(Europa) Streitkräfte der russischen Föderation

[Quintus Fabius]

Ich krame gerade in alten PDF Dokumenten rum und sortier die, und kam dabei über das folgende (welches auch immer noch im Netz steht):

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130048/pub1069.pdf

RUSSIAN LESSONS LEARNED IN THE WAR
WITH GEORGIA

Despite the fact that the war with Georgia resulted in a victory for Russia, the performance of the Russian military in the war has been the subject of significant discussion and criticism in the almost 2 years
since the war ended. President Dmitri Medvedev himself named five areas of reform that must be emphasized going forward: bringing all combat formations to permanent-readiness status (i.e., elimination
of cadre units); raising the effectiveness of command and control systems; improving the system of officer
training; upgrading equipment with a focus on PGMs; and improving pay, housing, and social amenities for
kontraktniky and officers.83 Approaching the problem from a different level, Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, former Chief of the Main Combat Training and Service Directorate, identified the key problems
exposed by the war as poor interoperability between the air force and ground forces, poor communications capabilities, and the low resolution of Russian reconnaissance systems, especially UAVs.84 As Mikhail Barabanov, editor and co-author of Tanks of August, noted, Though from the position of unsophisticated extraneous observers one saw a quick, massive and decisive action of the Russian army and successful crushing of the Georgian armed forces, in reality, as became completely clear, the experience of the utilization of the Russian armed forces in conflict was considered sufficiently contradictory by the political-military leadership of the RF, which led in the end to a new
stage of radical military reform, the one which has as its goal bringing the armed forces of the country to a
“new look,” oriented, first of all, towards participation in local conflicts in the territory of the former USSR. An adviser to the Minister of Defense of Russia told Dr. Cohen that the war confirmed that Russia needs to spend most of its efforts and procurement funds on building a smaller, more maneuverable, and
rapidly deployable army to defend its borders, not fight a world war. “This is where the money goes, de-
spite losing over 50 percent of the budget to graft.” Finally, Russian military analysts have concluded that
although the war validated the concept of joint operations, it also demonstrated that the Russian armed
forces have a long way to go before they are capable of operating in a truly joint manner. Readiness was a major issue as well—a survey of the Russian military completed after the war showed that only 17 percent of army units and 5 out of 150 air force regiments were combat-ready. Thus, the requirements for reform dictated by Russian performance in the war with Georgia are ample and fundamental, and seem to be acknowledged by both the political and military leadership of the country.

ff Equipment, Doctrine etc

Es ist schon erstaunlich, dass alle Probleme welche die Russen heute in der Ukraine haben bereits 2011 vollumfänglich in Russland bekannt waren, auch im Westen bekannt waren und es von da ab eigentlich eine vollständige Modernisierung und Reformierung des russischen Streitkräfte hätte geben sollen, stattdessen ist man im Endeffekt auf dem Stand von 2011 stehen geblieben und hat in der Realität einfach nichts erreicht. 12 Jahre einfach nichts. Und das bei einem Staat der sich mehr als andere vor allem immer auf seine militärische Stärke berufen hat.