area to retreat.

Meiner Ansicht nach ist es umgekehrt und die Russen lassen sich zurück fallen und die Ukrainer setzen lediglich nach!

Detailkarte von Kiew:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1508275558509068291/photo/1

6/ Kyiv AO. Kyiv has most likely shifted in importance from a strategic decisive point Russia seeks to seize to a political objective point Russia will contain. Maintaining pressure on Kyiv denies Uk force in the east, a front that holds greater chance for Russian success.

Sumy:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1508275690470359046/photo/1

7/ Sumy Front. Russian forces are unable to ensure the unimpeded flow of supplies and reinforcements throughout the Sumy Oblast. There are numerous unsubstantiated reports that Russian forces may be withdrawing forces from the Sumy area.

In der Gegend wird aktuell das russische Feuer immer sporadischer. Den geht anscheinend dort auch die Mun aus oder diese wird woanders hin gebracht und dort verwendet.

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1508275936105582600/photo/1

8/ Sumy AO. It is unknown if these reports indicate a shifting of Russian forces in response to Ukrainian counterattacks, or they constitute a move to drastically alter Russian disposition in the Chernihiv & Sumy Oblasts to reinforce success or create opportunity on other fronts.

Karte Donbass:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1508276189651214338/photo/1

9/ Donbas Front assessment. Russian forces continue to try and advance past southern Izium, but localized Ukrainian counterattacks have been able to contain them to Izium. Further west Ukrainian force have recaptured that Novovorontsovka (SE of Kryvyi Rih).

Man kann an dieser Stelle mal betonen, dass die Seperatisten welche da kämpfen extrem schlecht ausgerüstet waren und sind. Die wirken teilweise mehr wie eine 2WK Reenactment Veranstaltung (tatsächlich mit 2WK Stahlhelm und Mosin Nagant!) und sind von der Ausrüstung her teilweise unter irgendwelchen Islamisten-Milizen in Dritte Welt Ländern. Es ist eher erstaunlich dass die Seperatisten überhaupt in der Lage sind gegen die Ukrainer hier mitzuhalten. Offenkundig hat Russland 8 Jahre verschenkt in denen es die Seperatisten militärisch hätte aufbauen können!

Mariopol:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1508276407381762052/photo/1

10/ Mariupol. The Russian forces continue to press deeper into Mariupol. It is possible that the city defenses may soon be bisected by Russian forces advancing from east to west. Social media reporting continues to document the intense indiscriminate targeting of Mariupol.

Ein Musterbeispiel dafür was passiert wenn man dem Gegner überhaupt keine ernsthafte Möglichkeit lässt außer bis zum Tod zu kämpfen. Die Nazi-Milizen in der Stadt haben gar keine Wahl als bis zum letzten Blutstropfen und der letzten Patrone weiter zu machen.

11/ Aerospace Assessment. Over the past 72 hrs. the UAF states it has destroyed 18 Russian air targets: 1x fighter, 12x UAVs, 5x cruise missiles. VKS continues to increase the pace and extent of its strikes throughout Ukraine to break the UAF and IADs.

Was angesichts der Schwemme von Fliegerfäusten dafür spricht, dass die Russen immer vorsichtiger werden.

12/ In this interview, UAF pilots’ detail that they have been able to retain contested control of Ukrainian airspace except in areas like Mariupol. The pilots state there is good integration between fighters and IADs, but Russia does have better equipment.

13/ Information War. There has been a lot of commentary on the recent Russian General Staff briefing. While a good part of this brief was no doubt strategic messaging to a domestic audience, I think it is unwise to dismiss the brief in its entirety.

14/ I will not go into much depth on it here, as I am incorporating more extensive thoughts for a later date. But I do want to address a few points as objectively as it is possible from a Western point of view.

15/ First, there is a lot about the brief that is misleading and not true. Namely the claims of Ukrainian equipment destroyed (unverifiable), statements about not targeting civilians, Russian & Ukrainian casualty figures, the accuracy of Russian PGMs, etc.

16/ These exaggerated / false comments are not surprises, and therefore should not be of immense importance at this moment for analysis, though in themselves they do relieve a lot about how Russia views / will ultimately frame their theory of victory.

17/ Of more importance is the apparent emphasis being placed on the Donbas. Securing the DPR & LPR Oblast administrative borders is a stated war aim of the Kremlin, as indicated by Putin in his speech of 23 February.

18/ With the failed attempt to take Kyiv in the opening week of the war to install a puppet government it could “negotiate” with to impose its political will on Ukraine, it is clear the Kremlin seeks to achieve the conquest of the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblast.

19/ This aligns with Russian ongoing attempts to establish a “Kherson People’s Republic”, which is an obvious attempt to revive the Novorossiya Project. This will more than likely become the focus of Russian operations.

20/ Russian forces will continue to tie down Ukrainian forces before Kyiv, in NE Ukraine, and before Kharkiv, however the focus of major offensive action will be in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. I will expand more on this soon.

21/ Battle Damage Assessment. Russian losses in equipment continue to mount at a pace that is hard for repair and replacements to match. The Russian military has established a major resupply and refurbishment site in the Bryansk Oblast.

Auch an anderen Stellen legen sie inzwischen Depots an und Logistik-Basen und Versorgungspunkte. Geht aber alles kaum voran.

(28.03.2022, 09:49)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Dieser Umstand, dass nicht nur das Material fragwürdig ist, sondern dass vor allem anderen das Können und die Fähigkeiten der russischen Soldaten derart schlecht sind, ist für mich die größte Verblüffung in diesem Krieg. Das die Panzer veraltet sind, die Wartung schlecht, die Logistik eine Katastrophe, dass hatte ich ehrlich gesagt so erwartet. Aber dass die Soldaten selbst so schlecht sind vom Können her, dass ist erstaunlich, da hatte ich viel mehr Können angenommen.

Zitat:Da Russland ein Staat interner Sicherheitskräfte und der vor allem gegen die eigene Bevölkerung gerichteten Geheimdienste ist (es wird ja oft vergessen dass der FSB der Inlandsgeheimdienst ist) und darin seine eigentliche Stärke besteht (im Kampf gegen die eigenen Bürger), wird Russland selbst bei einer Niederlage keineswegs untergehen. Es wird deutlich unfreier werden, deutlich repressiver, die Ukraine wird umgekehrt einige kleinere Gebiete verlieren und dadurch schlußendlich weiterhin für lange Zeit geteilt werden. Für die Ukraine ist das natürlich dann trotzdem ein spektakulärer Sieg und im Endeffekt die Geburtsstunde einer tatsächlich geeinten und einigen wahren Nation Ukraine.

(28.03.2022, 15:20)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Zudem möchte ich zu bedenken geben, dass das beschriebene Phänomen primär Wehrpflichtige betrifft und jetzt komme ich zum Hauptpunkt: in der Ukraine sind bisher vor allem anderen Berufssoldaten eingesetzt (Kontraktniki).

Zitat:Es wäre interessant zu wissen, wie hoch dieser Anteil ist.

Zitat:Russian tank regiment commander killed himself ‘after finding out 90% of tanks held in reserve were unusable because parts had been stolen

Ministry of Defence said the commander of the '13th tank regiment' within the '4th tank division of the Russian Federation' shot himself due to the dire situation after learning the condition of the unit's reserve tanks.

The update also said that in general, Moscow's forces were struggling with poorly maintained military vehicles and is facing 'the problem of the impossibility of restoring equipment after "deconservation" from warehouses.'

It said that in many cases, electronic equipment that contained precious metals had been stripped for parts from many Russian combat vehicles held in storage.

In its update posted to the ministry's Telegram channel, it claimed that Russia was building storage and repair facilities in the Klimove, Bryansk region to fix the equipment that had been disabled on the battlefield.

'Currently, the enemy RVB is trying to 'put into operation' a significant amount of equipment coming from long-term storage facilities,' the update claimed.

Zitat:In theory, Russia was on the right track

Between 2008 and 2012, the Russian military discarded many of its legacy Soviet military structures following its operations in Georgia.

Next, a more profound transformation was undertaken: This included the Russian state armament program to compensate for 20 years of divestment in its armed forces.

It also reorganised its armed forces and built a smaller and more professional permanent force.

The transformation program also placed a high priority on joint exercises, enhanced readiness, improved training and a program to replace conscripts with contracted personnel.

New equipment, new ideas about future war, a more professional force at higher readiness and lessons from recent combat in Syria.

In theory, the combination of these elements, as well as its much larger size than the Ukrainian armed forces, should have given Russia a war-winning combination in Ukraine. What has gone wrong?

Like recent revelations about falsified intelligence on Ukraine, the President of Russia was probably kept in the dark about deficiencies in the Russian military.

If Putin had invested hundreds of billions of dollars in the military over the previous decade, who was going to tell him it wasn't working?

However, experienced Russia observers in the West were saying as early as 2017 that the power of the Russian military was overestimated, it was challenged by overstretch and was technologically backward. These observers have been proved right in the past two weeks.

There is an important lesson here for Western defence planners: They must have informed goals for military effectiveness in the 21st century.

And, if they are surrounded by yes-men and are not transparent with the outcomes of military transformation programs, they will probably get the wrong answers.

A second problem may be that the Russians got the balance of investment in different military services wrong.

US scholar Michael Kofman has written that the overall focus of Russian military development from 2008 to 2014 "was to counter Western advantages in air power … To this end, much of the investment initially did not go towards Russian ground forces".

Getting the balance of investment in land, air, maritime, cyber and information domains wrong can have catastrophic consequences.

Its army has been out-thought and outfought for most of the war. The conduct of Russian information operations has been a spectacular failure compared to their Ukrainian adversaries.

Western defence planners should also take heed of this. There is a trend in some circles in several nations to focus on heavy investments in maritime warfare.

It is useful for manufacturing, and there is a lot of water in the Pacific. But it is conceivable that governments might overinvest in naval forces at the cost of air, land and information operations.

It is hardly useful to sink enemy ships if you cannot then destroy their aircraft or soldiers on the ground.

Gerasimov made much of the lessons from Syria. He has described how Russia had acquired "priceless combat experience in Syria".

Despite this emphasis on Syria, the Russians appear to have taken away many wrong lessons.

The war in Syria was an intervention at the invitation of a host government to suppress the population.

While the Russians did not engage in large-scale ground operations, it ended up being a conflict with many lessons irrelevant to Ukraine.

After two decades of low-level counterinsurgency warfare, Western governments must also be careful about what lessons are taken from these conflicts.

Rarely were Western forces challenged in the air or at sea. And there was never a time when Western forces had to fight on the land, in the air, at sea or in the cyber and information domains all at once.