(Luft) Lockheed Martin F-35 - Lightning II

[Quintus Fabius]

Und hier im Detail warum:

Auf welchen Fakten basiert deine These bezüglich F-35. .....Und von so einer Behauptung hab ich noch nie was gehört.

Meiner Ansicht nach wird man die F-35 nicht ohne inakzeptables Risiko in einem feindlichen Luftraum der durch moderne Flugabwehrsysteme gesichert ist einsetzen können, bis diese ausreichend nieder gekämpft sind. Ansonsten würde man wie anfangs im Yom Kippur Krieg inakzeptable Verluste erleiden und dies nicht ersetzen können.

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Study of the shaping of the aircraft and comparison with other designs shows that the Joint Strike Fighter can provide genuinely good stealth performance only in a fairly narrow ~29° sector about the aircraft’s nose, where the shaping of the nose, engine inlets, panel edge serrations, and alignment of the leading and trailing edges of the wings and stabilators results in the absence of major lobes or “spikes” in the radar signature. The ±14.5° angular limit is constrained by the principal reflecting lobe of the leading and trailing edges of the wings and stabilators. The signature degrades rapidly due to the influence of the lower centre fuselage as the angle swings past ±45° off the nose, refer Diagram 4.

The second major departure from established stealth conventions is that the Joint Strike Fighter is designed to perform in the X-band, and upper portions of the S-band, with little effort expended in optimizing for the lower L-band, UHF-band and VHF-band. This design strategy is consistent with defeating mobile battlefield short range point defence SAM and AAA systems such as the SA-8 Gecko, SA-9 Gaskin, Chapparel, Crotale, Roland, SA-15 Gauntlet, SA-19 Grison and SA-22 “Greyhound”, where limited radar antenna size forces all acquisition and engagement functions into the X-band and upper S-band. Joint Strike Fighter literature refers to this optimization in terms of “breaking the kill chain”, the intent being to deny the effective use of X-band engagement radars and X/Ku-Band missile seekers, but not acquisition radars in lower bands.

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A smart IADS operator will not radiate until a potential target is close enough to get a steep elevation angle for a shot, a tactic commonly associated with 'shoot and scoot' operations - the cardinal example being Serbian ZRK Kvadrat / SA-6 operations in 1999.

The aircraft performs best in the X-band, and Ku-band, with performance declining through the S-band with increasing wavelength. In the L-band the axisymmetric nozzle design no longer produces useful effect, and the length of the inlet edges sits in resonant mode scattering rather than clean optical scattering, degrading performance. In the VHF band (~2 metres) Joint Strike Fighter airframe shaping has become largely ineffective.

The most generous description of the stealth design used in the Joint Strike Fighter is that it is 25% VLO, in the nose sector, 25% LO in the tail sector, and 50% “reduced observable” in the beam sectors, with a strong threat operating frequency and angular aspect dependency in stealth performance.

If these specific conditions are not met, such as by a SAM system with search radars operating outside the band coverage of the AESA, or geographically located such that the AESA cannot be pointed at them, then the Joint Strike Fighter may not survive such engagements frequently.

The root of these survivability problems in the Joint Strike Fighter design is that it provides robust stealth and robust jamming capabilities only in the sector under the aircraft’s nose. Its stealth capability from other angles, and in most bands, is poor or very poor, and without a proper internal jamming suite capable of covering all four quadrants around the aircraft, it is severely restricted in its choices of defensive tactics.

Since the mid 1990s the strategic environment has changed profoundly. Only two of the potential threat regimes then identified still exist. Both have advanced in IADS capabilities, with both deploying the S-200/SA-5 long range SAM, North Korea deploying the early S-300PMU / SA-10 and Iran the more recent S-300PMU1 / SA-20 long range SAMs. China has deployed many batteries of the S-300PMU / SA-10, S-300PMU1/PMU2 / SA-20, and HQ-9 long range SAMs. This is a very different operating environment, given that the medium range Hawk, S-75 / SA-2 Guideline, S-125 Goa / SA-3 and 3M9 / SA-6 Gainful were prevalent a decade ago, and the S-300PMU / SA-10 deployed only by former Soviet republics and satellites.

While potential threat nations replaced medium range SAMs with long range SAMs, and radars and SAMs evolved from analogue to digital, the Joint Strike Fighter’s design evolved in the opposite direction, with its stealth shaping progressively degraded in key areas.

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The Russian and Chinese technological strategy for dealing with penetrating all aspect stealth aircraft has been to develop a new generation of VHF band radars, including multistatic forward scattering radars. These will reduce opportunities for undetected penetration, especially by fighter sized aircraft, as the VHF radars defeat shaping measures and materials designed for S-band and X-band threats.

The US Air Force technological strategy for dealing with this counter-strategy is the use of the F-22A Raptor, armed with the GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb, for lethal suppression of such radars. A pair of F-22As, armed with sixteen SDBs in total, can overwhelm the point defence SAM systems defending critical search radars.

The inferior “single aspect stealth” capability of the Joint Strike Fighter denies it the option of penetrating a modern IADS SAM belt. The depth of the IADS simply makes it geometrically impossible to find a path between search radars where the combination of distance and relative aspect would allow it to penetrate unseen. This is exacerbated by the increasing availability of modern digital VHF, UHF and L-band search radars, especially radars with 3D capability and the accuracy to guide long range area defence SAMs.