13.03.2022, 09:19
Das kann man nur unterstreichen: die Kämpfer des Azow Regimentes können sich nicht ergeben, gerade deshalb kämpfen sie so erbittert und versuchen mit allen Mitteln das unvermeidbare Ende hinaus zu zögern. Wenn die bestimmten Truppen die da auf russischer Seite kämpfen in die Hände fallen, erwartet sie nur ein sehr langsamer und äußerst qualvoller Tod. Ich will sogar an dieser Stelle mal behaupten, dass Mariopol vor allem deshalb noch nicht gefallen ist. Und umgekehrt halte ich die Gerüchte dass die Kämpfer von Azow Zivilisten als Schutzschilde missbrauchen und auch auf fliehende Zivilisten feuern bzw. diese an der Flucht hindern für höchstwahrscheinlich wahr. Noch ein Gedanke von mir dazu ist, dass die ukrainische Armeeführung dies mit Absicht so herbei geführt hat, um die Kämpfer von Azow auf diese Weise organisch und nachhaltig los zu werden. Den die werden in der Ukraine durchaus auch als ein Problem gesehen. So werden sie post mortem Helden der Ukraine und stören im realen Leben die Politik nicht weiter.
Allgemein:
Tageszusammenfassung für Tag 16:
Allgemein:
Tageszusammenfassung für Tag 16:
Zitat:Gesamtkarte:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15025...92/photo/1
1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 16: Russian forces initiate an operational pause to refit and reorganize after failed attempts to encircle Kyiv. The Ukrainians continue to harass Russian supply routes and hold key cities of Kharkiv, Mariupol, and Mikolaiyv.
2/ A few updates of note to the overall Theater of War graphic. Internally displace persons are now indicated. An estimated casualty table has been reintroduced and notes the differences of reporting among various sources.
3/ Humanitarian Impact. UN sources report more than 2.5 million refugees have now fled Ukraine. Another 1.8 million persons are displaced in Ukraine. Indiscriminate attacks of civilians continue to mount. Mariupol suffers over 1,500 killed since start of siege.
4/ Weather assessment. Improved visibility and wind speed throughout Ukraine will increase the frequency of VKS air and missile attacks. Freezing temperatures and snow showers hamper tactical movement, morale of Russian forces, and vehicle maintenance.
Karte:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15025...86/photo/1
5/ Kyiv AO assessment. Russian attacks made no gains from 8-10 March. Most operations conducted on 11 March consisted of raids and reconnaissance according to the Ukrainians. Operations against Nizhyn have remained stalled for at least a week.
Karte:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15025...47/photo/1
6/ Northeast AO assessment. Counterattacks in NE Kyiv and the Chernihiv-Nizhyn area have yielded important gains for Ukrainian forces. Russian forces continue to struggle with securing multiple lines of communication. A major attack on Sumy is highly likely.
Karte:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15025...79/photo/1
7/ Kharkiv and Donbas AO assessments. Russian & Separatist forces continue to make incremental gains, most notably north of Mariupol. The Russians are assessed not to have enough combat power to seize Mariupol, they will continue to shell the city into submission.
Karte:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15025...57/photo/1
8/ The Southern AO assessment. An advance on Mikolalyv remains the focus of Russian operations; however, poor weather conditions (snow and below -10 C) is exacerbating low morale caused by poor logistical support and heavy combat loses.
9/ Aerospace Assessment. The VKS launched new air and missile strikes against targets in western and central Ukraine (Lutsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zhytomyr, and Dnipro). Targets appeared to be airfields and command nodes; however civilian targets were also hit.
10/ The UAF remains effective against VKS sorties, degrading an already lackluster air-ground integration support of Russian ground forces by close air support sorties. Ukraine continues to press the west for more sophisticated ADA systems.
11/ Electromagnetic Sphere. Russian communications continued to be challenged. It is becoming clear from captured equipment that VDV units are generally outfitted with encrypted radios while most units have to rely on unencrypted HF radios or cell phones.
12/ Captured Russian Soldiers cite their frustration with the lack of proper long-range communication equipment, stating that forward units easily become cutoff from headquarters rendering them directionless, prone to becoming lost, and unsupported.
13/ Information War. The Russian populace remains largely susceptible to state media propaganda. Russian citizens do want to know what is going on, but they walk a fine line between wanting to know the truth and act on it and avoiding repression or arrest.
14/ But the reality of the cost of the war, both economically and physically (as large numbers of dead Russian Soldiers return home), is placing strain on Putin’s state-media machine to illicit compliance and obedience to the Kremlin’s war narrative.
15/ Russian Foreign Fighters. As Russian forces struggle to press reservists into forward units, Putin has stated Russia will accept and aid foreign volunteers of their own (mainly Syrian) into the fight to counter western mercenaries.
16/ It is highly likely that Syrian Arab Army (SAA) units may deploy to Ukraine. Such a move would open the doorway for various Russian proxy-forces to be brought into active combat against Ukraine, increasing the likelihood of brutal urban combat.
17/ Battle Damage Assessment. Ukrainian equipment losses are harder to assess, as there is a lack of information regarding these losses compared to Russian. Ukrainian equipment fall victim to capture as well, and aid Russian forces to replenish losses.
18/ Russian Overall Assessment. Russian forces still struggle to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. These challenges are systemic, small units still display poor employment of tactics while commander’s struggle with control of maneuver.
19/ Russia seems increasingly likely to place intense pressure on Belarus to become an active participate in the conflict rather than a logistics hub. Likewise, Russian claims of Ukrainian WMDs signals Russia’s intent on employing these types of weapons.
20/ Putin is looking to radically alter the psychogeography of the current conflict to sow doubt in Ukraine’s incredible conviction that they can resist the Russian invasion with their current level of resistance. By raising the cost, he hopes to crush Ukraine’s will.
21/ Ukrainian Overall Assessment. The Ukrainian government feels it has turned an important strategic corner in surviving the initial Russian onslaught and sees a path toward victory. Battlefield realities support this assessment.
22/ What remains to be seen is if Ukrainian conviction in victory can hold past a WMD attack and the introduction of Russian foreign fighters into combat. This sustainment of Ukraine’s will to resist will be strenuously tested in the aftermath of Russian WMD attacks.
23/ The Moral Sphere. It is important to remember that war is won or lost in the heart and the mind. Moral is a link between will and action, it animates the human element in a concentrated direction with determination to achieve a goal.
24/ This is the controlling force of military action which guides organized movement, the endurance to withstand hardships, and influence’s purpose field commanders and national leaders imbue to inspire confidence in success. Moral victory is the keystone of total victory.