Aufstands- und Partisanenbekämpfung (COIN)

[Quintus Fabius]

Über die Entwicklung der französischen COIN Taktiken im 21 Jahrhundert:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2645947...acceptTC=1

Was mich besonders erstaunt hat mir bis dato nicht bekannt war:

Galula’s Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practices has been translated into French for the first time and published in January 2008 under the supervision of General Desportes—then the head of the CDEF—with forewords from General Petraeus. More recently, the CDEF published online a cahier de la recherche that commented upon the influence of Galula and Trinquier on the Petraeus’ strategy.12 In summary, the French experience in Algeria, more precisely “guerre revolutionnaire”, is reenacted through the rediscovering of Galula thanks to the US doctrine and the 2007/2008 campaign in Iraq. This is very ironic considering the fact that Galula was himself one of the “doctrinal bridges” between the French experience in Algeria.

Das heißt ich habe Galula auf englisch gelesen bevor er auch nur ins Französische übersetzt wurde.

At the lowest level, the counter-rebellion manual is framed by US militarysuccess in the so-called “surge”. The manual, issued in February 2009, is a summary of tactical procedures in the fight against an armed resistance.

Das müsste dieses hier sein:

https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/f...ctrine.pdf

These procedures are divided into two main groups: securing the populated areas by protecting the population and dismantling the enemy political- military infrastructure, fighting against rebels by quadrillage and the deterrent pressure in the margins of the controlled areas (oil-spot strategy). Even if an “oil-spot” strategy is used as a reference, description of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) is closer to contemporary operations in Iraq and refers mainly to operations in Algeria. For the latter, the manual goes as far as reenacting the classical division of labour between “territorial” actions (aimed at controlling the population) and “reserve” actions (whose tasks are the destruction of the rebellion’s military units). Furthermore, the imperative of the struggle against the political-military infrastructure is reminiscent of the parallel hierarchies defined by Lacheroy and other “guerre révolutionnaire” thinkers. Nevertheless, in its analysis of the logic of violence, the manual takes up the distinction between subversion, grievances and greed, assuming that most armed actors are hybrid (predatory and protesting at the same time). This manual is thus the equivalent of the Field Manual FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency. One can question the reasons behind the choice to produce a tactical manual. One answer could be the very necessity (or its perception by many officers) to assert the greatest margin of manoeuvrability possible vis-à-vis the civilian power, thus defining a sphere of autonomy for military action, only possible in the tactical realm.

Auch erstaunlich finde ich die folgende Schlussfolgerung (welche ich so nicht teile)

Consequently, there is no actual COIN doctrine in the French Army.

The word itself is explicitly deemed to refer to the Anglo-Saxon concept, both encompassing counter-rebellion and narrower than the “stabilisation” concept. Nevertheless, one can observe a tendency to refer to US concept through the writings of Galula, the analysis of his influence on the Petraeus’
strategy in Iraq and a sudden interest for the thinkers of “guerre révolutionnaire”.

Hat man nach Algerien tatsächlich einen derart scharfen Schlusstrich gezogen, dass die früheren Erkenntisse wirklich derart verschüttet wurden ?