Shahab3 schrieb:Ich erspare mir hier jeglichen weiteren Kommentar... Rolling Eyes

Zitat:Russian Navy's days could be numbered

The Russian Navy is building and modernizing warships. In the next few months, the big anti-submarine ship Vitse Admiral Kulakov will resume combat duty with the Northern Fleet.

A second warship, Project 1155, the Admiral Kulakov was commissioned in 1982 and was on combat duty with the Northern Fleet until March 1991, when it retired for repairs that lasted more than 18 years.

In fact, the ship's fate closely resembles that of Russia. Its repairs were suspended in 1993 for lack of funds, and it was plundered in the late 1990s. The authorities even considered scrapping it, but instead resumed repairs in the mid-2000s.

In late November 2009, Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, former commander of the Northern Fleet, said that in the next ten years Russia might lose the bulk of Soviet-made surface ships.

"The funds allocated [to the Navy] are insufficient to build new long-range sea- and ocean-going warships and maintain our current warships in combat order," he said.

Warships built in the 1970s and 1980s currently make up the bulk of the Russian Navy. Their service life can be prolonged through repair, but not indefinitely.

The ocean-going warships, which form the core of the surface fleet's combat group, are the biggest problem. There are approximately 30 such warships of different types, from cruisers to frigates, including those in mothballs, but all of them should be replaced within 10-15 years. Otherwise the Russian Navy will degenerate into a third-rate coastal fleet unable to protect the country's interests outside its territorial waters or even on its coasts.

However, Russia is so far building only sea and coastal ships (corvettes and boats), and not very quickly at that. Project 20380 corvettes have a sufficient combat capability but cannot replace larger ships. Russia's largest warships being built now are two Project 22350 frigates, one of them to be commissioned in 2011 and the other one only laid down in 2009.

Given the sluggish pace of fleet renewal, Russia will have only 15-20 corvettes and seven or eight frigates of the new generation by 2025. This is not enough to reliably defend any theater of war in Russia, which has very long sea borders.

To change the situation, Russia should build more warships of the corvette and frigate classes faster and should also start building larger-class warships such as destroyers, in order to replace the large ships that are quickly becoming obsolete.

It should also continue the fleet repair and modernization program to prolong the service life of its best warships, such as the Admiral Kuznetsov air carrier and Projects 1144 and 1164 missile cruisers, until 2025-2030.

However, Russia's efforts are hampered by lack of funds and also by the disintegration of its shipbuilding industry and related sectors, which has dramatically undermined its ability to build warships.

To resolve the problem that developed over two decades, it is not enough to increase allocations to defense. The authorities must take emergency measures to rehabilitate all sectors of the shipbuilding industry, including the process for training personnel.

Cooperation with foreign shipbuilders could have a beneficial effect at this point. The government may not be sure of the need to buy foreign-made warships such as a Mistral-class helicopter carrier, but it certainly needs to promote cooperation with foreign companies to train workers and engineers, gain access to modern design and the practical skills necessary for building warships of different classes, and to buy cutting-edge equipment.

France's Mistral-class ship is capable of transporting and deploying 16 helicopters, four landing barges, up to 70 vehicles, including 13 battle tanks, as well as 450 military personnel. The vessel is equipped with a 69-bed hospital and can be used as an amphibious command ship....

revan schrieb:

Shahab3 schrieb:Ich erspare mir hier jeglichen weiteren Kommentar... Rolling Eyes

Sorry aber was willst du den noch ich aber dir grad per Quelle nachgewiesen das die teste die du als simples zielloses Aufsteigen lassen bezeichnet hast in den meisten Fehlen Teste mit Wiedereintrittskörper waren und auch das sie als Erfolg gewertet wurden. Daher könntest du einfach deine Fehler/Irrtum zugeben den das ist sicherlich keine ideologische Diskussion.

Shahab3 schrieb:Was soll Deine Liste denn aussagen? Sie sagt wirklich rein garnichts aus. Die Trident hat sicher nicht beim aller ersten "erfolgreichen" Start, die komplette Ablaufprozedur bis zum Einschlag abgespult. Das betrifft die Tests in Deiner lustigen Liste sowie sicher weitere dort unerwähnte Tests. Es geht darum, WAS in den einzelnen Tests zu evaluieren war. Es geht generell darum, Daten zu sammeln. DAS war dann entweder im Einzelfall (es werden i.d.R. dutzende Dinge von verschiedenen Entwicklerteams gleichzeitig getestet) ein Erfolg oder eben nicht! Solche Tests sind gerade am Anfang eigentlich selten ein kompletter Erfolg oder ein kompletter Misserfolg. Auch bei der Bulawa hat sicherlich vieles korrekt funktioniert und irgendwas nicht. Wie bei den Amerikanern und allen anderen auch. Das Geschwätz von Außenstehenden nach dem Motto "x% der Tests erfolgreich" ist vom Ansatz her schon totaler Quatsch. Weiterhin bezieht sich die von Dir eingebrachte Statistik der erfolgreichen Tests (96%) eindeutig und unmissverständlich auf die S T A R T Z U V E R L Ä S S I G K E I T.

Zitat:Trident II D5 Missile Achieves Record 129 Successful Test Flights

SUNNYVALE, ca: The U.S. Navy conducted successful test flights Sept. 3 and 4 of two Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missiles (FBMs) built by Lockheed Martin. The Navy launched the unarmed missiles from the submerged submarine USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) in the Atlantic Ocean.

The Trident II D5 missile now has achieved 129 consecutive successful test flights since 1989 - a record unmatched by any other large ballistic missile or space launch vehicle.

"These successful missile tests again demonstrate the readiness and reliability of the entire Trident II D5 Strategic Weapon System," said Melanie A. Sloane, vice president of Fleet Ballistic Missile programs, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, the Navy's Trident missile prime contractor. "The Navy's Strategic Systems Programs achieves sustained performance through close government and industry partnerships. Lockheed Martin's role includes not only missile design, development and production, but also a full range of operations and sustainment support services."

The Navy launched the missiles as part of a Follow-on Commander's Evaluation Test. The Navy conducts a continuing series of operational system evaluation tests to assure the safety, reliability, readiness and performance of the Trident II D5 Strategic Weapon System, as required by the Department of Defense's National Command Authority. The Navy conducts the tests under the testing guidelines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the tests, the missiles were converted into test configurations using a test missile kit produced by Lockheed Martin that contains range safety devices and flight telemetry instrumentation.

First deployed in 1990, the D5 missile is currently aboard OHIO-class submarines and British VANGUARD-class submarines. The three-stage, solid-propellant, inertial-guided ballistic missile can travel a nominal range of 4,000 nautical miles and carries multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles....

Zitat:Successful Bulava launch


Everything went according to the plan - on September 18, 2008, Dmitri Donskoy submarine of the Northern Fleet successfully launched a Bulava missile. According to the Russian Navy, the launch was conducted from a submerged submarine deployed in the White Sea. The launch took place at 18:45 MSK (14:45UTC). Missile warheads reached their targets at the Kura test site at 19:05 MSK.

Zitat:
The Bulava missile saga

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - The December 9, 2009 test of the RSM-56 Bulava (SS-NX-30) submarine-launched ballistic missile has failed, said the Russian Defense Ministry. There have been 12 other test flights since December 2003.

Without going into technical details, which must be clarified by experts, we must now assess the entire project's status and the implications of the latest abortive test on the future development of Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

The decision to develop the Bulava missile was adopted in 1998 when Moscow's Institute of Thermal Technology was directed to develop an advanced missile system for the Russian navy.

Institute management claimed that it could promptly develop a new ballistic missile based on the Topol M (SS-27 Sickle B) intercontinental ballistic missile, for the Russian navy. This concept was expected to simplify the deployment of the naval component of Russia's strategic nuclear forces and to require less maintenance costs.

Although it is hard to say who initiated such drastic changes, the press claims that Yury Solomonov, director of the Institute of Thermal Technology, Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin, director of the Defense Ministry's Fourth Central Research Institute, Navy Commander Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, the then Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev, Economics Minister Yakov Urinson and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, are responsible for this.

It was decided to deploy the new Bulava missiles aboard the Project 955 Borei class and Project 955A Borei-A class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

The first submarine of the class, the Yury Dolgoruky, is currently undergoing sea trials. Another two submarines are under construction, and the keel of the fourth Borei class submarine is to be laid before New Year's Eve.

Initial tests of the new missile and its first images revealed that the Bulava will have little in common with the Topol-M. The Bulava was completely different in terms of its appearance, dimensions and warhead lay-out. Nevertheless, the plan had gone too far to back out.

Eleven full-fledged flight tests were conducted between September 27, 2005 and December 9, 2009. Only three launches, specifically the first, second and eighth, were deemed fully successful. Two other launches were rated partially successful.

Facilitating due control over missile component production and ready-made missile assembly, rather than project funding, is the main problem. Moreover, the companies involved require skilled, well-paid workers. However, wage raises alone cannot boost missile quality.

More expensive missiles would be manufactured, unless other measures are implemented.

Some experts think it would be appropriate to upgrade the Bulava missile and to hold a tender for another missile system, due to be installed aboard Project 955 submarines. In their opinion, the program should involve several leading design bureaus, and the most promising project should be implemented.

This would make it possible to develop another missile system for replacing the Bulava if its reliability is not improved.

Russia's president, who oversees the state of the Armed Forces as Commander-in-Chief, would be expected to personally monitor the program because this will ensure due supervision.

The project managers involved should be held personally liable in case of failure because material incentives are ineffective and because resignations no longer scare anyone.

Nuclear-tipped missiles largely facilitate national defense capability. Since the end of World War II and the break-up of the Soviet Union, too many high-ranking officials and production workers have become accustomed to the fact that resignations are the ultimate punishment for incompetence and mismanagement.

Obviously, this concept must be changed with regard to logistics support of the strategic nuclear forces, to say the least, because the price of possible mistakes is becoming too high.

Cluster schrieb:Nur mal zur Klarstellung: Es ist schon ein Unterschied zwischen Startzuverlässigkeit und erfolgreichem Test mit allen Flugphasen.
...

Zitat:Wieder Bulawa-Panne: Teurer Rohrkrepierer statt Superrakete?

MOSKAU, 11. Dezember (Ilja Kramnik, RIA Novosti). Russlands Verteidigungsministerium hat den gescheiterten zwölften Test der neuen seegestützten Interkontinentalrakete RSM-56 Bulawa verkündet.

Wir lassen die technischen Details mal beiseite, Experten werden sich damit ohnehin zu beschäftigen haben. Es muss jedoch geklärt werden, in welchem Zustand sich heute das gesamte Raketenprojekt befindet und inwiefern das erneute Versagen die Entwicklung von Russlands strategischen Atomwaffenkräften gefährdet.

Die Geschichte der Bulawa begann 1998, als dem Moskauer Institut für Wärmetechnik (MIT) die Ausarbeitung eines Raketensystems für die Marine aufgetragen wurde. Das Institut behauptete, in Kürze für die Kriegsmarine eine neue ballistische Rakete zu entwickeln, die mit der interkontinentalen ballistischen Rakete Topol-M vereinbar sein werde. Das hätte die Aufstellung und den Unterhalt einer Gruppierung der strategischen Atomwaffenkräfte der Flotte bedeutend vereinfachen und verbilligen sollen.

Wer diesen entschlossenen Kurswechsel angestoßen hat, lässt sich schwer sagen, doch die Presse nennt folgende verantwortliche Personen in jener Zeit.

MIT-Direktor Juri Solomonow; Generalmajor Wladimir Dworkin, Direktor des 4. Zentralen Forschungsinstituts des Verteidigungsministeriums; Flottenadmiral Wladimir Kurojedow, Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine; Verteidigungsminister Marschall Igor Sergejew; Wirtschaftsminister Jakow Urinson und Russlands Regierungschef Viktor Tschernomyrdin.

Mit der neuen Rakete hätten die künftigen Raketenträger des Projektes 955 und 955A ausgestattet werden sollen. Gegenwärtig wird das Nullschiff dieses Projektes, das Atom-U-Boot "Juri Dolgoruki", getestet, zwei weitere sind in Bau. Bis zum Neujahr soll die Kiellegung eines vierten Schiffs des Projektes erfolgen.

Dass die Bulawa mit der Topol-M sehr wenig gemein haben wird, wurde klar, als die Tests der neuen Rakete begannen und ihre allgemein zugänglichen Darstellungen erschienen: Die neue Rakete war nahezu in allem anders, angefangen mit dem Aussehen und den geometrischen Maßen bis zur Konstruktion des Sprengkopfes. Doch für einen Rückzieher war es bereits zu spät.

Zwischen dem 27. September 2005 und dem 9. Dezember 2009 fanden insgesamt elf tatsächliche Bulawa-Starts statt. Völlig erfolgreich waren nur drei davon: der erste, der zweite und der achte. Weitere zwei Starts waren "teilweise erfolgreich".

Das Problem ist in diesem Fall nicht so sehr die Finanzierung für das Projekt. Es geht vielmehr darum, in der ganzen Zeit der Produktion von Zulieferteilen und der Montage der fertigen Rakete für die gebührende Kontrolle zu sorgen, diesen Produktionszweigen die nötigen Fachkräfte zuzuführen und ihre gute Arbeit entsprechend zu stimulieren.

Begreiflicherweise ist die Qualität der Rakete nicht durch eine einfache Lohn- oder Gehaltserhöhung zu verbessern: Werden andere Maßnahmen nicht getroffen, so entsteht letztendlich ein gleiches, aber teureres Erzeugnis.

Ein Teil der Spezialisten ist der Ansicht, es sei zweckmäßig, gleichzeitig mit der Nachbearbeitung der Bulawa einen Wettbewerb um die Entwicklung eines neuen Raketenkomplexes für ein Atom-U-Boot des Projekts 955 auszuschreiben, an die Arbeiten mehrere führende Konstruktionsbüros heranzuziehen und später das aussichtsreichste Projekt in die Tat umzusetzen.

Dann hätte das Land in ein paar Jahren ein Raketensystem, das die Bulawa ersetzen könnte, falls es nicht gelinge, deren Zuverlässigkeit zu erhöhen.

Um die gebührende Aufsicht zu sichern, soll das Programm für die Neuausrüstung der strategischen Atomwaffenkräfte der Marine unter die persönliche Kontrolle des russischen Präsidenten gestellt werden, denn als Oberster Befehlshaber ist er für den Zustand der Streitkräfte verantwortlich.

Dabei sollen die unmittelbaren Leiter des Projekts mehr zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, als mit einer einfachen Amtsenthebung, weil die materiellen Anreize keinen gebührenden Effekt haben und ein Rücktritt niemanden erschreckt........

Zitat:Ganz gleich ob man es nun Startzuverlässigkeit nennt oder nicht und ich stehe kurz davor den entsprechende Wikipedia Artikel zu ändern um Shahabs Ast abzusägen, so spricht man von anderer Quelle (außer Wikipedia) schlicht und ergreifend von erfolgreichen Tests/Flügen das sowohl von allen Medien wie auch von offizieller Seite wie auch von allen Militärseiten die mir bekannt sind.

Zitat:Trident II D-5 Missile Achieves Record 129 Successful Test Flights In A Row

Lockheed Martin [LMT] last week said the Navy conducted successful test flights Sept. 3 and 4 of two Trident II D-5 Fleet Ballistic Missiles (FBMs). The Navy launched the unarmed missiles from the submerged submarine USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) in the...

Zitat: Lockheed Martin-Built Trident II D5 Missile Achieves Achieves Record 129 Successful Test Flights In A Row Over 20 Years
SUNNYVALE, Calif, October 21st, 2009 -- The U.S. Navy conducted successful test flights Sept. 3 and 4 of two Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missiles (FBMs) built by
Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT). The Navy launched the unarmed missiles from the submerged submarine USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) in the Atlantic Ocean.
The Trident II D5 missile now has achieved 129 consecutive successful test flights since 1989 – a record unmatched by any other large ballistic missile or space launch vehicle.
“These successful missile tests again demonstrate the readiness and reliability of the entire Trident II D5 Strategic Weapon System,” said Melanie A. Sloane, vice president of Fleet Ballistic Missile programs, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, the Navy’s Trident missile prime contractor. “The Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs achieves sustained performance through close government and industry partnerships. Lockheed Martin’s role includes not only missile design, development and production, but also a full range of operations and sustainment support services.”......

Zitat:RUSSLAND

Nach dem jüngsten (am 10. Dez.) missglückten Teststart eines U-Bootgestützten ballistischen Flugkörpers (SLBM) Bulava unausweichliche Reaktionen haben nicht lange auf sich warten lassen.

Schon am 15. Dezember erklärte die russische Marine einen vorläufigen Baustopp für die neuen strategischen U-Boote der BOREJ-Klasse. Typboot YURI DOLGORUKIY soll zwar seine begonnenen Erprobungen fortsetzen. Die Arbeiten an den bei Sevmash in Severodvinsk begonnenen nächsten zwei Booten (ALEKSANDR NEVSKIY und VLADIMIR MONOMAKH) werden allerdings eingestellt. Die für den 22. Dezember vorgesehene Kiellegung des vierten Bootes (SVYATITEL NIKOLAJ) wurde kurzfristig abgesagt und auf das „Frühjahr 2010“ verschoben.
...

Zitat:....Since 1989, none of more than 120 test launches have failed. The Trident had two failures during its 49 development test launches, but since then, it has been the most reliable SLBM to ever enter service. Each Trident II costs about $65 million, and entered service in 1990. Some of them are fired every year, to insure that the current configuration (of hardware and software) still works as it is supposed to....


....Russian leaders insist that the Bulava will eventually succeed. But insiders say that, if you use the same criteria for a successful Trident II launch, only one of the 13 Bulava tests was a success....