(Europa) Streitkräfte der russischen Föderation

[Quintus Fabius]

Ein meiner Meinung nach recht guter Artikel über die anwachsende Stärke der Russen im Bereich der Elektronischen Kriegsführung mit etlichen Weiter-Verknüpfungen:

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Russia’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities elucidates a broader point. The US Military’s superiority depends on advanced communications and electronics, yet these expensive advanced systems are highly susceptible to the Russian’ advanced jamming abilities.

These systems are also much less expensive to produce than many of the advanced weapons deployed by the United States. For example, a single Richag-AV radar system costs only $10 million – expensive in absolute terms but a cheap asymmetrical capability in relative terms.

While the commander of U.S. Army units in Europe, Lt. General Ben Hodges, calls Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities “eye-watering,” Russia’s cyber warfare capabilities are the Kremlin’s ultimate asymmetric tool. While Chinese hackers receive the majority of attention, the United States’ Director of National Intelligence James Clapper believes Russia’s cyber threat exceeds the Chinese one, using stealthier and more advanced cyberattack methods.

The Russian military recently established a dedicated cyber command in preparation for a future conflict, and reportedly hacked both the State Department and the White House. Although the Russian cyber penetration explored only unclassified portions of the White House network, the attackers were still able to gain access to the President’s daily schedule.

Moreover, this represents just the tip of the iceberg. Far more worryingly, Russian hackers have also been actively exploring the United States’ infrastructure vulnerabilities. In recent Congressional testimony, Clapper revealed that Russian hackers had successfully penetrated the industrial control systems which monitor and access critical U.S. infrastructure such as water and energy systems. By remotely accessing these systems, hackers could theoretically take down the United States’ power grid.

This is not solely an American problem. A 2014 report from leading cybersecurity firm Symantec reveals that European infrastructure sits squarely in the crosshairs of Russian cyber hackers as well. The attackers, dubbed Dragonfly by Symantec researchers, penetrated major energy firms in such sectors as electricity generation, pipeline operators and energy industry industrial equipment providers. Only 24 percent of the attacks struck the United States, with the remainder occurring largely in Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Poland and Romania. According to Symantec, if the attackers “had used the sabotage capabilities open to them, (they) could have caused damage or disruption to energy supplies in affected countries.” Translation – the European grid is vulnerable as well.

Those doubting the serious threat posed by Russia’s cyberattack capabilities need only look at last month’s unprecedented attack that took down Ukraine's Prykarpattyaoblenergo power grid for approximately six hours. Analysts from the American cyber intelligence firm iSight Partners attributed the attack to the Russian hacking group ‘Sandworm’. While it’s unclear whether Sandworm is working directly for the Russian government, iSight's director of espionage analysis, John Hultquist, says at a minimum “it is a Russian actor operating with alignment to the interest of the state."

Aside from the technical sophistication of these attacks, what’s also troubling is that they cannot be easily traced back to their exact origin. According to Admiral Michael Rogers, head of the United States’ National Security Agency, these penetrations are not always executed by governments, and sophisticated Russian cyber gangs are used to "obscure, if you will, their (nation-states) finger prints." The ability to obscure an attack’s origin, in turn, raises doubts about when there should be a government-to-government response – perhaps even of a kinetic variety – or whether it should be treated as a civilian domestic issue. If this sounds suspiciously like the “plausible deniability” approach behind Russia’s now widely discussed “hybrid warfare”, that’s because it is.

Needless to say, Russia is not the only country with advanced cyber capabilities. The United States military also established its own cyber command, and – as the Stuxnet attack which disabled Iranian nuclear centrifuges demonstrated – sophisticated Western cyber attack capabilities exist as well. Likewise, in a real conflict, NATO would surely deploy electronic counter counter measures (ECCM) against Russian electronic warfare systems such as the Khibin or Richag-AV. Most importantly, none of this means the West should assume a war with Russia is inevitable. It’s not – and concerted diplomacy must always seek to avert such a catastrophic scenario. Nevertheless, there are a number of things the West should do immediately.

First, when it comes to electronic warfare, NATO – especially the United States –remains horribly under-resourced, with a grand total of only 813 troops committed to this mission. The United States can spend ten billion dollars on its next generation aircraft carrier and 500 billion dollars on the flawed F-35 fighter, but if these weapons’’ advanced electronics risk being disabled by an opponent’s weapons systems at a fraction of the cost, then Americans’ overall advantage in firepower is negated. As Colonel Jeffrey Church, the U.S. Army’s chief of electronic warfare noted, Russia has “companies, they have battalions, they have brigades that are dedicated to the electronic warfare mission.” NATO should embark on a crash course to increase its own electronic warfare capabilities.

Second, NATO must confront the fact that its potential adversaries’ cyber capabilities represent a truly existential threat. Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine notes the "intensification of the role of information warfare" and assigns its development as a national priority. Moreover, Russia aside, the United States’ also considers China, Iran and North Korea as the primary nation state cyber threats.

While countries like Russia and China would surely think twice about launching a “cyber-911” strike during a crisis, an unstable state like North Korea might not – especially if reclusive leader Kim-Jong Un believed his regime’s hold on power was threatened. Moreover, as cyber hacking continues its global proliferation, contemplating what terrorist groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda might try to do is frightening.

Western countries should therefore follow Israel's lead and place the development of cyber defense at the very top of their priorities. An American led “Cyber Manhattan Project” should be assigned the highest priority, even if this means cutting budgets for other weapons systems.

61 percent of American cybersecurity experts believe that by 2025 a major cyber attack causing “widespread harm to a nation’s security and capacity to defend itself and its people” will occur. If this is not a warning the West will heed, then it’s hard to imagine what is.

Besonders interesssant sind diese Fähigkeiten auch in Richtung Schwarze Operationen - wobei man dann Angriffe durch das Weltnetz auf die zivile Infrastruktur einfach einem anderen in die Schuhe schiebt.

[Quintus Fabius]

Sehr gute Bilder diverser Fahrzeuge von der aktuellen Parade:

(die neueren Plattformen der ARMATA, Kurganets und Boomerang Gruppe habe ich extra im Strang Landstreitkräfte vernetzt)

BMD-4M

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BMP-3

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diverse Infanterie (standardmässig mit Schalldämpfer !)

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Tigr-M (Kornet)

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T-90A

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Iskander-M

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Buk-M2

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Pantsir-S1

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[Quintus Fabius]

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Impact of the economic crisis on Russian military modernization

The Cipher Brief asked me to write a short piece on the impact of Russia’s economic downturn on prospects for the Russian military, as part of a series on Russian military modernization.

The drop in Russian state revenues has affected Russian military modernization to some extent, though the Russian government has made an effort to insulate the military from budget cuts. Although the 2015 military budget was cut by five percent mid-year, the total allocation was still 25 percent higher than the previous year’s budget. This allowed the military to continue its modernization process, conduct operations in Syria, and fulfill its training and exercise programs.

With oil prices remaining low, the military is facing a more difficult financial picture in 2016. In November, the Finance Ministry announced that the total 2016 defense budget would be largely the same as in 2015. However, last month, an additional five percent cut was announced, which will result in the first annual net decline in Russian defense spending since Vladimir Putin became president in 2000.

As a result of the deteriorating financial outlook, the fulfillment of the 2011-2020 State Armament Program is now in question.

[WideMasta]

Russen arbeiten an Panzerdrohne

[Schneemann]

Putin stellt neues Atomwaffen-Arsenal vor

Moskau (Reuters) - Russlands Präsident Wladimir Putin hat die Entwicklung von neuartigen Atomwaffen bekanntgegeben. Bei einer Rede am Donnerstag vor Abgeordneten in Moskau sprach er von gleich mehreren neuen Systemen wie einer ballistischen Interkontinentalrakete, die nur schwer abzufangen sei; einer atomgetriebene Rakete; einem kleinen Nuklearsprengkopf für Marschflugkörper, die nicht abgefangen werden könnten; mit Kernwaffen bestückbare Unterwasserdrohnen sowie eine Überschallwaffe, die von Abwehrsystemen nicht erfasst werden könne. Russland verfüge nun über Raketen, die kein anderes Land besitze, sagte Putin.

Sein Land sei angesichts der Aufrüstung der USA gezwungen zu handeln, erklärte der Präsident weiter. Das Atomarsenal seines Landes werde ansonsten sinnlos. Die Stärkung des russischen Militärs solle den Weltfrieden sichern.

https://de.reuters.com/article/russland-...EKCN1GD4OR

Schneemann.

[PKr]

Etwas Lektüre in Englisch:
Eine kurze Zusammenfassung über die Fähigkeiten des russischen Militärs aus einem Report an den US-Kongress -hier-
Und -hier- eine schwedische Studie über die russische Luftverteidigung in der Region Kaliningrad.

[Schneemann]

Besonders dieser Auszug aus dem Kongress-Papier...

In particular, the Russian Navyhas focused on developing long-range andprecision-strike capabilities.Most of Russia’s larger surface ships are over 30 years old and undergoing various retrofits to extend their service life as Russia’s shipbuilding industry struggles to produce ships over 7,000 tons. As a result, Russia increasingly relies on heavily armed frigates as its primary surface combatants. These ships are equipped with Vertical Launch Systems to house an array of hypersonic anti-shipmissiles, cruise missiles, and antisubmarine missiles.

...ist interessant. Und genau genommen deckt sich diese Ansicht mit unseren Ausführungen hier zum Thema Russische Marine und Ostsee-Taktik. Die Befähigung zum Bau entsprechend großer blue water-Schiffe ist mit der Sowjetzeit untergangen bzw. nach und nach verloren gegangen. Um dies zu kompensieren werden in Zukunft kleinere Raketenschiffe- und -boote sowie Raketensysteme im litoralen Bereich verstärkt in den Vordergrund gerückt werden. Zudem, was hier meiner Meinung nach fehlt, werden sehr wahrscheinlich die U-Schiff-Flotte bzw. SSGN-Kapazitäten ausgebaut werden.

Schneemann.

[Quintus Fabius]

Neue russische Raketenartillerie:

https://www.defenseworld.net/news/27670#.Xz-sqshKiUl

Russia’s KBP Instrument Design Bureau will unveil a new generation Hermes precision missile system having a range of up to 100km during Army-2020 Forum scheduled to take place next week.

"During the forthcoming Army-2020 Forum, the KBP Instrument Design Bureau’s display will feature the Hermes high-precision guided missile system with over-the-horizon range of up to 100 km. This is a new-generation system that occupies the niche between precision munitions and artillery missile systems," spokesperson for Rostec’s High Precision Systems that owns KBP, was quoted as saying by TASS Wednesday.

Auch hier ist wieder eine drastisch zunehmende Fähigkeitslücke bei uns, welche wir im Verbund mit den USA und deren aktuellen Beschaffungen schließen könnten.

[Quintus Fabius]

Und auf der völlig entgegen gesetzten Seite des Spektrums von Bodenstreitkräften ein neues russisches Maschinengewehr:

https://soldat-und-technik.de/2020/08/be...pl-20-vor/

RPL-20 im Kaliber 5,45 mm x 39.

Russische Medien berichten, dass das RPL-20 im Auftrag des russischen Verteidigungsministeriums entwickelt wird. Offenbar wünschten sich die Streitkräfte eine Alternative zum RPK-16. Wesentliche Forderungen sind ein breiteres Einsatzspektrum der Waffe, Funktionssicherheit in allen Klimazonen, höhere Wirksamkeit und Reichweite sowie höhere Treffsicherheit durch den Einsatz von Zieloptiken.

[Redhead]

Hallo

Weiss einer wie die Russischen Luftlandetruppen organisiert sind?

Wie gross eine Kompanie ist und wieviele Fahrzeuge die haben bis zum Regiment bzw. Division.

Ist die Aufgabe einer Division die gleiche wie die einer Brigade und nur zahlenmässiger Unterschied?

Habe schon einiges im Netz rechechiert aber komme auf keine richtigen Zahlen.

Danke für eure Anwort

[Quintus Fabius]

In den Details der aktuellen neuesten TOE kenne ich mich nicht so aus, da gerade alles da im Fluss ist. Die bauen zur Zeit erheblich um und verstärken die Luftlande-Großkampfverbände um Kampfpanzer-Bataillone etc.

Allgemein ist der englische Wiki Artikel recht umfangreich:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c...Forces.png

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Ai..._equipment

Der folgende Text ist meiner Meinung nach ebenfalls für einen ersten Überblick recht brauchbar:

https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/tag/vdv/

Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade.

Zu den verwendeten Begriffen wie Division, Brigade, Regiment muss man aber anmerken, dass diese deutlich kleiner sind als westliche Verbände gleichen Namens. Weiter im Text:

Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions.

In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two.

The Russian General Staff has been experimenting with this force since 2016, and according to recent announcements by their commander, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, the VDV is in for a rethink........ stating in October 2018 that the Airborne is officially on a “search, testing new forms and methods of force employment to answer the challenges of modern warfare.”

Das letztgenannte ist vor allem eine Folge der Kämpfe in der Ostukraine und der Besetzung der Krim etc

Im Prinzip verwenden die Russen im Kampf ein Konzept von Kampfgruppen, welche um Bataillone herum aufgebaut werden. Diese werden im englischen Sprachraum entsprechend:

Bataillon Tactical Groups (BTG) genannt. Gerade die Fallschirmjäger der Russen werden in realen Kämpfen in solche BTG organisiert und dann mit Kampfpanzer-Einheiten der regulären Armee gemischt eingesetzt. Das war aber auch früher schon so und ist seit dem Afghanistan-Krieg der UdSSR im Prinzip die Einsatzweise für russische Fallschirmjäger, also keineswegs so neu wie es jetzt oft dargestellt wird.

Hier noch eine ausführlichere Darstellung:

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/...artles.pdf

Da dies (Kampf als Elite-Infanterie im Rahmen einer BTG) im praktischen Einsatz also ohnehin so der Fall ist (Kampfpanzer-Bataillon kombiniert mit VDV Infanterie Komponente) will man jetzt eigene Panzer-Bataillone in die VDV Großkampfverbände einziehen. Man geht also als Teilstreitkraft den umgekehrten Weg den aktuell beispielsweise das USMC geht und wird deutlich schwerere konventioneller Verbände aufstellen:

Therefore, the General Staff seems to have chosen an entirely different direction: the VDV’s air assault divisions are set to become heavier, with an expanded force structure, tanks, and air defenses, while independent brigades will conduct heliborne operations.

In 2016, the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, together with four brigades, were slated to receive tank companies. Since then, the 7th and 76th are being expanded with tank battalions, while one regiment (331st) will receive Russia’s new Sprut-SD airborne tank destroyer as part of a force structure experiment. The VDV is due to add three T-72B3 tank battalions in total.

Dabei geht die Richtung in der Frage der luftbeweglichen Komponente dieser Verbände ganz klar in Richtung Luftsturm - im Prinzip schon teilweise in Richtung dessen was die USA vor Dekaden schon mal mit der TRICAP Division angedacht hatten:

Those experiments employed a special battalion tactical group, based on the 31st brigade, suggesting that the size and scope of the concept is considerably different from the Soviet 1980s formulation. Recent reporting by journalists, like Aleksei Ramm, suggests that the 31st brigade has become an experimental unit, with its own army aviation support, composed of two squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. This would give the 31st native air mobility, granting the commander freedom to design and execute an operation. Otherwise, the VDV has to negotiate access to army aviation, which is not necessarily assigned to support it, and may have other competing requirements imposed by ground force operations. Not only would this dramatically reduce the time required for VDV to execute a manoeuvre, but it would add considerable flexibility to the force, though heliborne operations would limit the airborne to light utility vehicles. This force structure redesign would allow the VDV to deploy much faster in response to a local conflict, or execute their own raids behind enemy lines in a conventional war.

Ebenso hier noch ein paar weitere Informationen:

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/...dv-org.htm

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/...-orbat.htm

[Redhead]

Vielen Dank für die Informationen. Sehr Aufschlussreich.

[Quintus Fabius]

Redhead:

Da die russischen Fallschirmjäger sehr weitgehend mit SPz ausgerüstet sind, und seit Jahren immer mehr in Kombination mit Kampfpanzer-Kompanien astrein als mechanisierte Infanterie eingesetzt werden - und oft das Kern-Bataillon für russische mechanisierte Bataillons-Kampfgruppen bilden, dürfte ihre Gliederung im Detail der Kompanien / Züge usw sehr ähnlich und/oder gleich zu dem im folgenden Video gezeigten sein:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=felcqDnfrGA

Aktuell laufen aber auch jede Menge neue Schützenwaffen zu, und verschiedene Einheiten haben sehr unterschiedliche Rüststände was die verfügbaren Systeme angeht.

[Schneemann]

Zur Einführung der neuen TOS-Variante: Es handelt sich um einen Mehrfachraketenwerfer auf vormals T-72-Basis, der Raketen mit thermobarischen Köpfen verfeuern kann, weswegen auch CRBN zuständig ist. Allerdings ist TOS-2 im Grunde ein auf Lastwagen gestütztes System (also nicht von dem Kettenlaufwerk im Artikel irritieren lassen)...

Russia's CBRN Troops test TOS-2 MRL

Russia’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection Troops are testing the TOS-2 Tosochka multiple rocket launcher (MRL), the service’s commander, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, told the Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) newspaper on 13 November. [...] “The TOS-2 is a new weapon system of the CBRN Troops. The first platforms were delivered to the troops this year, and they are going through operational evaluation. The system’s declared specifications were confirmed during Exercise ‘Kavkaz [Caucasus] 2020’,” the general said.

The existing TOS-1A Solntespyok (Sunburn) MRL’s crew protection, accuracy, and lethality are now being upgraded, according to Lt Gen Kirillov.

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-...-tos-2-mrl

Schneemann.

[Quintus Fabius]

Ein paar nteressante Beiträge zur "russischen" Kriegsführung der Gegenwart, ihren Konzepten und ihrer praktischen Umsetzung und was sich daraus für Folgerungen ziehen lassen:

Eine erste grobe Zusammenfassung der strategischen Ebene:

https://mwi.usma.edu/dangerous-myths-ukr...mpetition/

Im weiteren als Video und vor allem auf der operativen Ebene (und darunter, wobei die Russen selbst den Schwerpunkt traditionell auf die Operative Ebene legen):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CMby_WPjk4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14LMmBsDw-g

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-DpW9yaSXiI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t5Uv6RH8eWs