Zitat:Vladimir Frolov: Another Russian general killed during war on Ukraine in new blow for Putin

Vladimir Frolov, deputy commander of Russia’s 8th army, was given a military funeral in St Petersburg’s Serafimovskoe Cemetary on Saturday. Alexander Beglov, governor of St Petersburg, confirmed the death in a statement saying Frolov fought in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. [...] Frolov is the latest of several Russian generals reported to have been killed since Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February.

Zitat:+++ 13:44 Von der Leyen sieht russischen Staatsbankrott kommen +++

EU-Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen rechnet damit, dass die aktuellen und kommenden Sanktionen der EU und ihrer Partner den russischen Angriffskrieg in der Ukraine ausbremsen werden. Putin zerstöre mit dem Krieg auch sein eigenes Land und die Zukunft seiner Bevölkerung, sagt von der Leyen der "Bild"-Zeitung. Die EU-Sanktionen seien nicht zu lasch. "Russlands Staatsbankrott ist nur eine Frage der Zeit", so die 63-Jährige. [...]

Zitat:Investigators: Drone that crashed in Croatia carried a bomb

ZAGREB, Croatia - A military drone that apparently flew all the way from the Ukrainian war zone over three European NATO member states before crashing in the Croatian capital was armed with an explosive device, Croatian crash investigators said Wednesday.

The 6-ton Soviet-era aircraft apparently drifted uncontrolled out of Ukraine, crossed into Romania and Hungary before entering Croatia, slamming into a field near a student dormitory early morning on March 10 in Zagreb. About 40 parked cars were damaged in the large explosion, but no one was injured. [...] Members of the Croatian investigative team told reporters Wednesday that fragments of the drone found at the crash site showed that the device carried an "improvised aircraft bomb” that was filled with unknown type of explosives.

“It was unequivocally established that these were fragments of the OFAB 100-120 air bomb,” said Maj. Mile Tomic. “Both the bomb and its trigger were made in the former USSR.”

Zitat:Russia’s specialized armored personnel carrier was destroyed in Ukraine

Ukrainian soldiers inspected damaged Russian military vehicles after fighting in the Chernihiv region and found a rare heavy armored personnel carrier.

Soldiers discovered charred remains of the Russian-made, specialized BMO-T armored personnel carrier. It is a rare combat vehicle designed to carry troops armed with shoulder-fired RPO-A launchers (disposable rocket-assisted flamethrowers). [...] These combat vehicles are built in very small numbers. [...]

The BMO-T is based on the Soviet-are T-72 main battle tank chassis. The vehicle has similar protection as the T-72. [...] The design of the BMO-T is similar to the Israeli development Achzarit. [...] The BMO-T has a crew of two, including a commander and driver and provides accommodation for a section of seven soldiers.

Zitat:Russian navy head meets crew of sunken missile cruiser

April 16 (Reuters) - The head of the Russian navy, Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov, has met with crew members from the sunken missile cruiser Moskva and said they would continue to serve in the navy, the defence ministry said on Saturday.

Zitat:What Comes Next in Ukraine: Three Scenarios

https://mwi.usma.edu/what-comes-next-in-ukraine-three-scenarios/

Success in war is often a clash of institutional adaptations. The Ukrainian way of war will have to evolve from the initial successes of the war’s opening six weeks. Having observed poor Russian performance up close, Ukrainian forces must avoid the same tactical mistakes their adversaries have made. On the other side, Russia is already demonstrating some adaptation, including designating a general officer, one with significant experience in Syria, as campaign commander. Russian military leaders certainly will not underestimate the motivation or lethality of the resistance. Attritional warfare, however, may still favor the Russians and their heavy artillery and ballistic missiles. Ultimately, I foresee three alternative scenarios that could emerge in the next few weeks.

Zitat:The most likely result is a stalemate, and the West is the biggest loser if that scenario plays out as it continues to cover the costs for Ukraine’s military operations, absorb the flow of refugees and meet their humanitarian needs, and see the economic impacts (including a possible recession in Europe) of its efforts to maintain pressure on the Russian government and elites. The more protracted this war becomes, as Sir Lawrence Freedman wisely counsels, the greater the possibility that Russian President Vladimir Putin escalates in an insidious manner or that some miscalculation results in NATO becoming a direct belligerent. However, given Putin’s history, another frozen conflict could be the long-term result.

Zitat:The US Must Deny Putin’s War Aims

The United States must decide, now, to deny Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin his personal war aims.

He will not stop until he shatters the national fabric of Ukraine, its government and most especially President Volodymyr Zelensky himself.

Putin’s only vulnerability is the stopwatch measuring the speed-to-zero of Russian war funding, and the time before Russia erupts in massive civil unrest.

Putin’s job is to beat the stopwatch before the two war-ending prospects converge.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Zelensky also has a stopwatch running against him. He must do three things: Keep fighting while continuing to seek and receive aid from friendly nations, disperse his government to prevent destruction in a decapitation attack, and keep up civilian morale.

Zelensky’s greatest vulnerabilities are twofold: A possible massive Russian missile barrage or large-scale carpet bombing designed to kill him and his cabinet, and the prospect of having the entirety of his military slowly attrited to combat ineffectiveness in the face of the seemingly endless Russian onslaught.

Logistics support from NATO and other countries is adequate but not optimal, in the face of Zelensky’s imminent need to train fresh Ukrainian forces. His stopwatch is ticking loudly.

Zitat:NATO should urgently encourage Sweden, Finland, Serbia, Georgia, and Ireland to join NATO now.

Zitat:The US Space Force must be charged with a renewed effort to eliminate the Russian nuclear missile threat by massively funding a reborn Strategic Defense Initiative, now enhanced by 40 years of technological progress.

Zitat:In addition, the United States should immediately reinforce Ukraine with Russian aircraft by negotiating a trade with Brazil to swap their twelve soon-to-be retired Soviet Mil-34 attack helicopters for US models; by negotiating a trade with Peru for their Mig-29 fighters, Sukhoi-25 ground attack aircraft, and Mil-8 transport helicopters.

Zitat:Prepare, and then donate, the 85 surplus Predator drones and their satellite control systems now in the AMARC (Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center.

Zitat:The best way to give the Russians a taste of their own hybrid medicine would be to activate units of the California National Guard which, along with a few units of the Tennessee Guard, have been training Ukrainians since 1993. These American Citizen-Soldiers have trained and interacted with the Ukrainians for decades, and thus are not faceless entities from the basement of the Pentagon. The Californians are known, credible and trusted. Thus, they are the ideal personnel to work from NATO territory with Ukrainians in two areas: Information Warfare and Advanced Training.

Zitat:The world has learned the lesson that appeasement of tyrants does not work. That lesson, at a cost of over 75 million dead in the ensuing World War II, should be strong enough evidence that Vladimir Putin cannot now be seen as the victor or even partial victor in his effort to crush Ukraine.

Zitat:It is 53 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I update my analysis of Russia’s shift to the east and examine key variables that will impact on operations in this part of Ukraine. 1/25

2/25 Russia, having ‘reset’ their theory of victory for their invasion of Ukraine, is building up its forces in the east. That said, they will continue strategic strikes across Ukraine, and remain alert to opportunities in the south.

3/25 As I explored earlier this month, the Russian have two key options to operationalise their strategic objectives. These are options built around either deep or shallow operational envelopments. Noting recent Russian movements, this assessment remains the same.

Die aktuell richtige Entscheidung auf russischer Seite wäre es meiner Meinung nach auf lokale begrenzte Einkesselungen zu setzen, auf begrenzte lokale Offensiven, und den Feind in vielen kleinen Siegen abzunutzen und nicht zu versuchen einen großen Kessel zu schaffen und einen großen Sieg zu erringen. Ebenso wären tiefe Vorstöße mit eben dieser Zielsetzung meiner Meinung nach ein schwerer Fehler.

Karte eines Cannae am Djnepr:

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1515867073582272512/photo/1

4/25 Option 1 is a ‘go big option’ – a deep double envelopment of Ukrainian forces in the east. This would see the Russians attempt to advance on the city of Dnipro from the northeast and from the south. Concurrently, they would need to fix Ukrainian forces in Luhansk & Donetsk.

w.o. beschrieben halte ich einen Erfolg dieses Planes für ausgeschlossen. Er würde mit einer krachenden Niederlage für die Russen enden, die angreifenden Truppenverbände würden selbst eingekesselt werden.

5/25 This would primarily seek full territorial control of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. It would also aim to fix Ukrainian forces in the east while the Russians attempt a deep envelopment to encircle them.

6/25 The ultimate objective would be to seize all Ukrainian territory east of Dnipro and destroy Ukrainian forces in the Joint Force Operation in the east. This would be a significant military and political victory for the Russians.

Wenn es den funktionieren würde. Das Risiko aber für eine verheerende Niederlage ist meiner Meinung nach inakzeptabel.

Karte einer Schlacht von Zama im Osten:

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1515867085234061313/photo/1

7/25 Option 2 remains a ‘minimalist approach’ which sees a shallow envelopment of Ukrainian forces. This would see a similar ‘fix and envelop’ campaign where the Russians would pin the Ukrainians in the east by attacks in Donetsk & Luhansk.

8/25 Concurrently, advances from the northeast (and possibly the south) would aim to give the Russians control of territory east of the line from Izyum through to Mariupol.

9/25 The objective would be to finally seize all of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, an incomplete task since 2014 and one of Putin’s key objectives for this war.

10/25 It would also aim to significantly reduce the strength of the Ukrainian Army, which deploys some of its best forces in this region.

11/25 In military planning, we often discuss the enemy’s ‘most likely’ & ‘most dangerous’ courses of action (COA). In the east, given Russian dispositions and their demonstrated strengths / weaknesses, their most likely COA is the ‘shallow envelopment option.’

12/25 If the Russians can successfully achieve this ‘most likely COA’ in the east, and defend their seized territory in the south, it might satisfy Putin’s current ‘theory of victory’ for his special military operation.

13/25 But there are several variables which may impact on their capacity to achieve this.

14/25 First, the Ukrainians appear to have launched attacks in the vicinity of Kharkiv and Izyum. The key variable is whether these are local spoiling attacks aimed to disrupt Russian preparations for further advances, or part of a wider Ukrainian counter offensive.

15/25 Both are possible. Good tactical leaders are always looking for opportunities to disrupt the enemy’s plans. And good command environments nurture this. The Ukrainians have demonstrated they have both in this war. So these could just be local attacks.

16/25 But we can’t discount a wider counter offensive by the Ukrainians. They know that seizing the initiative from the Russians before they can launch a major offensive in the Izyum area would disrupt Russian strategy AND mess with Putin’s reputed 9 May time.

17/25 The 2nd variable is Mariupol. If it falls, it could free up Russian troops for the eastern offensive. The key variable is how many, and what their combat readiness might be. After weeks of tough urban fighting, the Russians may need a break.

Aktuell sieht es für mich so aus, dass die russischen Verbände um und in Mariupol durchaus noch einsatzfähig sind, die Stadt wurde im Endeffekt langsam zusammen geschossen. Die freiwerdenden Verbände könnten daher den Ausschlag in einer Schlacht um den Osten geben.

18/25 A 3rd variable is logistics. We have seen how poor Russian logistics is throughout the war. Can they improve this to supply the concentration of forces in the east? The key variable is whether their logistic system, and rear area security approach, will allow this.

19/25 But logistics also impacts on the Ukrainians. For the east, they are likely to require larger amounts of artillery ammunition, fuel and other items whether they are on the offensive or operating defensively.

20/25 A 4th variable is the role of Russian forces in the south during an eastern offensive. Will they remain on the defensive, or assume a more active role by conducting feints and supporting attacks to draw Ukrainian forces from the east or north?

21/25 A final variable is Russian contingency plans in the event their eastern offensive does not achieve its objectives. There is almost nowhere else that Putin can look to provide ‘victory’. If it becomes clear they can’t achieve a decisive success in the east, what then?

22/25 As I have written previously, the Russians are yet to demonstrate the adaptive capacity to significantly improve their tactical competence. Regardless of the greater concentration of mass they have deployed in the east, this is an important factor.

23/25 Failure might trigger Russian use of nuclear or chem weapons. They have been searching for a pretext to use chem weapons. Another bloody nose from the Ukrainians might justify – in Russian minds – the use of such weapons to achieve a breakthrough.

Sehe ich auch so. Dazu kommen noch die offenen westlichen Waffenlieferungen. Meiner Meinung nach wird Russland wenn es so weitergeht wie bis jetzt taktische Nuklearwaffen einsetzen.

24/25 The eastern theatre may feature large scale combat of a type we did not see in the north. The Russians, who are more familiar with the terrain in the east, will look to use numbers (including low quality proxy conscripts) & firepower superiority to generate a breakthrough.

25/25 At the same time, the Ukrainians may decide on a series of counter offensives before the Russians begin their eastern offensive in order to disrupt the Russian plan enough for the Ukrainian army to seize the initiative. End

Zitat:Karte Nordosten - das jetzt entscheidende Gebiet !

https://mobile.twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1516047571264937990/photo/1

Battle of the railways. Small thread with me guessing and trying to predict the future (most likely without success) This is roughly what we have now in the eastern part of Ukraine (i know its a mess, but need railways and rivers).

Yesterday, UA forces liberated 2 small settlements SE of Kharkiv. This makes it likely they soon have or already have control over the dam. This opens up a possibility to create a similar scenario to the one we had in Kyiv with Irpin River. (and like we have east of Izium)

https://mobile.twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1516047585911648256/photo/1

This also diverted the RU supply line further east and secured the area between Donets and Velykyi Burluk river.

https://mobile.twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1516047591158566912/photo/1

Just 50km to the east, we have Kupiansk (red square), its an extremely important railway hub for the Russian advance. Railroad map. I believe this would be the target for a counter offensive in the Kharkiv area. There are more tracks than these, these are the major ones marked.

https://mobile.twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1516047596372037636/photo/1

I think it is likely that we will se and advance to the east between Velykyi Burluk river and the railroad, and disruptive attacks on the railroad in the area north of Kupiansk.

Before anyone gets exited, RU forces still have plenty of ways to get supplies in by road, we do not have a motti if Kupiansk gets contested, it just hinders supplies by railroad.

Einspruch dahingehend, dass der Verbrauch der russischen Artillerie de facto nur per Eisenbahn gedeckt werden kann. Das wird also die größte Einzelstärke der Russen mindern.


I believe RU forces have been using trains to extend their supply line down to Svatove and Borova (based on reports from general staff UA). I think Svatove is supposed to be the main distribution hub for supplies for the next offensive phase of RU forces.

Without trains, the trucks will have to work very hard to keep up with supplies. The route down to the front line will be very long.

Karte Straßenverbindungen:

https://mobile.twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1516047608304832519/photo/1

I have linked this before, but ill link it again. Take your time to read it, the amount of transports needed to maintain a ground offensive is staggering.

MeToo:

https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-russian-army-logistics/

Now lets talk about the rivers. If the Velykyi Burluk RIver gets flooded, it would create a 15km/10mile gap for the RU forces to use, I believe this would easily be blocked by UA forces.

Karte Fluss und Überflutungsgebiet:

https://mobile.twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1516047618241175559/photo/1

With Kupiansk contested, RU forces would have to rely on two bridges for their supply to get west of the Oskil river.

Karte Brücken:

https://mobile.twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1516047623664410629/photo/1

This is also why the area SE of Izium could be important, to create a railroad and road way connection between Borova and Izium. Most bridges are blown in that area, but RU forces have 38th Railway brigade in the area, they can repair damaged bridges fast.

Zitat:Karte der aktuellen russischen Angriffe:

https://mobile.twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1516062500604854277/photo/1

Kreminna has possibly fallen in to the hands of the RU forces and Rubizhne.

Yesterday we also saw reports of Artillery and Grads moving NW from Starobilsk to Svatove. They then headed in a westward direction, I think they were going in the direction of Borova.

Zitat:https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMPT_(Panzer)

Hat man den eigentlich mal im Einsatz gesehen? Oder faktisch auch nur Papiertiger?

(18.04.2022, 22:04)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Facilier:


Auf deine Frage vom 28.03. auf welche ich angab die Teile in einem Twitter Film gesehen zu haben konnte ich diesen leider nicht wieder finden. Aber gerade bin ich rein zufällig über folgendes gestolpert:

https://defence-blog.com/russias-terrifying-terminator-vehicles-floods-toward-border-with-ukraine/

(17.04.2022, 18:03)Schneemann schrieb: Ich hatte anfangs auf rund acht Wochen getippt bis zum Zusammenbruch der Wirtschaft, an diesem Punkt wären wir bald. Nun, möglich, dass ich mich geirrt habe - gleichwohl fließen auch Öl und Gas weiter -, aber alle Zeichen derzeit weisen auf eine massive Zuspitzung der wirtschaftlichen Krise hin. Warten wir mal ab, wie sie sich in der kommenden Woche entwickelt.

Zitat:+++ Bericht: russische Spezialkräfte stürmen Stahlwerk in Mariupol +++

Spezialeinheiten sollen mit einem Angriff auf das Stahlwerk Azovstal in Mariupol begonnen haben. Dies berichtet die Nachrichtenagentur Nexta unter Berufung auf das Innenministerium der selbsternannten "Donezker Volksrepublik". Nach Angaben der Stadtverwaltung von Mariupol haben mehr als 1000 Zivilisten in den Kellergewölben unter dem Werk Zuflucht gesucht. Wie Nexta berichtet, sagt der Führer der "Donezker Volksrepublik", Denis Puschilin, es gehe darum, das Unternehmen Azovstal so schnell wie möglich zu "befreien".

Zitat:Russia accused of using ‘bunker buster’ bombs to kill remaining Mariupol troops

Around 1,000 civilians were still hiding in shelters beneath a steel plant in the besieged city, officials have said.

Russian forces have been accused of using devastating “bunker bombs” to target remaining Ukrainian troops, Kyiv officials have said. [...]

Zitat:Russische Offensive in Ostukraine

"Zweite Phase des Krieges hat begonnen"

Russland hat nach ukrainischen Angaben seine Großoffensive auf die Ostukraine begonnen. [...]

Die russische Armee hat offenbar ihre seit Wochen erwartete Großoffensive im Osten der Ukraine gestartet. Der Sekretär des ukrainischen Sicherheitsrates, Alexej Danilow, sagte im Fernsehen, die russischen Streitkräfte hätten fast entlang der gesamten Frontlinie in den östlichen Regionen Donezk, Luhansk und Charkiw versucht, die ukrainischen Verteidigungslinien zu durchbrechen. [...]

Nach Angaben ukrainischer Medien gab es entlang der Frontlinie in der östlichen Region Donezk offenbar mehrere, zum Teil heftige Explosionen. Die Städte Marinka, Slawjansk und Kramatorsk seien unter Beschuss geraten. Auch in Charkiw im Nordosten des Landes sowie in Saporischschja im Südosten habe es demnach Explosionen gegeben. [...]

Ukrainischen Angaben zufolge griffen russische Einheiten auf einer breiten Front von mehr als 480 Kilometer Länge an. [...] Der Militäradministrator der Region Luhansk, Serhij Haudau, sagte, Kreminna sei unter schweres Artilleriefeuer gekommen. Die Russen hätten die Stadt erobert, nachdem sie "alles eingeebnet" hätten, sagte er im ukrainischen Fernsehen. [...]

Auch nach Informationen des US-Verteidigungsministeriums verstärkt Russland seine Truppen im Osten und Süden der Ukraine deutlich. In den vergangenen Tagen seien mehr als zehn sogenannte taktische Kampfverbände dorthin verlegt worden, sagte der Sprecher des Verteidigungsministeriums, John Kirby. Das russische Militär fliege zudem mehr Luftangriffe im Donbass und auf die Hafenstadt Mariupol.

Zitat:Russland hat nach ukrainischen Angaben seine Großoffensive auf die Ostukraine begonnen.

Zitat:Gesamtkarte Tag 54:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1516276200540459016/photo/1

1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 52-54: The past 72 hrs. have seen Russian forces reduce Ukrainian defenses in Mariupol to the Azovstal area. Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv launch several successful counterattacks while Russia builds forces near Izium.

Die Gegenangriffe bei Kharkiv sind interessant, weil die Ukrainer dort Dämme unter Kontrolle gebracht haben und damit das Land fluten können. Zudem bedroht dass wieder einmal relevante russische Nachschublinien.

2/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees top 6.67 million, with over 6.6 million IDPs throughout Ukraine. 27 European countries are hosting Ukrainian Refugees, with many eastern European nations taking the weight of this humanitarian crisis.

3/ Weather Impact. The 10-day forecast for most of the Donbas-Kherson TVD will comprise of increased cloud cover & rainstorms, wind speed will generally average at 8 mph. Air & artillery strikes will remain degraded, while heavy rain continues to restrict ground movement.

Karte Kharkiv:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1516276203640049665/photo/1

4/ Kharkiv OD. Ukraine appears to be reinforcing the Kharkiv OD, the 93rd Mech Brigade is reportedly operating in NW Kharkiv now. Successful counterattacks SE of Chuhuiv may be expanded in the coming days to threaten Russian GLOCs to the east.

Detailkarte:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1516276204617273349/photo/1

5/ As assessed late last week, the Kharkiv OD may potentially become 1 of 2 battle zones for the Ukrainian military. A weighted counteroffensive in this area will sever Russian GLOCs running from Belgorod & Valuyki to the Izium area.

Karte Severodonetsk:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1516276205535866885/photo/1

6/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. Russian forces have increased offensive activity in Severodonetsk Salient over the past 24 hours. Although these attacks have not made significant gains they could be the start of the anticipated general Donbas offensive.

7/ Ukrainian and western intelligence statements claim Russia has massed at least 22 Battalion Tactical Groups in the Izium area. Even with severely damaged units, a force of this size could make a meaningful breakthrough if properly employed to make & exploit one.

Wird vermutlich heute massiv in dieser Stoßrichtung losgehen.

Karte Zaporizhzhia:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1516276207234568193/photo/1

8/ Zaporizhzhia OD. Russian activity in the in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast remains focused on the capture of Mariupol. Limited attacks and counterattacks by Russian and Ukrainian forces continue between the line running from Vasylivka to Volnovakha.

Karte Mariupol:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1516276209033768963/photo/1

Veraltet, dass Stahlwerk dürfte jetzt heute Vormittag endgültig gefallen sein.

9/ Mariupol. Russian forces will more than likely defeat the remaining Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol in the coming week. Ukrainian defenders will not make it easy for the Russians, they will most likely force them to storm their positions rather than surrender.

Der Tod der Zivilisten in und unter dem Stahlwerk ist von den Ukrainern definitiv gewollt um ihn zu instrumentalisieren.

Karte Kherson:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1516276210422235137/photo/1

10/ Odesa-Kherson OD. Fighting continues for the control of Oleksandrivka to the west of Kherson. There has been little other action in this area over the past 72 hours.

Die Russen haben sich dort zunehmend eingegraben. Bei Verlustbildern aus der Region habe ich eine ganze Reihe russischer Raketenjagdpanzer gesehen, darunter auch solche des neuesten Typs.

11/ Aerospace Assessment. U.S. intelligence estimates that the VKS averages 200 air sorties a day. Russia is still able to conduct missile strikes against Kyiv and into western Ukraine to target both critical infrastructure and civilians alike.