Aufstands- und Partisanenbekämpfung (COIN)

[Quintus Fabius]

Beyond Counterinsurgency: Why the Concept is Failing

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2632628...acceptTC=1

Weaknesses

During the process of evaluating FM 3-24, it became obvious that by looking at only a limited number of examples from Western nations in the twentieth century, the discussion of counterinsurgency approaches seemed somehow limited. In addition, this fact also limits our thinking and understanding of current and future challenges in small-war scenarios. Gorka and Kilcullen emphasize that “modern Western [counterinsurgency] theory is built on a handful of books based upon practitioner experiences in a handful of twentieth-century conflicts….”

Although counterinsurgency as presented in FM 3-24 is far more complex than had been previously thought, when viewed through a historical lens its presentation is limited to a narrow perspective: Iraq is not Malay or Ireland.

It is important to consider that FM 3-24 as it is used currently offers the soldier a set of best practices and an easily referred to “check-list.”

But without recognizing that every insurgency is different from those that have come before, it is impossible to remember that every counterinsurgency campaign must be different as well. The length of operational tours is affecting the success of counterinsurgency operations. Building trust with locals takes time, but if operational deployments are only from four to six months long, it cannot be expected that an adequate level of knowledge and respect between the main players can develop. The short duration of deployments was one of the reasons behind the frequent strategy changes in Iraq, and undermined the relationship-building efforts of British military in the area of operations. In order to work closely with the local population or local decision makers, it is evident that a certain level of trust is needed.

In this regard, the “Winning Hearts and Minds” approach was totally misunderstood. In a
counterinsurgency scenario, it means that winning the support of the population might
serve as a center of gravity for the overall aims of the mission, but that popularity or
likeability among the people is not the aim.

It is indeed necessary to use robust force in kinetic operations during a counterinsurgency campaign, but targets should be chosen carefully, keeping in mind the ultimate goal of building a legitimate and functional government.

Current expectations derived from military operations in Iraq were too high, and were not transferable to the situation in Afghanistan – indeed, it is even disputed that the success in Iraq has resulted in the United States changing its approach toward counterinsurgency operations. The slow pace of process has a serious impact on the level of domestic public support. Counterinsurgency efforts take time and are very
expensive, which creates pressure on political stakeholders, who are often up for reelection before a counterinsurgency campaign has run its course.

Counterinsurgency is no replacement for a strategy.

It is aimed mainly at the tactical and operational levels, but absolutely requires an overall strategy that does not consist only of short-term expectations. Knowing the weaknesses of the concept, Wood’s demand is blunt: “Drop the hearts n’ minds stuff. Go kill the enemy.”