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https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1...1855292423
Zitat:TL;DR "Elite" paratroopers are glorified riot police. They were used as airborne only in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968. In Ukraine 2022 they expected to route a mutiny but faced a regular army and were destroyed
Today they confirmed the death of Russian General Major Suhovetsky. He's unsurprisingly a paratrooper. So let's discuss the role of paratroopers in Russian military doctrine. That'll shed a light on the course of this war and why Russia lost it
Paratroopers hold more legendary status than any other troops in Russia. They are elite force comprising the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. They are supposed to lead the offensive, being dropped behind the enemy lines and holding the ground before the rest of the army comes
Except they aren't used this way. In pretty much every conflict - Afghanistan, Karabakh, Georgia, Chechnya they were used as regular infantry
Since WWII there were only three cases when Russian paratroopers were actually dropped on the enemy from the air:
Hungary 1956
Czechoslovakia 1968
Ukraine 2022
Ergo, paratroopers act as paratroopers only when they don't expect resistance from another regular army
Paratroopers aren't that strong. The firepower of an "elite" paratrooper regiment is way weaker than that of regular, "non-elite" infantry regiment. They can't defeat an army. But they aren't supposed to fight against an army. They are supposed to suppress mutinies and rebellions
The entire concept of VDV, Russian paratroopers makes total sense if we consider that they are not so much soldiers as the riot police. They don't need to fight other regular armies, they need to suppress disorganised mutinies and protests
Das macht vor allem auch deshalb Sinn, weil der Raum der RF so groß ist. Wenn es irgendwo Unruhen gibt kann man mit solchen Truppen viel schneller und eher eingreifen.
Since paratroopers are the shock troops of regime, they absolutely need to look scary to scare off any mutineers. Their entire legendary status is one huge psyop. That's not a secret, really well-trained forces such as those of GRU consider these guys to be fraudsters
For this reason paratroopers absolutely need to be very tall. Physical fitness is not enough, you need to be very big. Why? Because they need to be scary. Because their main weaponry is purely psychological. People should see these big guys and realise resistance is meaningless
Hence the entire "legendary" status, well-developed mythology and iconography. There's no other troops with so developed symbolics, such as paratroopers. Consider this one where Elia the Prophet gets a blue paratrooper beret
Tons of songs, visuals etc are dedicated to paratroopers, more than to any other troops. Why? Again, because VDV are psyop troops and they are powerless without a thoroughly developed mythology. Thus government heavily invests in building this mythology
2nd of August is the VDV day. So every year ex-paratroopers (or whoever decided to west the light blue vest and beret) jump into the public fountains... harass civilians.. and the police. Regular people (or soldiers) would get long prison terms for beating up the cops. But not the paratroopers. They are shock troops of the regime and the regime gonna maintain their badass status. They are so badass because they have full support of the state
That's why "elite" paratroopers comprise the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. It's not a reserve for a big war. Nope. It's a reserve for suppressing mutinies within Russia or in neighbouring countries. And that's largely done through psyops. Thus they work hard to seem scary
When Russia decided to suppress the insurrection in Kazakstan last year, it sent there its glorified riot police - the paratroopers. See the light blue stripes on their vests? Only VDV wears it
Let's be honest, Kremlin sees Ukraine as a rebel province. The very existence of this country is mutiny. And if you need to suppress a riot, you send the riot police. So Putin sent there paratroopers and they were completely routed. Because they didn't expect organised resistance
Russian paratroopers were used as paratroopers only during the suppression of "fascist revolt" in Hungary 1956 and in Czechoslovakia 1968. Why? Because they knew they're not gonna face another regular army there. So they can unleash their psyop without fearing any consequences
When Putin invaded Ukraine he thought he's suppressiing yet another Eastern European mutiny. And sent his riot police expecting Ukrainian army to run or surrender. But it didn't. And once it didn't his entire special operation modelled after Whirlwind 1956 or Danube 1968, failed
Paratroopers were supposed to take control of the main cities and logistical clusters, so the occupation of the country by the army would go smoothly. But Ukrainian army opened fire and they failed. And after that initial failure the entire plan was broken
The most dramatic example of this failure were Russian vehicles stuck in the early spring mud. You see they are trying to put tree logs under its wheels to get it out. Sounds good, doesn't work
Putin expected Ukrainian army to surrender. Unexpectedly not only the army but even regular civilians whom government gave guns started attacking Russian supply lines. Russia didn't plan for war and simply pushed forward with just one army echelon, so supply lines are unguarded
Diesen Punkt muss man hervorheben: Weil die reguläre russische Doktrin in einem Krieg IMMER mehrere Echelons vorsieht die aufeinander folgen. Dadurch greifen folgende Echelons flankierende Feinde in deren Flanken an, sichernn die Nachschublinien welche querbeet durch sie verlaufen und wenn das vorderste Echelon liegen bleibt geht das nächste über dieses hinweg und greift weiter an (das bisherige vorderste wird dann zu einem hinteren Echelon und da es direkt an der Versorgungslinie ist, kann es aufgefüllt und wieder in Stand gesetzt werden.
Die Gliederung in Echelons ist so elementar bei den Russen, dass selbst auf unterster taktischer Ebene immer genau dieses Konzept versucht wird. In der Ukraine wurde es aber genau nicht angewandt.
As a results those columns that pushed forward run out of fuel and simply get stuck on the roads and in the fields. That's the most plausible explanation for this Russian column simply staying in the field and being filmed by civilians
Putin's Blitzkrieg failed because it wasn't a Blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg is a war operation against an enemy who fights. But Russia launched a special operation expecting Ukrainians to surrender. That's why they sent forward their glorified riot police. Of course, they were beaten
They sent only one echelon of troops by land. They wanted to occupy a defenceless country and didn't care about covering their supply lines. Of course they were cut off and now thousands of Russian vehicles are stuck with no fuel
Putin's plan of a special operation failed. It failed for two reasons. Firstly, after 2014 Ukrainians rebuilt their army and state for the imminent clash with Russia. Secondly, when Russia finally attacked, Ukrainians didn't fall for an empty psyop and didn't get scared. And if you don't fear, psyop doesn't work. End
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Vorab nochmal zur Klarstellung: ich teile keineswegs alle Aussagen des Autors, dass hatte ich ja damals auch schon Facilier so geschrieben. Oft fehlt da einiges an Kontext. Dessen ungeachtet gibt es viele Aspekte die so einiges erklären von dem was wir zur Zeit beobachten, und auch ich habe die rusissche Armee anscheinend heillos überschätzt. Aber warum ist sie so schwach? Ein paar Gedanken dazu:
WHY IS THE RUSSIAN ARMY SO WEAK?
https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1...2572854278
Zitat:Russian army isn't used to fight wars against regular armies. It also holds low position in Russian dominance hierarchy. Ruling state security fears rivalry from the military and makes every effort to castrate them
When Russia invaded, experts thought it'd win in 24-72 hours. Two weeks later the war's still going. How come? On paper Russian superiority's overwhelming
Although Russia projects warlike image, its military r weak and don't know how to fight wars
Rein persönlich ging ich bei Kriegsbeginn von zwei Wochen aus.
Notwithstanding with its warlike image, boosted by massive PR campaign, Russian military have nearly zero experience of fighting conventional wars against other regular armies. They were quite successful in suppressing civilian riots ofc, in Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, etc
Das ist ein interessanter und wenig beachteter Fakt: Russland ist vergleichweise gut in COIN. Tatsächlich hat Russland seit Jahrzehnten die meisten COIN Kampagnen gewonnen und selbst in Afghanistan querschnittlich besser abgeschnitten als die NATO. Dazu müsste man mal gesondert etwas schreiben. Keine westliche Nation hat so viele COIN Einsätze siegreich bestanden wie die russische. Das Primat auf Geheimdiensten, klandestinen Operationen, Sondereinheiten, Fallschirmjägern usw welches in einem großen konventionellen Krieg in Kombination mit den besonderen innenpolitischen Umständen die russische Armee so derart schwächt, macht sie zugleich gut in COIN.
Since WWII Russia never fought a conventional war against a regular army. The only exception was Georgia 2008. Russia invaded to support separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and defeated tiny Georgian army. That was the closest Russia had to a real war in last 70 y.
Individual Russian military specialists fought in Korea, Vietnam, Angola etc. But army as a whole did not. Russian military machine, from recruitment to logistics, hasn't been checked in a war against a large regular army since 1945. That's the first experiment we're having now
Since 1945 Russian army fought against enemies neither of which had a regular army of its own. Enemies of Russia had no structure, little training, tiny firepower. To compensate this, Russia heavily invests in propaganda glorifying its military. But what do they really look like?
December 2021. Thieves-in-law imposed tribute on a Russian military base, making NCOs & officers to pay them cash. They specifically target veterans of Syria who earned cash there. They harass, threaten, beat them. Leader of the gang was arrested but released
That's not an exception. That's a rule. Russian military is constantly harassed by thieves and forced to pay money. Just four random headlines on how thieves force literally any military including the ones managing the nuclear rockets to pay them tribute. Russian army is a prey
Ein Staat bzw. eine Armee die so etwas zulassen, sind verdammt. Sie haben keinerlei Zukunft. Die Organisierte Kriminalität hat den russischen Staat übernommen, ist mit ihm deckungsgleich geworden, sie hat aber auch mit ihrer Gefängniskultur die russische Kultur selbst übernommen, den anders sind solche Missstände gar nicht mehr erklärbar.
Let's introduce some sociological context. Russian thieves traditionally portray themselves as the counterculture, the rebels. We don't care about the official law (Law of Cops), we follow only the Law of Thieves. We constitute a parallel state much superior to the official one
Thieves dominate in prisons. Their propaganda is working so well, that many naive prisoners really view thieves as rebels. But then they start doubting the narrative. They wonder, what if thieves play rebels but in reality are actively collaborating with prison administration?
If prisoners refuse to work and try to sabotage the production, thieves will plead, persuade, threaten and then physically force them to resume their work. Thieves may develop very long and complicated argumentation, but with only one imperative - production goals must be met
That's well reflected in culture. Consider, Беспредел - a great movie on how Russian institutional culture (shaped by prison culture) works in reality. A prisoner refuses to work and tells administration. They inform the thieves and that's what happens
And only much later prisoners realise: thieves are not a parallel state. They're just another branch of the same state machine. They're controlled opposition which actively cooperates with authorities, do whatever state commands and never ever cross the line
Thieves racketeering the military, including Syria veterans, nuke personnel is not an "accident". It's a deliberate government policy to keep professional military low in dominance hierarchy. Russian state purposefully keeps its military in this position. It's all part of a plan
If you want, you can dig further into how harassed, how abused and how low in hierarchy the Russian military are. Of course the lowest position ever is taken by conscripts. There are many publications on how conscripts were forced into gay prostitution to earn cash for higher ups
Das hat in Russland noch einen weiterreichenden kulturellen Kontext: der penetrierte ist der Schuldige, und schlußendlich derjenige den man für das was ihm getan wird zur Rechenschaft zieht, dass sind also dann nach russischer Auffassung keine Opfer, sondern Täter gegen die jede Gewalt legitim und geboten ist
Ok, that's all part of a plan. But why would they develop such a plan? Well, higher-ups are afraid of the army. Russian thieves play rebels, being a part of state apparatus. The same way Russia plays a military regime being in fact a state security regime
State security are *not* the military. That's another institution which has very uneasy relations with soldiers. That's understandable. State security will easily suppress any civilian revolt and any guerilla. Thus the only inner force that could overthrow them would be the army
One precaution is to do a cleansing after each military conflict. In peacetime, power of military generals is low. They're bounded by instructions, protocols, guidelines, are overwatched by state security and military prosecutors. But during the war this control nearly disappears
The longer the war lasts, the less procedural and more personal military power becomes. Soon nobody cares about procedures. Everything is done by personal oral orders. Troops get used to unquestioning obedience to a general's word. So you have to do a cleaning up after each war
State security fears potential rivalry from the army. So they introduced several mechanisms of control. One is to do a cleaning up after each war killing generals who got too influential among the troops. And leaving the less infuential ones. That's a negative selection mechanism
Dazu kommt noch der massive Nepotismus. Man kriegt ertragreiche Generalsstellen fast immer nur noch über persönliche Beziehungen, und das völlig ungeachtet der Fähigkeiten.
Kremlin actively promotes state security to the army positions. A typical monologue of a Russian professional military:
1. [Long patriotic speech]
2. Complaints on how he'll never get promoted, cuz all the positions are given to young state security with no military experience
Third layer is extreme, unbelievable antiillectualism among the military officers promoted by the state. If Prussian army was the most intellectual army in Europe, modern Russian is the least. Again, it's not an accident. It's a deliberate policy to minimise this internal threat
Deshalb hat man vor allem anderen die Reformen in der Ausbildung der Offiziere sabotiert und vollständig zurück genommen.
Let's sum up. Kremlin is not maxing efficiency, it's minimising the threat. Recruit as low IQ officers as possible, give them very narrow training. If some officers are capable and rising quickly, kill them. Appoint as many state security to the army to make it more controllable
Entsprechend sickert damit auch das Gedankengut und die interne Kultur von Sicherheitskräften / Geheimdiensten in die Armee ein, und dieses ist für das Kriegführen oft nicht gut geeignet.
To minimise the threat from the army, the ruling state security attacks the army mythos. Why would mafia even dare to racketeer military officers? Because they know in case of conflict the state will back the mafia. These guys stand much higher in Russian hierarchy than soldiers
This explains all these strange phenomena such as thieves harassing the military bases, soldiers being forced into gay prostitution, etc. I don't think Putin personally ordered that (though he might). But he purposefully destroys the army mythos, to eliminate a rival for power
Words cannot describe how low in dominance hierarchy the Russian army is. To get some idea, watch this video from a Russian official TV channel. An officer asks for a minute of silence for "our special operation boys dying there" and see what happens. Army has no respect at all
Conclusions about the Russian artillery-centric army are not wrong. But they must be considered in political context. You must be artillery centric, if you have low morale troops. Nobody respects them, they have no self respect either. They can't stand the close range fight
Das war beispielsweise ein Grund warum die USA im 2WK so stark auf das Infanterie - Artillerie Team setzten. Sie taten dies aus der Erkenntnis der geringen Qualität ihrer Infanterie. Die Russen setzen heute auf ein Panzer - Artillerie Team. Nur dass die daraus resultierenden höheren logistischen Anforderungen in einem ernsthaften Krieg nicht aufrecht erhalten werden können.
If regime trained capable high morale infantry with intelligent officers, it'd constitute a mortal political threat. So it will maintain low morale incapable infantry with the dumbest officers possible and kill brighter ones. Artillery is way to fight *somehow* with these troops
Russian regime pretends to be military. But it's not . Its thinking, language, methods are very state security. On Feb 24 Putin started a Special Operation in Ukraine and on Feb 27 congratulated Russian forces there with the annniversary of the "Day of Special Operation Forces"
Why Feb 27? What happened that day? On Feb 26, 2015 Putin ordered to establish a new holiday, the Day of Special Operation Forces. The first one will be tomorrow, Feb 27, 2015 - and then every year. Next day, Feb 27, 2015 oppositional leader Nemtsov was killed in view of Kremlin
That's their mode of thinking. Killing Nemtsov is a special operation. Invasion of Ukraine is a special operation. Sounds dumb isn't it? Actually it makes sense. Russian regime is regime of cosplayers: state security agents who pretend to be soldiers and desire the military glory
State security playing soldiers launched a Special Operation and accidentally got into a real war. They're scared. You see Shoygu is reporting to Putin "everything's going according to the plan". Watch Putin's body language. He knows it isn't. He doesn't trust the plan himself
Initial Putin's assumptions were wrong. He launched invasion expecting no resistance. 5th Department of FSB which worked on Ukraine reported to Putin that Ukraine is just a cosplay and everyone switches to us the moment we come. Why? They told Putin whatever he wanted to hear
At this point director of 5th department Sergey Beseda and his deputy are under house arrest. They are charged with embezzlement and "low quality intelligence data" he provided. Beseda hugely exaggerated pro-Russian sentiments and lied to Putin regarding the prospects of invasion
That's why Naryshkin, Chief of Foreign Intelligence Service publicly tried to reassure Putin from escalation. He knew Putin's assumptions are wrong. Putin rebuked him and Naryshkin agreed to everything. Notice how he is trembling and stuttering. He already knows they'r all doomed
At this point everyone with half a brain knows Russia lost. Watch Lavrov's body language in Antalya. Russia tried to project strong implacable image but trembling hands and nervous moves of its top officials including Putin himself speak otherwise. They are mortally scared
A loyalist TV host Vladimir Solovyov is Putin's top and highest paid propagandist. For many years Solovyov launched jingoist propaganda, assured everyone of Russian supremacy over anyone including ofc its neighbours and was lavishly rewarded by the regime
That's a real time TV talk between Solovyov and Kedmi - jingoist pundits who always preached Russia would win. They're devastated and can't come up with anything slightly optimistic. Solovyov tells that continuing this operation will lead to Russia's destruction. Watch it all
Regime knows they're fucked. Rats are already escaping from the sinking ship in huge numbers. The problem is - the larger ones can't escape, nobody's gonna accept them. Only the small fish can. Very Orthodox and patriotic MP Milonov escaped to Armenia for example
Milonov ist ein Rechtsextremist der im Prinzip seit Jahren gegen das System Putin ankämpft, weil es ihm nicht ansatzweise radikal genug ist.
Same with oligarchs. Bankers Fridman and Aven are sanctioned and can't leave Russia. But most of their top managers already did (reportedly mostly to the US). Oligarchs are doomed, but their henchmen who were prudent enough to get Western visas or residence are leaving en masse
Metallurgy tycoon Mordashov, owner of Severstal, always projected a very rational, technocratic, no nonsense image. He convened all his top managers who are still in Russia and gave an hour long speech, using the words "to pray/prayer" nine times. Never did before
Officials working in economic policy have very grim view on Russian perspectives. As minister of industry and trade Manturov formulated "import substitution failed because of inability to get foreign components". That kinda sums up the economic history of Putinism
This doesn't meat the regime is delegitimised. I'd say about 2/3 of population support Z-campaign. Loyalists are far more numerous and outspoken than dissidents. They're also much dumber: most of Z folk is just low IQ who don't get what's gonna happen. Smarter ones left already
Dem ist meiner Kenntnis nach nicht so und hier verwechselt der Autor die staatliche Darstellung mit der Realität. Das Gros der Russen ist gegen diese Operation, will aber vor allem anderen seine Ruhe und eigentlich nichts davon wissen.
Listen to this sermon which reflects a message that has an increasing mass support. He's preaching for annexing Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Georgia. "And what is gonna happen with Baltic countries - you can imagine yourself". Public cheers the escalation and imperial expansion
Sputnik and Pogrom - the most prominent Russian nationalist media posted the recording from a captured village documenting "total de-Ukrainisation of everything alive (including the dogs) and absolute Russian happiness". That's far right message, but it's within current discourse
Kazakstan attorney is investigating an ethnic-Russian Kazakh citizen who posted a TikTok video thanking Putin for making her feel safe and believing he'll invade Kazakstan too if Nazism wins here as in Ukraine. However, there are dozens such TikTok's among Russian community there
Of course there are many dissidents in Russia. Here you see a young guy threatening an older driver for putting Z-letter on his bus. He promises to find him later. That reflects a sociological reality: older folk tends to endorse Z-message more often than youngsters
Z-folл constitutes majority. Still, almost all of them are *really* dumb and have no idea of price they're gonna pay. Like an elderly woman who told she supports invasion and doesn't care of sanctions because she is a pensionary and Putin "will not leave her". Soon she's know
Und da muss ich nochmal wiedersprechen. Die Mehrheit der Russen ist weitgehend apolitisch / neutral in dieser Frage. Vor allem anderen wollen sie damit in Ruhe gelassen werden und sie wollen keinen langfristigen persönlichen Schaden davon. Wenn dieser nun doch dadurch eintritt, dann wird es politisch in Russland interessant.
Now Putin is desperately trying to find new manpower for his war. Here you see Assad's Z-troops in Syria who are reportedly preparing to be transported to Ukraine
Arabische Islamisten töten dann also rechtgläubige blonde blauäugige Slawen.
It's important to note that Russian "Wagner" mercenaries are present in many conflict zones, including Africa. Reportedly they're recruiting Central Africans to send them to Ukraine as well. That might turn out to be logistically difficult however
Why would Putin need it? Primarily because all the Russian support for Z-campaign is based on assumption, they're not gonna pay for it. If they are, support will disappear quickly. Putin not only denies he sent conscripts to Ukraine, but orders to investigate those who sent them
Masses support Z cuz they believe they aren't gonna pay a significant price for it. Z-policy works, because it's based on realistic assessment of human intellectual abilities. And vice versa: policies that are based on exaggerated estimation of mass intellect are doomed to fail
I got a reliable info that officials are working hard to supply the supermarkets and to avoid "empty shelves". They think empty shelves will have a really bad impact on the regime's image. Well, good luck with that. They can keep the illusion of business as usual but not for long
Why are the pushing Z so hard? Russia has official fla which isn'tt used much un Ukraine. Why? And the answer is - they made up Z *after* invasion went wrong. They'll try to abandon and forget it later. They don't want to connect Russian flag with a tainted and failed cause
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Aus dem von @Quintus verlinkten Text:
Zitat:December 2021. Thieves-in-law imposed tribute on a Russian military base, making NCOs & officers to pay them cash. They specifically target veterans of Syria who earned cash there. They harass, threaten, beat them. Leader of the gang was arrested but released
Als ich dies las, fiel mir etwas ein. Es ist schon einige Jahre her, grob wohl fünf oder sechs, als ich in einem älteren GEO Epoche Magazin über die Mafia (aus dem Internet: GEO Epoche Nr. 48 - 04/11 - Mafia) einen Beitrag über die sog. "Diebe im Gesetz" durchlas. Sie haben ihren Anfang in den Gulag-Jahren von Stalin genommen - die Strukturen wurden genau genommen schon zuvor geprägt -, und waren in den 1930er recht beliebt bei den Wächtern, da sie eine Art von kriminellen Kapos in den Lagern waren, und weil sie einen eigenen "Kodex" (hochtrabend formuliert) hatten. Es waren knallharte Verbrecher, die aber politisch unverdächtig waren. Es ging soweit, dass man sog. Wory w Sakone gezielt förderte bzw. Gruppen von Wor (etwa 30 Mann) entstehen ließ, um Camps kontrollieren zu können. Einzig: Die Wory durften nicht dem Staat direkt dienen (so ihre interne Ausrichtung).
Als 1941 die Wehrmacht auf den Plan trat und der Sowjetstaat ein Problem bekam, kriselte es aber in den Reihen dieser Ganoven. Wer gegen die "Faschisten" antritt, so die oberste Sowjetführung, und sich tapfer verhält, der bekommt nach dem Krieg eine Chance auf Freilassung. Manche entschieden sich dafür. Und prompt war der Konflikt innerhalb der "Diebe im Gesetz" da. Manche hielten sich an den "Kodex", manch andere entschieden sich für die Rote Armee (sie wurden innerhalb dieser Banden als verachtete Suki - Hunde - angesehen). Nach 1945 machten sich die sowjetischen Behörden einen Spaß daraus, diese beiden Flügel gegeneinander zu hetzen. Die Folge war ab 1948 ein mehrjähriger "Lagerkrieg" mit ungezählten Toten unter den Gefangenen, und die Wory unterlagen (!) - wohl auch wegen der verschwiegenen Unterstützung der Suki durch die Geheimpolizei. Weil genehme Ganoven sind dem Staat lieber als unangenehme. Ganoven bleiben es dennoch.
Es gibt Spekulationen, dass die Wory ausgerechnet durch Chruschtschow ab etwa 1956/57 wieder groß wurden, als dieser die Entstalinisierung anstieß, da sie von da an sich langsam wieder stabilisieren konnten. Und die Wory haben sich vom langsam zerfallenden Gulag ausgebreitet und neue Verdienstfelder gesucht. Erst in der Landwirtschaft (1960er), dann in der Versorgungsindustrie (1970er), dann ab grob den späten 1980ern auch die Armee.
Und es sollte mich doch irritieren, wenn sie sich nicht nach den überaus traumatischen (für die russische Gesellschaft) und wüsten 1990ern heute weiter an der Armee bereichern würden. Zumal unter einem so korrupten Regime, wie jenem von Putin, sie wohl kaum Kontrollen fürchten müssten, so lange sie "mit den Wölfen heulen". Nur liest man eben nicht mehr viel über sie...
Schneemann
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Staat und organisierte Kriminalität sind in Russland unter Putin im Endeffekt fließend ineinander übergegangen. Putin selbst war ja gerade in seinen Anfangsjahren teilweise erstaunlich eng mit einigen Größen der organisierten Kriminalität verbandelt, beispielsweise mit Aslan Usoyan u.a.
Diese stellen heute im Endeffekt auch eine 5. Kolonne für Russland in anderen Ländern dar und es ist nicht so, dass man nicht unendlich viel über sie lesen könnte, es interessiert nur kaum einen. Beispielsweise gibt es in dieser Bundesrepublik vermutlich um die 50.000 Angehörige der organisierten Kriminalität aus Russland.
Es ist demgegenüber geradezu verblüffend wie wenig real gegen sie getan wird. Ein wesentliches Problem hierbei ist die aktuelle völlig verfehlte Einwanderungspolitik und der Umgang mit Migranten im allgemeinen. Wir müssten diese Personen zum einen radikal aus der EU entfernen, zum anderen ersatzlos ihre Vermögenswerte beschlagnahmen. Letztgenanntes müsste EU Weit massiv getan werden, hier hängen aber längst gewisse EU Staaten wie Zypern, Griechenland, Malta u.a. weit in dieser Misere drin.
Aber in Schland erfreuen wir uns lieber daran dass Prostitution angeblich ein normaler Beruf ist und von selbstbewussten starken Frauen ausgeübt wird und ignorieren halt mal die Realität, dass im Bordell Europas mehrere zehntausend Sexsklavinnen welche sich die Russenmafia hierzulande hält jeden Tag mehrfach vergewaltigt werden, und diskutieren bei einem edlen Biowein am Abend in unserem Reiheneckaus lieber über den Biorollrasen vom Nachbarn und wie man das Weltklima retten könnte. Ein Hoch auf die Menschenrechte und so.....
Mit den vielen Ukrainern wird jetzt wenigstens auch die ukrainische organisierte Kriminalität mal so richtig hierher kommen. Dann haben die in Zukunft wenigstens mehr Konkurrenz.
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Über russische Panzerfahrzeuge:
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...g-vehicles
Zitat:Technical Reflections on Russia’s Armoured Fighting Vehicles
What Does It All Mean?
The first point to note is that every single tank design is a series of compromises. It is the responsibility of the design team to balance mobility, firepower, and protection to meet the customer’s needs. Because of this, Russian and Soviet tanks are not inherently flawed, the autoloader was a conscious decision made to improve mobility and provide enough protection for its original role. They have certain weaknesses in modern warfare, but all designs will have some weakness, be that weight, cost, firepower, or limited protection. In sum, the perfect tank doesn’t exist.
The second point is that this article does not cover Russia’s other armoured fighting vehicles, such as the BMP-3 and BTR-82 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). These vehicles typically have favoured protection to the front, and rarely carry the advanced composite armours of Western IFVs, which would enable them to withstand heavy machine gun and cannon fire to the sides. They often lack mine blast protection too, which places them at a disadvantage when an opponent is comfortable using land mines and improvised explosive devices. However, the same caveats apply as with tanks: they are designed to be used in a certain way that emphasises their strengths in firepower and mobility.
The third and final point is the need to consider of Russian tactics and doctrine, which typically emphasise combined arms operations with a view to creating opportunities for artillery and close air support to deliver overwhelming force onto an opponent. Mission command – the delegation of authority and creativity to the lowest levels – rarely features in Russian training. This means that armoured formations operating independently from their supporting arms are probably doing something that they are not trained to do. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this factor, and failure to take it into account has previously led analysts to incorrectly write off Russian-made armour.
For example, the poor performance of Iraq’s Russian-made T-72 tanks during Operation Desert Storm led many analysts to question their utility against Western main battle tanks. However, subsequent simulations of the Battle of 73 Easting run using the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory’s JANUS system showed that when the Iraqi crews were modelled as using effective combined arms tactics including reconnaissance and infantry support, they inflicted 50 vehicle losses – over 70% of the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment’s strength at the battle – despite losing overall. This was despite the model incorporating the M1 Abrams’ advantages in areas such as range and thermal sights, as well as the effects of US air supremacy. Overall, Russian armour is relatively capable; it must contend with past design decisions that can expose the crew to risk, but images of destroyed tanks rarely provide an idea of the impact that vehicles had upon the fighting before they were destroyed. It is therefore important to put Russian armour into context and understand that it is likely more capable at a technical level than the war in Ukraine suggests.
Anbei noch eine kurze Anmerkung: in der Ukraine operiert auch eine kleinere Zahl von neuesten russischen Kampfpanzern, T-90M, von diesen wurde bis dato noch kein einziger abgeschossen, auch interessant. Das hängt natürlich an einem ganzen Faktorenbündel, beispielsweise dürften die BTG welche diese Panzer haben auch sonst im Schnitt wesentlich besser ausgerüstet und trainiert sein und die Panzer dürften daher auf ausgesuchte Eliteeinheiten konzentriert sein etc
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https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/russi...ary-power/
The collapse of the Russian military machine
Zitat:It is symptomatic that when the Russian military command sought to compensate for battlefield losses by bringing tanks out of storage, it discovered that in many cases vital hi-tech equipment like gyros and target finders had been stripped and gone missing. Entire engine blocks had been removed; for example, in Boguchar, Voronezh Oblast, 40 percent of the equipment in long-term storage proved inoperable. Tellingly, agents of the Federal Security Service (FSB) sent to Ukraine to recruit pro-Russian elements for a new government reportedly had pocketed the funds provided and submitted false reports, causing U.S. intelligence to warn about success in such endeavors. The operation of the dreaded Russian agency thus proved to be another house of cards.
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Treffen folgende Punkte des Videos aus eurer Sicht auf die russischen Streitkräfte zu:
- Ausbildungsdefizit der Armee
- Mangel an Unteroffizieren und zu kurze Dienstzeiten
- Aufgrund der anscheinend immer noch vorherrschenden Misshandlungen in der Armee ist der Militärdienst in Russland extrem unpopulär
- Letztendlich herrscht in der Armee die gleiche Kultur vor, wie im russischen Staat an sich
- interessant fand ich auch, dass die russisch Armee aus Mangel an Vertrauen zu ihren Soldaten selbstständiges Operieren nicht ausbilden würde
uvm.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJXjr2CKMH4
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Dem würde ich so schon zustimmen, aber bezüglich der Popularität des Dienstes anmerken, dass hier die Frage komplexer ist. Es gibt durchaus Gruppen in Russland bei denen der Militärdienst populär ist.
Zum einen bestimmte ethnische Minderheiten, welche schlicht und einfach Söldner sind. Es gibt Gebiete in der RF, in denen es deutlich mehr Bewerber fürs Militär als offene Stellen gibt. Entsprechend sind ethnische Minderheiten in den russischen Streitkräften drastisch überrepräsentiert.
Zum anderen bestimmte verelendete Kreise des Proletariats, das russische Äquivalent von White Trash. Nur dass dieses Soldatenmaterial in Russland ziemliche Defizite mit sich bringt aufgrund seiner Sozialisierung und damit die Unkultur seiner Abstammung weitgehend in die Streitkräfte hinein trägt.
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Sehr schöne Bilder russischer Panzer- und anderer Fahrzeuge für die Parade 2022:
https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/
Wirklich sehenswert !
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https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archiv...ne/629803/
Zitat:These sorts of combined operations involve hundreds of aircraft and thousands of people in a tightly choreographed dance that takes a lifetime to master. But when managed correctly, these overlapping operations allow a military to dominate the skies, making life much easier for the ground or naval forces below.
Unfortunately for the Russians, the recent modernization of the Russian air force, although intended to enable it to conduct modern combined operations, was mostly for show.
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@Quintus
Zitat:Sehr schöne Bilder russischer Panzer- und anderer Fahrzeuge für die Parade 2022:
https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/
Wirklich sehenswert !
Ich frage mich eben, was das für eine Waffe war, die recht weit unten (etwa nach 2/3 des Bilddurchlaufes) zu sehen war, eine Art Sturmgewehr mit Aufsätzen, die wie drei kleine weiße Dinosauriereier aussehen? Ist das eher eine Riot-Control-Waffe? Oder sind dies Granataufsätze?
Schneemann
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Vielen Dank für den Beitrag über die Russischen Luftlandetruppen. Sehr klein die Einheiten. Fragen an die Profis unter euch. Was hält ihr von der Organisation?
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Für eine luftbewegliche Operation ist dass meiner Ansicht nach eine sehr gute Aufstellung. Die Frage ist halt, was für einen militärischen Wert solche Operationen heute überhaupt noch haben. Die Beantwortung dieser Frage hängt dann im weiteren stark vom Szenario und dessen genauen Umständen ab.
Klein, hochbeweglich, mit vergleichsweise viel Feuerkraft im Verhältnis zur Mannzahl ist an sich immer positiv. Kritisch zu hinterfragen sind die Luftlande-Panzer. Zum einen sind sie zu wenig geschützt - was man aber mit Hardkill-Systemen deutlich ändern könnte. Zum anderen machen sie die eigentliche Infanterie de facto abhängig von der Feuerkraft dieser Panzerfahrzeuge, weil diese einen wesentlichen Teil der Kampfkraft liefern sollen. Aber: man wird in einem realen Krieg diese Fahrzeuge in sehr vielen Fällen einfach nicht zusammen mit der Infanterie einsetzen können. Das ganze Konzept luftbeweglich eingesetzter Panzer ist höchst fragwürdig / diskutabel. Und in einem assymetrischen Szenario / Guerillakrieg / COIN fehlt diesen Panzerfahrzeugen der notwendige Schutz gegen Minen / USBV etc in einem großen konventionellen Krieg wären wiederum die Schwimmfähigkeit, die hohe Querfeldeinbeweglichkeit und die geringe Größe und Signatur wesentliche Vorteile (hier spielt dann auch die passive Panzerung eine viel geringere Rolle, weil angesichts von Artillerie / Drohnen etc irrelevant. Aber wie schon geschrieben: gerade in so einem Krieg werden diese Fahrzeuge meist nicht dabei sein, was für einen Sinn hat also ein Konzept, dass auf die Präsenz solcher Panzerfahrzeuge abzielt, aber nicht gewährleisten kann, dass sie da sind wo die ihnen zugehörige Infanterie agiert?
Beschließend muss man betonen, dass dies eine rein theoretische Ideal-Aufstellung ist, und die praktische Realität in den russischen Luftlandetruppen ganz anders aussieht. Da fehlen überall etliche der hier gezeigten Systeme.
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Einsatz "russischer" Mikro-Drohnen durch Speznaz:
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/15400...21/photo/3
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/15400...21/photo/1
Hersteller ist folgende Firma:
https://www.dji.com/de/camera-drones
Um den Begriff Speznaz hier nochmal klarzustellen, dass sind teils höchst unterschiedliche Truppen. Das reicht von einfachen Aufklärungseinheiten welche überwiegend aus Wehrpflichtigen bestehen bis hin zu Anti-Terror-Einheiten. Speznaz wird einfach als Begriff für Spezialist verwendet. Die meisten Speznaz sind schlicht und einfach bessere Aufklärungs-Einheiten mit einem hohen Anteil leichter / infanteristischer Aufklärungskräfte oder de facto LRRP Einheiten. Deshalb haben die meisten Speznaz Einheiten eigentlich gar keinen direkten Kampfauftrag, auch wenn sie oft für so etwas missbraucht werden.
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