Zitat:Die russische Kampfgruppe manövriert nicht. Die drei Gruppenführer des Zuges (von denen zwei, die nicht Zugführer sind, beim Anlanden herausfinden, was vor sich geht) sind nicht darauf trainiert, selbstständig zu handeln. Die Gruppe ist nicht auf Manöver ausgerichtet, sondern dient lediglich als Basis für Anti-Personen- und Panzerabwehrfeuer. Es ist der russische Zug allein, der unter dem Befehl eines Leutnants manövriert, der keinen Funker hat und das Kommando über den gesamten Zug (drei Gruppen und drei Fahrzeuge, die zugegebenermaßen oft dem Stellvertreter überlassen werden) mit dem Funknetz in den Ohren verwalten muss. In der Bilanz ist das schwierig und die Manöver sind begrenzt, mit einem Zug, der auf kleinem Raum sehr eng zusammensteht. Auch hier mit einer geringen Truppenstärke reichen einige Verluste aus, um die Gesamtwirksamkeit sehr schnell zu verringern, und wenn der Zugführer neutralisiert wird, ist der Zug gelähmt.

Zitat:Gesamtkarte:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1513354960469213188/photo/1

1/ Surmising a revised Russian OPLAN. Here are my thoughts on what Russia’s revised operational plan may look like. I have constructed this off what I consider the most logical operational approach that can yield positive results

2/ Given Russian operational performance to date I realize that this assessment may end up being wildly off. Producing a reliable open-source analysis is difficult to say the least. Information is scarce & what is available is heavily weighted in favor of Ukraine.

3/ Still, to understand where this war is going, what conditions military operations will create in the coming weeks, and how they may set conditions for a negotiated settlement an attempt to surmise a logical course of action is necessary.

4/ I do not see the Kremlin altering their war aims in Ukraine. If anything, the defeat of Russian forces in Kyiv have caused Putin & his top advisors to see the fulfillment of their war aims as vital to the survival of their regime. Therefore, I feel they will remain in place.

Das kann man nicht genug betonen. Für die geht es bereits um Sieg oder Tod. Das heißt: Russland wird diesen Krieg rein militärisch nicht verlieren. Unter gar keinen wie auch immer gearteten Umständen. Die Ukraine wird zerstört werden, der Westen diesen Stellvertreterkrieg vielleicht "bis zum letzten Ukrainer" führen können, aber das Endergebnis steht schon fest. Russland verliert politisch und geostrategisch und gewinnt militärisch. Die Ukraine wird vernichtet werden. Es sei den die Ukrainer lenken ein.

5/ I have added what I feel are the Ukrainian government’s war aims to this assessment. Essential they are the opposite of Russia’s aims but contain important nuances that offer a “golden bridge” (i.e., making the Russians feel they have achieved a goal).

6/ BLUF, Ukraine seeks a condition in which they are politically independent of Russia, Russia recognizes Ukraine’s international borders, does not oppose its membership into the EU, and its future security is guaranteed by a legally binding agreement with world powers.

7/ Russia has already stated that it has achieved the goal of “demilitarization” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (25 March General Staff press conference). This goal was described as the reduction of Ukraine’s ability to threaten the Donbas & Russia.

8/ Though the claims made as to the level of destruction suffered by the UAF & its defense industrial base were exaggerated, it can be inferred that significant damage has been inflicted on the Ukrainian military, to the point the General Staff can claim a goal has been met.

9/ The Ukrainian concession of seeking a legally binding international security guarantee backed by the U.S. & major European powers to prevent future Russian aggression in lieu of NATO membership is a golden bridge for Russia’s 2nd war aim.

10/ This leaves the question of Crimea and the Donbas the only stated grievance remaining to be resolved by both parties. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is prepared to negotiate this point without a clear battlefield victory. This will be the focus of future operations.

11/ Russia is still faced with three key questions that need to be answered to properly allocate forces & resources to achieve its goals of Ukrainian acquiescence to its annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Separatist Republics.

12/ First, what military conditions much be produced to achieve the strategic goals? Second, what is sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions? Finally, how should forces and resources be arrayed to accomplish that sequence of actions?

13/ The logical conditions Russia must achieve to meet its strategic goals is the ability of the Russian military to seize and hold the entirety of the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, retain territory it occupies in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and hold Kherson and its environs.

14/ The logical sequence of actions to obtain these conditions is to conduct simultaneous operations in designated Battle and Disruption Zones in each of these Oblasts, to include Kharkiv, and a series of sequential offensive actions in Donetsk.

15/ Terminology. Disruption Zone – Operations in these areas create windows of opportunity that is exploitable in the battle zone by attacking specific components of the enemy’s defensive systems and cause it to breakdown.

16/ Terminology. Battle Zone – Operations in these areas are decisive, using all components of available combat power, an armed force closes & engages with the enemy to defeat him. Doing so increases the likelihood to compel him to negotiations.

17/ Given the operational realities Russia is faced with (i.e., limited manpower, poor morale, fragmented command & control, substandard maintenance, inexperienced leaders, etc.) it’s military can only reasonably focus offensive operations in one area.

18/ It is assessed the primary battle zone for Russian forces will be in north central Donetsk. Located here is the Donets River Line, Severodonetsk Salient, and former Line of Contact running SE to SW from Popasna to Donetsk along with 7x Ukrainian maneuver brigades.

9/ This area also constitutes one of the most fortified areas of east Ukraine. Russian attempts to break through the Ukrainian LOC over nearly two months of combat have proven unsuccessful. It is likely that Russian forces now massing near Izium will attempt to outflank the line.

Weiterhin stellen das aktuelle Wetter und das Gelände die Russen vor immense Probleme was Flankenangriffe darstellt. Aber das wird irgendwann enden und der Krieg wird dann immer noch weiter gehen.

20/ Russian forces will advance on Slovyansk, but this will more than likely be meant as a feint to fix Ukrainian maneuver brigades along in the Severodonetsk Salient. It is more likely that Russian forces will seize the decisive geographic point of Barvinkove & then push SW.

21/ The objective of this drive will most likely be decisive geographic point of Pokrovsk which is 79 km NW of Donetsk. The goal is likely to control the main highway from Barvinkove to Pokrovsk & create a cauldron out of north central & NE Donetsk.

Da bin ich mal gespannt, den diese Einschätzung teile ich ganz und gar nicht. Meiner Meinung nach wird man versuchen die Ukrainer frontal zu werfen (siehe unten)

22/ The Russian concept of a cauldron is a very large strategic-level concentration of trapped enemy forces. In the cauldron, Ukrainian forces would be contained but not directly engaged. Russian VKS, artillery, and other stand-off weapons would reduce Ukrainian resistance.

23/ The Russians could close the cauldron or leave an opening to encourage Ukrainian troops to flee through, either way Russian forces would be able to clear the most fortified region of Donetsk without having to physically push Ukraine forces out of their positions (in theory).

24/ The Russians used this approach during the Battle of Debaltseve (14 January – 20 February 2015), forcing Ukrainian units to retreat from a key portion of the LOC. Success of this smaller cauldron allowed Russia to gain a more favorable negotiating position for Minsk II.

25/ The second battle zone would be around Kherson. Here we would expect to see priority of forces and resources behind those sent to the Donetsk battle zone to maintain control of this decisive strategic point. A point necessary for a favorable negotiation position.

26/ Kharkiv remains the principal disruption zone. Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix a substantial portion of Ukrainian mechanized forces, denying their involvement for operations in Donetsk.

27/ A second disruption zone will center near the northern border of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Like Kharkiv Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix several maneuver brigades from counterattacks in Donetsk.

28/ A potential third disruption zone is Kyiv itself. Although it is unknown if Russia intends to continue any sort of offensive action against the Ukrainian capital, air & missile strikes have the potential to divert critical resources away from east Ukraine.

29/ Of course all of this is speculation. The Russian approach to operations in the Donbas may be drastically different. They may opt to go head on with prepared Ukrainian defenses, hoping that artillery and air strikes can overcome stiff resistance.

Das ist meine Einschätzung für die anstehende Schlacht.

30/ Russia may finally use chemical weapons to force Ukrainian units from their prepared defenses and into the open where they are vulnerable to air & artillery strikes. Such a move would bring a new level of barbarity to the fighting.

Das ständige Geheule wegen chemischen Waffen ist absurd, und rein politisch. Chemische Waffen sind im Prinzip besser und menschlicher als viele andere völlig legale Waffensyteme (ja ich weiß!)

31/ Without reliable data this assessment is really a wild stab in the dark, but it might provide a glimpse of what is in the realm of the possible. One thing I have not discussed is Ukrainian options, this is because there is even less verified Ukrainian data than Russian.

32/ One thing that can be guessed about the Ukrainian military is they are stretched thin too. Combat losses for Ukraine are equally a challenge to overcome. It is highly likely Ukraine will be unable to muster enough forces for a major counteroffensive for quite some time. END.

Zitat:In On the Origin of the Species, Charles Darwin wrestled with the question of why people would ever be willing to risk themselves for strangers. Only in 1871, in The Descent of Man, did Darwin find an answer: Societies that include brave people in their population would have an advantage when faced with hopeless causes — situations in which the brave act without regard for personal survival in the event of success. In other words, particularly in existential conflicts when losses against a competing group could mean genetic or cultural extinction, moral commitments to group loyalty, sacrifice, and heroism are most consequential.

Zitat:+++ Liveticker +++

Krieg in der Ukraine: Detonation auf russischem Raketenkreuzer

Die Besatzung des russischen Raketenkreuzers «Moskwa» ist nach einer Detonation evakuiert worden. Laut russischen Angaben ist auf dem Schiff Munition infolge eines Brands explodiert. Kiew meldete, das Schiff sei von einer ukrainischen Anti-Schiffsrakete getroffen worden.

Zitat:Russian Navy Confirms Severe Damage to Black Sea Cruiser Moskva, Crew Abandoned Ship

The Russian Navy’s Black Sea flagship has suffered major damage and the crew has abandoned the ship, state media said late Tuesday in reports following Ukrainian claims of hitting the ship with a missile strike.

The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed the mishap on RTS Moskva (121), a ship in the country’s Black Sea Fleet, according to state-run outlet TASS. [...] Moskva the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet was severely damaged and the crew abandoned ship, the Russian Defense Ministry told TASS.

A fire broke out on the ship, causing ammunition to detonate, according to TASS. State media did not elaborate on the cause of the fire.

Zitat:In der Bevölkerung kann die Regierung mit Zuspruch für den Schritt rechnen. Denn diese ist mehrheitlich sehr skeptisch gegenüber Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine eingestellt. Laut einer Umfrage sind 65 Prozent der Griechen der Meinung, ihr Land sollte in dem Krieg neutral bleiben. 39 Prozent wollen, dass Griechenland sich nicht an den EU-Sanktionen gegen Russland beteiligt. Über ein Drittel zeigt „Verständnis“ für die russische Invasion.

Zitat:Russisches Flaggschiff "Moskwa" ist gesunken

Der Raketenkreuzer "Moskwa" hat eine Schlüsselrolle in den Bemühungen Russlands gespielt, eine "Dominanz seiner Marine im Schwarzen Meer" herzustellen, sagt ein Sprecher der US-Regierung. Noch immer ist unklar, ob das Schiff durch eine Explosion an Bord oder einen ukrainischen Angriff gesunken ist.

Der beschädigte russische Raketenkreuzer "Moskwa" ist nach russischen Angaben gesunken. Der Raketenkreuzer habe sein "Gleichgewicht" verloren und sei bei starkem Seegang untergegangen, als er in Richtung eines Hafens geschleppt worden sei, teilte das Verteidigungsministerium in Moskau mit. Die "Moskwa" war das Flaggschiff der russischen Schwarzmeerflotte. [...] Zu den Ursachen der Schäden an der Moskau wiederholte das russische Verteidigungsministerium am Abend seine Darstellung, dass Munition an Bord explodiert sei. Durch das anschließende Feuer sei der Rumpf beschädigt worden. Dies habe dann zum Untergang der "Moskwa" geführt. [...]

Das Moskauer Verteidigungsministerium äußerte sich am Donnerstagabend aber weiterhin nicht dazu, wie die Explosion ausgelöst wurde. Zuvor hatte es erklärt, es lasse die Ursache der Detonation untersuchen.

Zitat:Shoigu ist aus dem Spiel, er könnte behindert werden, wenn er überlebt. Er hatte plötzlich einen massiven Herzinfarkt, er liegt auf der Intensivstation, an die Geräte angeschlossen. Gerüchten zufolge konnte der Herzinfarkt keine natürlichen Ursachen haben.

20 Generäle der MO wurden festgenommen. Alle Hauptquartiere. Hier ist alles klar - die totale Unterschlagung von Geldern für die Vorbereitung der ukrainischen Führung und der Bevölkerung auf das feierliche Treffen der Armee der Befreier aus Russland. Seit 2014 wurden etwa 10 Milliarden Dollar gestohlen, die Putin für die Vorbereitung des Blitzkriegs bereitgestellt hatte.

Zitat:Gesamtkarte:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1515178039327535106/photo/1

1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 47-51: The past 120 hrs. have seen Russian forces attempt to break through the Donets River Line & Severodonetsk Salient. In Mariupol Russian forces have made multiple gains, Ukrainian defenses still hold SW & central Mariupol.

Diese Durchbruchsversuche von denen er hier schreibt wurden übrigens mit einem Artilleriefeuer unterstützt was weitgehend an den 1WK erinnert hat (kein Schreibfehler, ich meine den 1)

2/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees top 6.4 million, with over 6.6 million IDPs throughout Ukraine. The extent of destruction to Ukrainian cities due to recent fighting is becoming more apparent as UN UNOSAT data becomes available.

Vogelwild:

https://t.me/ukrpravda_news/14556

3/ Weather Impact. The 10-day forecast for most of the Donbas-Kherson TVD will comprise of increased cloud cover & rainstorms, wind speed will generally average at 10 mph. These conditions will degrade air & artillery strikes, while restricting ground movement.

Karte Raum Kharkiv:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1515178046134919179/photo/1

4/ Kharkiv OD. Russian forces remained focused on fixing Ukrainian maneuver units in the Kharkiv area while screening the movement of Russian forces from Belgorod to Izium. Ukrainian forces appear to be opting for limited attacks against Russian critical targets.

Die Ukrainer stecken da mit ihren mechanisierten Verbänden übrigens auch witterungsbedingt zur Zeit fest.

5/ The Ukrainian SOF attack on the railroad bridge in Shebekino is indicative of the type of Ukrainian offensive action we will see in the Kharkiv OD so the foreseeable future. Raids of this nature are crucial to defeating Russian operations near Izium.

Die ukrainischen Sondereinheiten haben schon mehrere herausragende Operationen durchgeführt, Lehrbuchmäßig bis Episch! Stoff für mehrere Bücher und Filme. Das führt zu der Frage, woher sie ein derartiges Niveau haben und dem folgend zu etlichen Ausbildungs-Missionen der Green Berets in den letzten Jahren.

Karte Severodonetsk:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1515178048055828482/photo/1

6/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. Russian forces continue daily small-scale attacks SE & SW of Izium and against Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, and Popasna. Russia continues to feed reinforcements piecemeal into combat like they did around Kyiv.

Dieses verkleckern von Kräften in lauter zu kleinen Angriffswellen deutet meiner Meinung nach auf einen großen (politischen) Druck auf russischer Seite hin. Man verschwendet seine Kräfte in lauter unzureichenden Angriffen mit völlig unzureichenden, zu kleinen Verbänden.

7/ This approach squanders what offensive capability Russia has left. Conversely this plays to Ukraine’s defensive strengths and will allow Ukrainian forces to gradually attrit Russian combat power and enable transition to more significant counterattacks.

Karte Süden:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1515178050023038980/photo/1

8/ Zaporizhzhia OD. Russian activity in the in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast remains focused on the capture of Mariupol. Limited attacks and counterattacks by Russian and Ukrainian forces continue between the line running from Vasylivka to Volnovakha.

Karte Mariupol:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1515178051809779715/photo/1

10/ Mariupol. The situation in Mariupol continues to deteriorate for Ukrainian defenders, yet they hold on to SW & central Mariupol. It is unclear how much longer they can hold out, but the increase of Russian strike activity suggests they have heavily damaged Russian forces.

Die spannende Frage ist hier meiner Meinung nach, wieviele russische Kräfte der Fall der Stadt dann frei setzen wird.

Karte Kherson:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1515178052845723649/photo/1

11/ Odesa-Kherson OD. Russian forces continue to struggle with maintaining meaningful control of Kherson. Attempts to expand the Russian defensive perimeter west of Kherson have not been successful. Ukraine may launch larger counterattacks here.

12/ Aerospace Assessment. According to Oryx, Russia has lost a total of 32 UAVs since 24 Feb, 21 of which have been destroyed while the other 11 have been captured. The Ukrainian forces report 6x Orlan-10 recon UAVs destroyed in the Donbas this week.

Russland hat aber hunderte dieser Drohnen einsatzbereit. Von daher sind diese Verluste völlig irrelevant.

13/ Chem-Bio-Nuclear. Though it is difficult to verify if the Russians did conduct a chemical attack in Mariupol, it is possible this attack occured. Mariupol is ideal to test delivery of chemical munitions by UAV, given the ambiguity of information coming from the city.

14/ Battle Damage Assessment. The Ukrainian General Staff reports Ukrainian forces have repelled 6 attacks throughout the Donbas over the past 24 hours, destroying 4x tanks, 6x armored vehicles, 4x unarmored vehicles, and 1x artillery system.

15/ Information Advantage. The sinking of the Black Seas Fleet flagship, the Moskva, is an important psychological victory for Ukraine, being the largest ship sunk in combat since World War II. The Moskva was the only BSF ship with long-range air defense.

16/ Resisting Occupation. The arrest of Viktor Medvedchuck is an important political victory for Ukraine, as Medvedchuck (who escaped house arrest in February) was the Kremlin’s strongest Ukrainian government ally.

17/ Overall Assessment. Both Ukraine and Russia will not reenter negotiations until they have gained a clear upper hand through operational success in the Donbas. Continued battlefield failures will make the Kremlin more erratic and prone to resort to desperate measures.

Zitat:British special forces have trained local troops in Kyiv for the first time since the war with Russia began, Ukrainian commanders have told The Times.

Officers from two battalions stationed in and around the capital said they had undergone military training, one last week and the other the week before.

Captain Yuriy Myronenko, whose battalion is stationed in Obolon on the northern outskirts of Kyiv, said that military trainers had come to instruct new and returning military recruits to use NLAWs, British-supplied anti-tank missiles that were delivered in February as the invasion was beginning.

Zitat:It is 7 weeks since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. Today I examine how the Russians have fared in the ongoing adaptation battle, which is a feature in all wars. 1/25

2/25 It is impossible for the military to anticipate every eventuality in war. With human capacity for surprise, resilience, and intelligence, as well as selfishness, cowardness and stupidity, there are a range of potential outcomes that are possible in warfare.

3/25 Michael Howard suggested in the “The Uses and Abuses of Military History” that military institutions normally get the next war wrong, mostly for reasons beyond their control. As such, an important virtue for military organizations must be adaptability to unexpected events.

4/25 Back in March I explored the concept of adaptation in war, as well as how Russian transformation efforts since 2008 appear to have paid minimal dividends for them at the tactical & strategic levels.

5/25 The month since then has provided more insights into the adaptive capacity of the Russian military.

6/25 The Russians had to adapt their campaign within the first 48 hours because their attempt at a lightening conquest of Ukraine failed. This was most obvious in the attempts to capture Kyiv. They had to adapt their campaign to the realities of Ukraine’s defensive strategy.

7/25 However, the adaptations by the Russians only manifested as ‘throw more tanks and soldiers at the problem’ and ‘terrorise the populace’. Their sloppy integration of combined arms, and air-land integration, did not appear to change.

8/25 After seizing parts of northern Ukraine, a lack of forces & inability to logistically support the northern campaign meant Russia was unable to make an operational breakthrough. The northern campaign was a debacle & ended in March.

9/25 Have we seen a demonstrated institutional capacity to learn from this by the Russians? The answer is, maybe. The areas examined are overall strategy, command, logistics, combined arms, air support and leadership.

10/25 Russia has adapted its #strategy, although this has been ad hoc, and driven by failure. The Russian Plan B after the first 48 hours was a ‘creeping, multi-axis attrition’. It featured more firepower, as well as destruction of smaller cities to set an example to Kyiv.

11/25 The Russians rested Plan B on ‘mass on multiple fronts’ being able to win the day in the north, east and south. This dispersed strategy meant there was no obvious main effort. The Russians took heavy casualties for small gains in terrain, while rear area security suffered.

12/25 The Russian high command was forced to adapt their strategic design again. In late March we saw Russia’s ‘Plan C’ strategy in Ukraine. It featured holding gains, long range firepower on cities, and destroy as much infrastructure as possible.

13/25 Despite their efforts to concentrate their forces in the east and south, the Russian force still has too many missions with too few combat formations. This demonstrates their lack of adaptive capacity as this situation has not been addressed throughout their invasion.

Das hat politische Gründe. Da es kein Krieg sein darf, setzt man nicht genug Truppen ein, weil dies ja dann ein Krieg wäre und sein muss (aufgrund des russischen Militärsystems).

14/25 Command and control. In the planning & command of operations, the appointment of a unified commander for the Ukraine invasion – General Dvornikov – indicates the Russians accept their previous disaggregated fronts approach was suboptimal.

15/25 This is a positive adaptation from the Russian perspective. However, at the same time, Russian commanders continue to use insecure communications & are targeted by the Ukrainians. Their inability to adapt in this regard is staggering.

16/25 Combined arms warfare. The Russians continue to commit forces piecemeal in places such as Izyum, Rubizhne and Popasna. There does not appear to be an understanding of concentration of force, or unity of effort, still. No adaptation here, just tactical stupidity.

Wie oben: Politische Gründe!

17/25 They continue to experience significant challenges in their ability to coordinate combined arms maneuver on the ground. They have therefore adapted to rely more on firepower than maneuver. They are demonstrating minimal adaptive capacity in this regard.

18/25 Air Support. It is apparent that the Russian Air Force has now turned up to the fight. They have significantly increased the number of sorties flown in Ukraine. They have also improved their ability to support ground operations.

19/25 The Russian Navy? The Black Sea’s latest dive wreck shows how arrogant the Russians were in assessing Ukraine’s capacity to fight in the maritime environment. The only adaptation they have shown is to quickly steam further out to sea.

20/25 Logistics. Pentagon background briefings, as well as open-sources, indicates Russian tactical & operational logistics remains suboptimal. This probably shows significant underinvestment in the last decade in logistics and will be hard to fix quickly.

21/25 Rear area security. The Russians and their proxies have held parts of the Donbas for years. That said, if the Russians are able to advance further into Ukraine, this will bear watching. Given manpower constraints, it is likely to still be an issue.

22/25 Leadership. Soldiers act in accordance with training, tasks they are given, direct supervision from NCOs & the example of leaders. When each of these is corrupted, military effectiveness is degraded. We have seen only evidence of a corrupt military system from the Russians.

23/25 Slovenly generalship has seen a sloppy initial military strategy adapt into one which might focus on fewer areas. However, this adaptation is actually a reversion to the same military culture as the Russian Army that killed and raped its way to Berlin in WW2.

24/25 Barno & Bensahel argue military adaptation is much easier to talk about in principle than to achieve in practice. Bureaucratic resistance, battlefield friction & the enemy’s adaptations all make it harder. But it is possible, as previous successful militaries have shown.

25/25 The Russians in Ukraine have shown minimal adaptive capacity. Their organisational learning culture is almost non-existent & lessons from Syria are irrelevant. Despite this, they remain a large & very dangerous military force in the east and south. End

Zitat:Russian Bombers Just Carpet-Bombed Mariupol

Russian air force Tu-22M bombers flew into Ukrainian air space Thursday and dropped unguided bombs on Ukrainian troops in the besieged city of Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coast.

It was the first time the 120-ton, swing-wing, supersonic bombers directly have raided Ukraine since Russia widened its war on the country starting the night of Feb. 23. [...] The bombing run, which was recorded by a Russian drone and later confirmed by Ukrainian officials, could indicate that the Kremlin is running low on cruise missiles. [...] The drone footage of the Tu-22M raid clearly depicts a stick of gravity bombs exploding on the campus of the Azovstal steel plant on the eastern outskirts of Mariupol.

Zitat:+++ Entscheidung im Kampf um Mariupol rückt näher +++

In der Nacht rief die russische Armee die ukrainischen Streitkräfte in Mariupol erneut zur Aufgabe auf. Unter Berücksichtigung der "katastrophalen Situation" im Stahlwerk Asowstal biete man den eingeschlossenen ukrainischen Kämpfern sowie "ausländischen Söldnern" an, die Feindseligkeiten einzustellen und am Sonntag ab 6.00 Uhr Moskauer Zeit (5.00 Uhr MEZ) die Waffen niederzulegen, hieß es aus dem russischen Verteidigungsministerium. Allen, die ihre Waffen niederlegten, sei ihr Leben garantiert.

Zitat:Last marines defending Mariupol ‘running out of ammunition’

The 36th brigade say they face ‘death for some of us, and captivity for the rest’ as Russian offensive continues

The last Ukrainian soldiers defending Mariupol said they were “running out of ammunition” on Monday and expected to be killed or taken prisoner very soon by Russian forces surrounding the city. Writing on Facebook, the 36th brigade said its 47-day defence of Mariupol was coming to a tragic conclusion. [...] The territory controlled by Ukrainian forces has gradually shrunk to a few central areas. The surviving marines are now holed up in the Azovstal iron and steelworks next to the port. [...]

In their message, the marines in Mariupol also say they feel “written off” by their commander in chief. [...] The message ends: “It’s death for some of us, and captivity for the rest. Do not talk badly about the Marines. For we are FAITHFUL FOREVER!”