Special Operation Forces

[Quintus Fabius]

Eine meiner Ansicht nach recht gelungene Zusammenstellung von Informationen über die niederländischen Kommmando-Einheiten:

https://www.korpscommandotroepen.nl/wp-c...nglish.pdf

Das Korps Commandotroepen wird meiner Meinung nach sehr unterschätzt. Was mir bei denen immer gefallen hat war, dass sie meiner Meinung nach irgendwie gedanklich freier und unkonventioneller waren als andere und dass sie die Ausrüstung nicht so hoch gewichten (im Vergleich). Das zeigt sich selbst in Kleinigkeiten wie beispielsweise an den Klamotten mit denen sie in Afghanistan rumgegeistert sind.

[Quintus Fabius]

Über nicht-staatliche Sondereinheiten und deren strategische Effekte:

https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/al-aqs...perations/

Tailor-building a small unit to achieve specific outcomes can provide two main opportunities for an actor. First is economy of force. The placement of the specific element at the right time and place can generate effects that larger organizations cannot.

Second, employing elements to achieve outsized effects can help decision-makers reimagine the possibility of an outcome by employing innovative means. The Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command’s motto “Make the Impossible, Possible” directly speaks to this point of expanding options.

Special operations can also provide additional options to influence the will and perception of both friendly and enemy actors. Such operations can demonstrate acumen and guile, be designed to embarrass the enemy, or bolster the morale of supporters.

Israel is not the only state to be surprised by violent non-state special operations. The 2007 Karbala raid, for example, executed by Asaib al-Haq militia members disguised as U.S special forces, succeeded in taking hostages at a U.S. military base in Iraq. As these examples proliferate, it is becoming increasingly clear that states’ monopoly over special operations is over.

The growing proliferation of military technologies, coupled with the consistent underestimation of militant groups, is allowing non-state actors to take on states and demonstrate the power to hurt.

In einem gewissen ähnlichen Kontext:

https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/rewind...alexander/

In 2018, Leo Blanken, Kai Thaxton, and Michael Alexander wrote “Shock of the Mundane: The Dangerous Diffusion of Basic Infantry Tactics” for War on the Rocks, in which they argued that “the marginal improvement of tactical prowess in violent non-state groups may lead to outcomes that have strategic implications for global U.S. counter-terrorist and counter-insurgent operations.”

https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/shock-...y-tactics/

Conventional wisdom focuses on technological superiority as the key source of American dominance on the battlefield. Even though the United States is clearly still struggling at the strategic level in its fight against terrorists and insurgents, it is supremely confident in its ability to defeat these groups in combat at the tactical level, due in no small part to technological advantages such as total air superiority, remote surveillance, command-and-control systems, precision munitions, and night-vision capabilities. Observers are largely focused on these technologies – such as drones and night-vision goggles – and their potential diffusion to violent non-state actors. What has been overlooked in the debate over the combat potential of violent extremists is the diffusion of something much more rudimentary and potentially more lethal: basic infantry skills. These include coordinated small-team tactical maneuvers supported by elementary marksmanship. The diffusion of such tactics seems to be underway, and it may generate serious concerns for U.S. security policy in the future if ignored.

Wir verlassen uns viel zu sehr auf Technik, und Fähigkeiten degenerieren demgegenüber, während der Feind, welcher aus Mangel an Finanzen sich diese Technik so nicht leisten kann, die Fähigkeit als militärischen Wert explorieren muss und darin im Verhältnis immer besser wird.

We need to remember that humans are more important than hardware. The welter of debate over high technology widgets has obscured the fact that technologies are leveraged by individuals and organizations. Biddle wrote a prescient article back in 1996 entitled “Victory Misunderstood” about the implications of the 1991 Gulf War in which he challenged the hypothesis that technology would be the deciding factor on 21st century battlefields. His analysis showed that basic soldiering skills were crucial to the lopsided victory over Iraqi forces. He argued that technology may simply “be magnifying the effects of skill differentials on the battlefield. If so, then a given skill imbalance may be much more important today than in the past”.

[Quintus Fabius]

Ein weiteres Musterbeispiel für die ritualisierte Kriegsführung des Westens TM, welcher zumindest Westeuropa kollektiv das Genick brechen wird:

https://warisboring.com/five-sas-soldier...de-bomber/

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defence said: “We hold our personnel to the highest standards and any allegations of wrongdoing are taken seriously.

“Where appropriate, any criminal allegations are referred to the service police for investigation.”

Die verlogene Heuchelei von "militärischer" Führung und Politik regt mich hierbei noch weniger auf, als die aus dieser heuchlerischen ritualisierten Kriegsführung resultierende Kriegsunfähigkeit.